Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

105. Memorandum of Discussion at the 309th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 11, 1957¹

Washington, January 11, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Ballistic Missiles Programs (NSC Actions 1433–a, 1484 and 1615–c²)

Mr. Robert Cutler, newly reappointed Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, explained the nature of this agenda item, and called on Secretary Wilson. The latter in turn introduced Dr. E. V. Murphree, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on the missiles programs. Dr. Murphree indicated that he would make some general comments on the long-range ballistic missiles programs and would leave the details of each program to be treated subsequently by the representatives of the three Military Services. (The reports of Dr. Murphree and the Service representatives are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)³

Dr. Murphree stated that, thanks to significant technical advances in the course of the year 1956, the outlook for success in achieving the objectives of the ICBM and IRBM programs was much more promising. He reminded the members of the Council that by determination of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force was to have operational responsibility for the ICBM and for the land-based IRBM. The Navy was to have operational responsibility for the ship-based IRBM.

Dr. Murphree went on to indicate the considerable differences between the two ICBM missiles, Atlas and Titan, which were in the course of being developed. It was the present plan of the Defense Department to carry both the Atlas and the Titan programs to the point at which an initial operational capability would have been achieved with both missiles. He stated that the serious problem of reentry showed every likelihood of being solved, although, of course, we had no actual flight data as yet and would not have such data until next year.

With respect to the IRBM, Dr. Murphree said there were likewise two different missiles in the course of development, the Jupiter and the Thor. The first flight tests of the IRBM would occur in the very near future. It ought to be possible by the end of the calendar year 1957 to tell which of these two missiles was the more promising. But due to the great importance and urgency of achieving an IRBM capability, the Defense Department had decided to carry both the Thor and Jupiter programs forward through the calendar year 1957. Thereafter the move effective missile program would be carried forward and the other dropped.

After a brief comment on the estimated future costs of these missiles programs, Dr. Murphree indicated that it was the hope of the Defense Department that the British would build bases for the IRBM in the United Kingdom and would assume operational responsibility for the IRBM. From a number of points of view the British Isles offered the most advantageous location for IRBM bases.

After a brief comment on the development of Soviet long-range ballistic missiles capabilities, Dr. Murphree indicated that the representatives of the Services would discuss these programs in greater detail. The first report would be on the Air Force program, which would be presented by General Schriever.

With the aid of slides, General Schriever first discussed the “ICBM Development Timetable”. He was also optimistic with respect to the likelihood of a solution of the re-entry problem, basing his judgment on tests conducted to date and practically terminated at this point. It was the Air Force’s hope to have the first operational ICBM ready at a date early in 1959.

General Schriever then indicated the major difference between the Atlas 1½-stage missile and the 2-stage Titan missile. In so doing he was assisted by models of these missiles which had been brought to the Cabinet Room. He predicted that the first launching of the flight test missile Atlas would occur in the course of 1957. The first guided flight of an Atlas missile was likely to occur in 1958. The corresponding dates for tests of the Titan missile would be approximately one year behind the similar developments on Atlas.

Thereafter, and again with the aid of slides, General Schriever outlined the “Initial Operational Capability Force Build-up”. He noted that the program called for the first three launchers to be operational by the spring of 1959. The ultimate objective of the program was eight squadrons of missiles, four Atlas and four Titan.

General Schriever then turned to the Air Force IRBM program which was developing the Thor missile. As in the case of the ICBM, General Schriever outlined in the first instance the IRBM initial operational capability force build-up. He stated that the first launching of the Thor missile should come very soon in the current calendar year. The first guided flights of the Thor missile would occur in August 1957. Turning to the operational aspects of the IRBM program, General Schriever noted that current plans involved three phases. The first phase consisted of the achievement of an emergency capability for the IRBM in the United Kingdom by February 1958. Six missiles should be in existence by mid-1958, and four squadrons by 1960.

General Schriever noted that the foregoing arrangements still require high-level approval and, of course, negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom. General Schriever closed his remarks with a summary in which he stated that the Air Force believed that we were now entering upon the most critical phase in the development of our missiles—namely, the testing phase. In all essentials the program was on schedule, and the Air Force felt confident that we would achieve the objectives of the program within the time limits which had been set.

