Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

96. Report to the President and the National Security Council by the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development¹

Washington, November 21, 1956.

[Here follow a list of members on the panel, an undated memorandum of transmission from Val Peterson to the President and the National Security Council, an undated letter of transmission from Frank Fremont-Smith to Peterson, a one-page table of contents, and a statement of the mission of the panel.]

SUMMARY

1. The Panel believes that:

a. A massive nuclear attack on the United States resulting in casualties of the order of 50,000,000, without drastically improved preparation of the people, would jeopardize support of the National Government and of the war effort, and might well result in national disintegration (p. 9).

b. The major weakness in the preparedness of our people results from the fact that while pertinent information has been made available, it has not been successfully conveyed to them. The people would, therefore, be psychologically overwhelmed by the extent of damage and casualties in such an attempted “knock-out” attack (p. 10).

c. The prospect, however, is not a hopeless one. A vigorously supported program of “involvement” of the people would bring about a significant change, not only in post-attack attitudes and behavior, but also in the necessarily correlated pre-attack attitudes and behavior. A panel of governmental and citizen leaders should plan and implement a program of public education and action designed to involve progressively increasing numbers of citizens, their leaders, and organizations and institutions in the issues of national security in the nuclear age, including preparation for any possible nuclear attack and designed to sustain that involvement as necessary over a prolonged period (p. 11).

d. Such a program of “involvement” of the people would increase national unity and thereby strengthen the hands of our leaders in pursuing the policies and taking the actions necessary to preserve and develop the basic values of democracy. It would also result in greater citizen support of national efforts to prevent war (p. 17).

e. Involvement of the people would be substantially stimulated by independent evidence that action is being taken by Government at all levels to strengthen our civil defense program. To the maximum extent, civil defense programs and recommended measures should be blended into the normal governmental machinery and community patterns, and should have a recognizable social value in peacetime (p. 13).

f. Increased awareness of nuclear weapons effects would, to a varying extent in different nations, create public attitudes which would tend to restrain the initiation of general war by the duly constituted leaders of nations. (See text, page 19, for qualifications of this judgment.)

g. The heritage and institutions of the American people give them the potential strength to meet successfully the complex problems and perils of the nuclear age, but that strength must be nourished by effective knowledge and inspiring leadership (p. 12).

2. While we are unanimous in the judgments expressed above, we suggest that they be tested systematically during the period of implementation of any program of action which is adopted. The skills and tools required for this purpose are themselves well tested and available (p. 12).

[Here follows the text of the report.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development. Top Secret. Another copy of the report is Ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Civil Defense.