Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

795.00/4–1254

Memorandum by the Coordinator for the Geneva Conference (Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

[Washington,] April 12, 1954.

Subject:

• Position on Korean Unification for Geneva Conference.

The ROKs have not yet indicated their intention to attend the Geneva Conference, however all indications are that they will in fact attend but are deferring any announcement in order to extract maximum concessions from us and to avoid consulting with us prior to the Conference in order to retain a free hand at the Conference.

Over the past weeks we have repeatedly reiterated to the ROKs our desire to honor our commitment to consult with them prior to consulting with anyone else concerning positions to be taken at the Conference and the difficulty of doing so until they have reached a decision on whether to attend. Last week we informed the ROK that in view of the very short time before the Conference we could no longer delay consulting with other members of the Allied side. The ROK expressed no objection and merely asked to be kept informed of the results.

We have thus far carried out preliminary consultations with U.K., the Commonwealth and France. We have made it clear in our consultation that we are not going to permit our Allies to bargain us down on our position prior to Geneva so that we have no “give” by the time we start negotiations with the Communists. We have taken the position that at least the opening Allied position at Geneva should be support of the ROK position which provides for extension of ROK sovereignty over North Korea and the holding of elections under U.N. observation for the seats in the ROK Assembly provided for North Korea under the ROK Constitution. We have attempted to support this position by, among other arguments, stating that it would be a logical completion of the U.N. plans for the unification of Korea interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War.

The U.K. and the Commonwealth have expressed strong opposition to this position even as an opening tactical maneuver. France has not yet replied, but I expect that its position will be one of somewhat grudging support, or at least not opposition, in the hope of obtaining U.S. support for French positions with respect to Indochina.

The Commonwealth position is that a plan for all-Korean elections to a constituent Assembly should be put forward at Geneva, similar to the Allied plan put forward at Berlin for Germany. While having a superficial plausibility, such a plan ignores the great differences between the Korean and the German situation. It in effect places the ROK and the North Korean regimes on the same basis and “starts from scratch” in Korea. Although Rhee and his supporters could be expected to win overwhelmingly any such election, the ROK could be expected violently to oppose the plan, which also ignores the basic U.S. position of the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK.

There is a position upon which I believe we could take a firm stand at Geneva which would be more consistent with basic U.N. resolutions than the present ROK position; which would be entirely consistent with our position on the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK; which I think has a reasonable prospect of obtaining support of Rhee if it is carefully and sympathetically explained to him, and upon which I believe we could obtain a very considerable degree of international support. This position would be to hold an election under international observation for the ROK Assembly throughout both North and South Korea within the framework of the present ROK Constitution, possibly accompanied by a popular election for President. Rhee has previously indicated publicly (with many qualifications) his willingness to have an all-Korea popular election for President.

We are not going to be able to accomplish much in the way of concerting our position with Pyun at Geneva. Therefore it is urgent that an appropriate individual be prepared to go to Korea to see Rhee immediately upon ROK announcing its decision to attend the Geneva Conference.

I discussed the situation with Mr. Robertson and the Secretary along the foregoing lines. As I indicated to you, the Secretary gave his approval to attempting to obtain ROK agreement and to Mr. Morton² discussing with Senator Knowland³ an emissary to Rhee for the purpose.

I am following up the matter with Mr. Morton.⁴

1. Secretary Dulles visited London and Paris, Apr. 11–14, for discussions primarily with regard to Southeast Asia; see pp. 514 ff.
2. Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
3. Senator William Knowland, Republican, of California was majority leader in the U.S. Senate.

4. In a memorandum to the Secretary, Apr. 14, Johnson stated that Morton had talked with Knowland about a trip to Korea by Arthur Dean. Knowland’s reaction, said the memorandum, was to suggest that General Van Fleet might be more effective, but he—Knowland—would not oppose Dean’s going. Johnson indicated his belief that Dean should be sent to Seoul immediately upon Korean announcement of intention to attend the Conference. Under Secretary Smith concurred in the recommendation. On the following day, Secretary Dulles in a brief memorandum to Johnson indicated his agreement to asking Dean to go if Van Fleet also went to Korea. (795.00/4–1454)

   During the following week, it was announced that General Van Fleet had been chosen by President Eisenhower as his Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador to make a military survey to the Far East. For further documentation on the missions of Dean and Van Fleet in Korea, additional to that contained in this volume, see volume xv. Concerning the report of the Van Fleet Mission, see volume xii.