At the conclusion of General Schriever’s report, Dr. Murphree requested General Medaris to report on the Army’s IRBM program. General Medaris stated that the missile being developed under this program was called the Jupiter, with a range of 1500 nautical miles. There had been ten firings in 1956 of missiles of a Jupiter configuration, but the first complete Jupiter missile would be fired in February 1957. General Medaris expressed confidence that the Army IRBM program would demonstrate an emergency capability soon after October 1957. The program was on schedule.

Dr. Murphree indicated that Admiral Raborn would discuss the Navy’s IRBM program. Admiral Raborn referred initially to the change in the Navy program, which was now concentrating on the development of a missile called Polaris. This was a smaller weapon, with a solid fuel propellant instead of the liquid fuel propellant. This missile was thought much more suitable for sea-based missiles than the others. It was smaller; it had lower costs and greater safety; it was a 1500-mile range missile. The initial testing could be expected in 1961 and the first launching from a submarine in 1962. Admiral Raborn was likewise optimistic as to the prospects for success in completing the Navy IRBM program within the time limits originally set.

At this point in the presentation, Mr. Cutler said he wished to raise a point with respect to the earlier Council actions regarding the ballistic missiles programs. It was his understanding that the object of these programs was the achievement of a research and development capability for the missiles, but that there had been no authorization to date by the President for the creation of force units and inventories of missiles along the lines described by the previous speakers. He asked the President if this was not also his impression, and the President stated that he did agree with Mr. Cutler’s interpretation. Secretary Wilson argued, however, that it would be very difficult for the planners to proceed with the development of the missiles if they were to have no reasonable assurance that these missiles would enter our weapons inventory at some future date. Moreover, he was sure that before long we should have to face squarely the question of creating a real operational capability for the ballistic missile.

Dr. Murphree indicated that the final presentation by the Department of Defense on the missiles program would be given by his Deputy, Admiral Sides, who would discuss the status of developments of a defense against ballistic missiles. Admiral Sides stated initially that the Defense Department had concluded that an effective defense against ballistic missiles was technically feasible. Secondly, it concluded that the achievement of such a defense would require a complete new weapons and warning system. Thus, radars would be required which do not now exist. These radars would have to be powered by atomic energy. A network to provide warning would cost approximately $1.1 billion. It was estimated that such a warning network would provide an average of some 15 minutes of warning of the approach of a missile to its target. Admiral Sides then answered the question as to how important was such a brief interval of warning. With this 15 minutes, he stated, it would be possible for approximately one-third of our SAC planes to be got off the ground and into the air. This interval would permit warning to planes in the air not to land at their bases. Millions of lives might be spared if in this 15 minutes citizens in target areas could get into some kind of shelter. It would be possible also for the alert status of SAC to be improved.

The Vice President commented on the emphasis which the Navy program put on missiles to be launched from submarines. We must assume, he said, that Soviet development is paralleling our own. If this is indeed the case, what would be involved in a missile program to defend our coasts against attack from Soviet submarines carrying ballistic missiles? Admiral Sides replied that in view of the extended length of the U.S. coastline, there would be enormous costs involved in achieving the means of protecting these coasts against such a threat.

The National Security Council:⁴

• a. Noted and discussed the second annual briefing by the Department of Defense on progress of research and development programs for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the status of developing a defense against ballistic missiles.
• b. Noted the President’s statement that the presentation at this meeting of projected force units and missile inventories to achieve an initial operational capability for the ICBM and the IRBM in accordance with NSC Actions Nos. 1433–a and 1484, should not be interpreted as constituting Presidential approval at this time of any specific numbers of such force units and inventories.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follows agenda item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

3. Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook

Mr. Cutler explained the nature of the forthcoming report and then called on Director Brundage to make it. (A copy of the report rendered by the Director of the Budget is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)⁵

At the end of Mr. Brundage’s statement, Mr. Cutler, as was customary, called on the Secretary of the Treasury for any comment he wished to make.

