Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

126. Memorandum of Discussion at the 329th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 3, 1957¹

Washington, July 3, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Ballistic and Non-Ballistic Missiles Program

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that, at the President’s direction, he had requested the Secretary of Defense on May 21 to arrange for a full presentation before the National Security Council of all Defense Department ballistic and aerodynamic missile programs.² The information requested was, first, the cumulative cost of each missile program through FY 1957 and such programs’ projected annual cost estimated from FY 1958 through FY 1963. Secondly, the presentation was to include the estimated date of availability and retirement of each missile program, with clear indication of the extent to which the capabilities of each missile might overlap the capabilities of any other missile.

At the conclusion of his briefing (a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting),³ Mr. Cutler indicated that the Defense Department presentation would be opened by Mr. Holaday, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; would be carried on by Admiral Sides; and would conclude with comments by Deputy Secretary Quarles. He then called on Mr. Holaday, who, after some general remarks, turned the technical aspects of the presentation over to Admiral Sides. (A copy of the Defense Department presentation⁴ is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of the presentation, which Mr. Cutler described as one of the most effective reports that he had ever heard made in the National Security Council, Secretary Quarles said he wished to make a few comments on the report. He said he thought it would be helpful to look at a chart which would summarize the terrible dollar cost figures in terms of the four main categories of missiles.⁵ The chart indicated that through FY 1957 we had spent $11.8 billion on our missile programs. The cost of continuing these programs from FY 1957 through FY 1963 would amount to approximately $36.1 billion, for a grand total of some $47 billion.

Secretary Quarles followed with a chart analyzing the main categories of fund requirements: for research, for procurement, and for operational facilities. Secretary Quarles indicated his realization that the resources of the United States would be insufficient to support all these programs, and that some would have to be eliminated in the future as others have been eliminated in the past. Under certain assumptions, for example, the Navaho missile program will be completely dropped. Rascal would likewise virtually be eliminated.

In explanation of these heavy expenditures, Secretary Quarles emphasized the dynamic nature of our missile programs, pointing out that in this relatively new field things changed very rapidly. After citing examples to illustrate his point, Secretary Quarles indicated how the shifting of the technological base of our missile programs had presented very tough problems for decision in the Defense Department, and would continue to present such problems in the future. He then invited questions from the members of the Council.

The President said that with respect to the matter of eliminating missile programs, to which Secretary Quarles had referred, he wished to inquire whether the Defense Department conducted, so to speak, a court martial at regular intervals to decide which missile programs were to be “executed”. The President illustrated his point with a reference to the three missile systems—Thor, Jupiter and Polaris.

Secretary Quarles replied that a court martial to determine the fate of Thor and Jupiter was being convened now. The development of Polaris, on the contrary, was still so far in the future that no decision could yet be made with respect to this missile program.

Secretary Wilson commented that he did not believe we could afford to allocate more than ten percent of the funds of the Defense Department for activities in the missile field.

The President then explained that he had asked his question because so many of the missile systems discussed in the presentation seemed to him to resemble one another quite markedly in their capabilities. He pointed out that in such cases a choice must be made of the best all-round program, because we could not afford to carry on so many programs in the quest for a missile which would have the quality of perfection. Secretary Wilson replied that the Defense Department had been taking a look at the total picture of its missile programs every six months. Moreover, from time to time some of the programs had been eliminated between these six-months intervals when circumstances dictated that this could be safely done.

The President then said he wished to cite two examples which lay behind his question. The missile Tartar is in the course of development, and its estimated performance seemed to lie somewhere in between the Terrier missile and the advanced Terrier missile. Thus, merely because a weapon gave promise of slightly better capabilities, this is not a criterion for continuing a program to develop this weapon when costs were so extremely high. We cannot hope for a perfect family of these weapons designed to achieve every purpose in warfare.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that with the over-all budget ceiling of $38 billion annually, 1/10 of this amount (which Secretary Wilson had earlier indicated should be allocated to our missile programs) would amount to $3.8 billion annually. However, the charts had indicated that we had spent $11.8 billion on our missile programs in the fiscal 1956 and 1957. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson concluded, we must pull down the costs of our missile programs in the future.

The President inquired whether there were any further questions from members of the Council. There being no response, the President commented that he guessed everybody was thunderstruck at what he had heard on the subject of our missile programs and their costs.

Secretary Wilson expressed strong doubt as to the value of the Thor–Jupiter 1500-mile-range missiles, in view of the situation of our bases. Such an intermediate range missile, he believed, would be more useful to the Russians than to ourselves.

Mr. Brundage inquired as to the priority which had been given to the Navy’s Polaris missile. Secretary Wilson said he believed that the Polaris missile deserved a priority above that accorded to Thor and Jupiter.

Admiral Sides pointed out that allocating the same priority to Polaris as to Thor and Jupiter would not actually cost any more money or produce a missile in a shorter time. The allocation of such a priority would merely assure access to the needed materials.

Mr. Cutler recalled that on May 7 Secretary Wilson had written to the President to ask whether the same priority should be accorded to Polaris as had been accorded to the IRBM and ICBM programs.⁶ Mr. Cutler indicated his belief that the President had not yet responded to the question asked by Secretary Wilson. The President confirmed Mr. Cutler’s understanding by pointing out that it was Secretary Wilson’s request of May 7 which had occasioned the President’s own request for the over-all presentation on our missile programs which the Council had heard today.

The National Security Council:⁷

Noted and discussed a report on the subject by the Department of Defense, as presented orally by Mr. Holaday and Admiral Sides, and commented upon by Deputy Secretary Quarles.

[Here follows agenda item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on July 5.
2. No record of the President’s request has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. The briefing paper is not filed in the minutes.
4. The presentation is filed in the minutes.
5. This chart and the one mentioned in the next paragraph are filed in the minutes.
6. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files nor filed in the minutes.
7. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1743, approved by the President on July 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)