Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

138. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President¹

Washington, August 9, 1957.

Dear Mr. President: In response to your letter of 8 July,² we have again assessed each project in our current guided missile program. This reassessment has confirmed the remarks I made at the 3 July presentation³ to the effect that this program can and must be reduced to meet budget limitations. In fact, as you will remember, we indicated we were critically reviewing the Navaho system. On 8 July, the Air Force recommended the cancellation of this program and I approved this recommendation the following day. This action will reduce the cost projections of the missile programs as presented to you by $1,948 million for the FY 1958–FY 1963 time period and will have an undetermined effect on FY 1958 expenditures. Except for the Navaho, in view of the complex inter-relationship between projected missile force structures and those of other weapons systems, I cannot, at this time, give you more than an indication of the areas wherein other reductions will be made.

The first of these refers to the apparent overlapping of the Nike and Talos programs that you indicated in your 8 July letter. I wish to assure you that these programs were very critically reviewed before I authorized the Army to go ahead with the addition of a land-based Talos program for modernization of the Nike systems. We were convinced at the time that a combination of these two systems would ultimately result in a more effective air defense than the same dollars could buy of either system alone. In our presentation to you, since the rate of build-up has not yet been specifically defined for either the land-based Talos or the Nike–Hercules, we showed these two programs in an additive way. It is my intention that this Talos program will be balanced by a commensurate reduction in the Nike-Hercules program. For this reason, the over-all totals presented to you can be reduced by the $701 million planned for FY 1958 through FY 1963 for the Talos. Moreover, I fully expect that the finally approved Nike-Hercules-Talos total force based on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be substantially less than the total force now projected for Nike-Hercules alone. In the final analysis it is still possible that the Army version of the Talos might be dropped.

The reductions resulting in the Navaho and Nike-Talos systems which can be specifically defined at this time are shown in the following table:

	FY 58	FY 59	FY 60	FY 61	FY 62	FY 63	Totals
	Millions of Dollars
Navaho Reductions	159	269	420	500	466	134	1,948
Nike-Talos Reduction	61	221	278	117	19	5	701
Total Reduction	220	490	698	617	485	139	2,649

Regarding the other examples referred to in your letter of 8 July, the following remarks are pertinent:

(a) Jupiter–Thor—Steps are under way to consolidate these projects into a national land-based IRBM program. The mechanism for accomplishing this was given in my letter of 31 July 1957.⁴

(b) Atlas–Titan—This was also reported in my letter of 31 July 1957.

(c) Terrier–Tartar—The Navy requirement for these two missiles stems from the need for an air defense capability to replace 5-inch guns on ships with limited storage space. Both missiles are produced By the same manufacturer, with about 70% interchangeability in components. This is essentially one program. The Tartar operates without the separate Terrier booster, which reduces its operational capability. Space problems aboard ship make this necessary.

(d) Polaris–Triton—Discussions are under way with the Navy which may result in the phasing out of either Regulus II or Triton; a possible alternative would be [to] reduce the presently planned scopes of these programs to carry them both forward within the cost projected for Regulus II alone. Development of the Polaris missile will be carried on with a high defense priority. As pointed out in our presentation of 3 July 1957, this missile will provide many logistic and strategic advantages. In addition to its use on submarines we are giving serious consideration to its use as a land-based IRBM with a range of from 300 to 1500 miles. If this development is successful, it might at least in part supersede the Thor–Jupiter IRBM and should then be picked up by the Air Force for their mission.

Although we do not now anticipate further missile eliminations before 1 October 1957, a second area for possible reduction lies in a detailed review which I have instituted to determine to what extent certain missile force projections can or should be reduced.

Since the bulk of the projected funding needs are directly related to force requirements, I am reviewing the missile force projections, particularly as they are affected by related aircraft and ordnance weapons systems, as a part of my review of the over-all military force projection. In this manner the missile program adjustments will be kept consistent with the adjustments of related aircraft and ordnance programs.

The missiles to be reviewed are:

Surface-to-Air Missiles	Action
Nike-Hercules (A)	Review of force projection
Talos (A)	Review of force projection
Bomarc (AF)	Review of force projection
Hawk (A)	Review of force projection

Air-to-Surface Missiles
B–52 ASM (AF)	Program review
B–58 POD (AF)	Program review

Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Lacrosse (A)	Program review
Redstone (A)	Review of force projection
Regulus II (N)	Program review

As was stressed in our presentation to you on 3 July 1957, certain programs will be phased out during the development cycle; others will not be carried into operational use; and in other programs there will be a general scaling down of force requirements when confronted with a realistic appraisal of the resources available and the complementary weapons systems already existent. We expect to have certain actions completed in time to effect expenditures during FY 1958 and to provide for a sound FY 1959 budget and to continue our efforts to bring the program into proper balance thereafter.

I assure you, Mr. President, that your aims are fully appreciated and that the effort to attain them will be prosecuted on an urgent basis. I shall report significant progress to you as appropriate.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

C. E. Wilson

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Missiles. Secret.
2. In this letter to Secretary Wilson, the President congratulated the Department of Defense on its “superior and most informative” presentation on missile programs to the NSC on July 3, and he asked Wilson to give him his recommendations not later than August 15 on any additional missile programs which could be eliminated before October 15. (Ibid. )
3. See Document 126.
4. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but quoted under agenda item 10 in Document 134.