Secretary Humphrey commenced by stating that the members of the National Security Council had heard from him so often on this subject that they all must be thoroughly sick and tired of it. Nevertheless, he felt he must say that every single individual in this room carried a responsibility for determining what this Government should spend and how we should spend it. This determination was essentially more the job of the military departments than it was of the Treasury and the Budget. We must also admit that neither the military on their side nor Treasury and Budget on theirs, really knew very much what they were talking about. Defense is hard put to it to produce reliable information as to what this country needs at any given time for an adequate national defense. On the other hand, the Treasury was unable to say for sure just how much money this country is in a position to spend in the future before we go broke. Accordingly, the problem was one of balancing two sets of unknowns. It seemed to Secretary Humphrey that what we must do is to achieve a much higher degree of selectivity in our national expenditures. Secretary Humphrey illustrated this point by reference to the missiles presentation which had been heard earlier. Here we were, he said, engaged in spending billions of dollars to achieve a ballistic missile. At the same time we were spending other billions to produce aircraft like the B–52, early warning systems, etc., etc.; yet if these ballistic missiles really work, the early warning network would be overflown by the enemy and rendered useless. So how we get together all these considerations and make a selective choice in our expenditure—this was primarily the task of the Defense Department. The Defense people must decide what is generally in the national security interest for us to have in the way of defense. We could not continue to take billions of dollars from the pockets of our people while affirming our belief that our international position is generally a great deal better than it has been and that there is very little likelihood of war.

To continue spending on the scale that we have been spending, said Secretary Humphrey, would entail two very serious risks. The first one was that our people would rebel and refuse to stand for a continuation of such large expenditures. The second risk was that we might well overreach ourselves in our spending and thus again run into bad times. Accordingly, the only solution was more selective spending. Nor was it good enough simply to try to hold government spending at present levels. On the contrary, these levels must be brought down. In order to make a beginning of this, Secretary Humphrey said he had just one suggestion to make. The Departments of State and Defense should give a great deal more attention to what this Government should do about maintaining such large troop deployments (together with their civilian followers) all over the world. The time was at hand for these two departments to collaborate on the achievement of a radical change and reduction in this situation.

Secretary Wilson replied by stating that the Department of Defense found itself caught in the middle between the needs of national defense on the one hand and the availability of resources on the other. In this situation, if we hope to make any substantial cuts in our expenditures we would certainly have to change and reduce our commitments and our activities. In point of fact, moreover, the Defense Department had in recent years made many savings, despite the Budget figures which had just been presented. Even now the Defense Department was reconsidering the deployment of U.S. forces abroad and other Defense Department activities, because we could not possibly remain in our present frozen position if we are ever to achieve the savings objectives about which the Secretary of the Treasury had been speaking.

Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson on this latter point, and stated that we are indeed “out of line”. If we were ever to get back into line, we must be willing to incur certain risks. The troublesome question was which risks to run. If the Democrats were smart, said Secretary Humphrey, and some of them were smart—they will soon be turning up in the public mind as the economy boys and the balancers of the budget. The Republicans would be put down as the true spendthrifts.

Secretary Dulles asked if he might now be heard. When the President indicated that he had the floor, Secretary Dulles said that he fully shared the views of Secretary Humphrey on the importance of avoiding unnecessary expenditures. Certainly some expenditures could be reduced by this Government without incurring unacceptable risks to the national security. For example, said Secretary Dulles, he was very dubious about the distant early warning (DEW) line and some of our continental defense programs. The DEW line was something of a Maginot Line idea and, as the missiles presentation earlier suggested, such lines could be overflown. Perhaps likewise in Korea, Japan and Germany there were U.S. programs which involved unnecessary U.S. expenditures. While, said Secretary Dulles, he thought it quite unlikely that the United States would ever become engaged in a war with the Soviet Union along the lines suggested by the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee a couple of weeks ago, he did think that if the United States were ever to get into a military posture inferior to that of the USSR, this country would suffer defeat without the occurrence of a war. He said he would illustrate the point of his remark by reference to the game of chess. In a chess game you wouldn’t normally ever go so far as to take your opponent’s king; you checkmate that king and don’t play out the rest.

