Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

146. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957¹

Washington, October 10, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security.” For text, see volume XI, page 757.]

2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690, 1743 and 1765)²

Mr. Cutler introduced the subject and indicated that Mr. Holaday, of the Department of Defense, would give the presentation. Thereupon Mr. Holaday read his report, with its conclusion that the time was not yet at hand when a clear choice could be made in favor of either the Thor or the Jupiter program, and that both should be continued until successful tests are achieved by one or the other missile.

The President pointed out that the early NSC directives on the development of the U.S. ballistic missiles program had emphasized that one of the first requirements was for the achievement of a workable intermediate range ballistic missile. If an attempt to develop an IRBM with a 2000-mile range was slowing up the achievement of an IRBM with a 1500-mile range, the President was altogether against it. (The President’s remark derived from a statement by Mr. Holaday that the British were pressing us to extend the range of our IRBM’s to 2000 miles.)

Mr. Holaday assured the President that the Defense Department was following the NSC directives implicitly, and its objective continued to be the achievement of an IRBM with a range of 1500 miles.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Holaday and his associates were keeping under constant study the possibility of resort to a Manhattan District approach for the achievement of the objectives of our ballistic missiles program. Mr. Holaday replied in the affirmative, and the President went on to say that we might have to consider this approach despite the fact that up until now we had rejected the idea of a new Manhattan District operation for the missiles program.

Referring once again to points made by Mr. Holaday, the President inquired what difference it made whether the Army or the Air Force conducted the test firings of these missiles. Mr. Holaday replied that the Air Force fires its missiles from fixed concrete installations on its airfields. The Army, on the other hand, makes use of the principle of “shoot and scoot”. It was the Army’s objective to make the installations for firing missiles mobile in character.

The President, after stating that he approved the recommendations with respect to Thor and Jupiter proposed by Mr. Holaday, went on to say that only yesterday he had again been asked how much of the delay in our earth satellite program derived from inter-service rivalry. The President said that he always denied the validity of such assertions, but the question showed the widespread belief in our country that we are competing among ourselves rather than with the Russians.

Mr. Holaday informed the President that there was very little rivalry to be observed in the Project Vanguard program. The President cautioned Mr. Holaday to watch this problem of inter-service rivalry all the time. The objective of the program was not to achieve a missile which a particular service desired, but instead to achieve the most efficient missiles system. The President felt that such matters as deployment, the character of the ground installations, methods of employment desired by the different military services, and similar matters, were completely secondary to the determination by the United States to fire a 1500-mile missile and hit something. The President emphasized that he was interested first of all in achieving such a vehicle, and that nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of getting it.

Mr. Holaday pointed out to the President that, after all, the development of ground support equipment for the missile must be carried along with the development of the missile itself. Otherwise we would end up having the missile but with no suitable installation from which to shoot it. Nevertheless, our main effort was, of course, to get the missile.

Thereafter, the President stressed once again the great political and psychological advantage of the first achievement of an IRBM and an ICBM. He noted that from the inception of the ballistic missiles program the Council had agreed that these political and psychological considerations were perhaps even more important than the strictly military considerations.

The Vice President referred to numerous press reports about interservice rivalry and lack of adequate support for the U.S. satellite and missiles programs. He warned again that we would be in for a very rough time when the Congress began investigating these rumors and reports. The Congressional investigators would light on every shred of evidence indicating undue delay or rivalry among the services. If they think that they have proved the existence of these obstacles, they will force on us a single-missile program whether we like it or not.

The Vice President then referred to Mr. Larson’s earlier remarks about the United States being first in the field on the next great breakthrough. In this connection he pointed out that the ICBM had been built up as the great ultimate weapon. The Russians felt that they had to possess an ICBM in order to frighten us. But the IRBM can be much more dangerous to the Russians than the ICBM to us. Accordingly, the IRBM is of extreme importance in the propaganda of the cold war.

Governor Stassen suggested that it might be desirable for the Administration to issue a laconic factual account of the entire missile development in the United States. This might be published some time between now and next January. This would help to correct the unfortunate impression provided by photographs of missile failures, which photographs had distorted the truth of our real progress in this field. Within the limits of security, we should do our best to counteract this distortion.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the OCB was concerning itself with publicity on the missile program, and was even now preparing a proposal for the President’s consideration.³

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed a report by the Department of Defense on (1) the readjustment of ballistic and aerodynamic missile programs since the July 3, 1957, presentation to the Council on the subject (NSC Action No. 1743); and (2) the study of combining the Thor and Jupiter development programs into a single missile program, as called for by NSC Action No. 1765.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the recommendation by the Secretary of Defense, contained in a–(1) above, that, because the various factors to be considered do not in total clearly favor the selection of one program at this time, both the Thor and Jupiter programs be continued until successful flight tests are achieved by either missile, in order that greater assurance of the early availability of an operable missile system may be achieved.

c. Noted the President’s instructions to the Department of Defense that, in approving the recommendation in b above:

(1) He would expect the Department of Defense to keep under constant study the most effective organizational structure for the ICBM and IRBM programs, including the possibility of concentrating such programs outside of the military services in one organization similar to the wartime Manhattan District; and, if deemed desirable as a result of such constant study, to make recommendations thereon to him.

(2) The overriding objective of the IRBM program, in view of the political and psychological impact referred to in NSC Action No. 1484–c, continues to be the successful achievement of an IRBM with approximately 1500 miles range and reasonable accuracy; and that the related problems of ground support, methods of employment contemplated by the various military services, and increased range, should not be allowed to delay such an achievement.

(3) Similarly, the overriding objective of the ICBM program continues to be the successful achievement of an ICBM with necessary range and reasonable accuracy, in priority over related

Note: In approving the action in b above, the President directed that the Secretary of Defense report to the Council as soon as more adequate test information shall have been accumulated as to the Thor and Jupiter programs and, in any event, not later than December 31, 1957.⁵

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 3 and 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11.
2. For references to NSC Actions No. 1433, 1484, 1690, and 1743, see footnote 12, Document 134. Regarding NSC Action No. 1765, see footnote 16, Document 134.
3. The OCB Report on the Department of Defense Recommendations With Respect to Ballistic Missile Information Policy, dated October 16, is in Department of State,S/SA Files: Lot 61 D 385, Ballistic Missiles.
4. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1800, approved by the President on October 11. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
5. The NSC did not again consider priorities for ballistic missiles and satellite programs during 1957.