Now, if the Soviet Union should ever get itself in a position where it could checkmate the United States, the Soviet Union would never have to resort to war in order to destroy the United States. We would be obliged to give in. And in a sense, continued Secretary Dulles, a war with the Soviet Union is being fought by the United States at the present time. Thus in our recent thinking about what we ought to do with respect to this terrible situation in the Middle East, we anticipated and counted on a significant Soviet reaction and challenge to our new proposals. We will get such a challenge. Nevertheless, we felt that we could accept this forthcoming challenge because Admiral Radford had stated that our own military establishment was superior to Russia’s and that the Russians knew that it was superior. Thus, if necessary, we could call checkmate on the Soviet Union.

In view of all this, Secretary Dulles said he thought that we would have to bear in mind that while these terrible missiles which we have heard described this morning might never be used, they are nevertheless essential to the national security. We simply cannot afford to be inferior to the USSR.

In closing, Secretary Dulles stressed that there was no incompatibility between what he was saying and what Secretary Humphrey had been saying. All that was required was that the two views be got together. In any event, Secretary Dulles felt that what he had said formed an important part of the total picture.

At the end of Secretary Dulles’ statement, Mr. Cutler reminded Secretary Humphrey that he would surely want to say something about the problematical nature of the projected increase in the Treasury’s receipts in the next fiscal year. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed emphatically that the likelihood of such an increase was far from certain.

Secretary Wilson stated that he and his military advisers all felt that this Government was already skating dangerously close to losing that superiority over the USSR of which Secretary Dulles had just spoken. Secretary Wilson also said that in his opinion this country had never been so prosperous as it was at the present time. Accordingly, if we needed to spend all that we were now spending in order to maintain our military superiority over the Soviet Union, he believed that our country could well afford the expenditure.

Secretary Humphrey said that he agreed with Secretary Wilson that there was certainly no immediate threat to the health of the U.S. economy; but such a threat could develop in the future if we go on spending at the present rate. Perhaps, added Secretary Humphrey, what we are facing is an absolute necessity for disarmament. Of course, if we have to maintain this expensive defense posture and go broke, it would be just too bad; we would have to go broke. However, Secretary Humphrey again called for greater selectivity in our spending, and added his belief that all our national security policies ought to be reviewed now “from the guts up”.

Secretary Wilson commented that his people kept saying that even present expenditures will not provide the United States with the military strength that it ought to have. About the only comfort he could derive from the situation was his belief that the burden of armaments on the Russian people was even worse.

Governor Stassen said that he would like to make one point with respect to the views of Secretary Humphrey. He would like to suggest a study which might conceivably prove fruitful. He referred to some of the major increases in our military effectiveness in the shape of missiles, atomic weapons, and the like. In view of this increase in our fire power, perhaps it would be profitable to conduct a study which might lead to a more rapid phase-out of certain categories of weapons which are becoming slightly obsolescent. Governor Stassen said he had in mind fighter bombers, medium bombers, aircraft carriers, and front line divisions.

As the Council was about to adjourn, the President said he had one point to make. It seemed to him, he said, that some world problems are insoluble. For instance, that is what we are getting up against with the advent of these ballistic missiles which had been described earlier. War had always been hitherto a contest, but it was preposterous to describe a war of missiles as a contest. The President added that he believed that there was already in the world all the deterrent power that could be used. That is, there was enough deterrent power so that each side could destroy the other side completely. The concept of deterrent power has gone as far as it can. In view of this incredible situation we must have more fresh thinking on how to conduct ourselves. We must also educate our European allies. At least they have now come to desire atomic weapons in their defense arsenals. But in any case, over the long run this country must get to a point where we can stabilize at least on a percentage basis of the gross national product to be devoted to our defense. Everyone who professes to be seriously concerned with the future of our country must do some fresh thinking. We cannot continue along our present line of thinking and acting without “busting” ourselves.

The National Security Council:⁶

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 11.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. Regarding NSC Action No. 1484, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding NSC Action No. 1615, see footnote 9, Document 92.
3. The reports are filed in the minutes.
4. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1653, approved by the President on January 12. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
5. See footnote 3 above.
6. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1655, approved by the President on January 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)