Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Moscow, April 11, 1954—4 p.m.

1234. Repeated information priority London 189, priority Paris 253. Have discussed this morning with British and French Ambassadors method of handling aide-mémoire Deptel 643¹ and proposed note Deptels 642² and 646.³ French Ambassador has had no word from Paris concerning note at all and British Ambassador has not yet received approval for revised text.

On assumption approval will be received from both Paris, London, we tentatively agreed as follows regarding delivery:

1. I should as separate operation hand to Kuznetsov aide-mémoire. Press would be told, as previously, that I had delivered tripartite answer to Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5 dealing with practical preparations and arrangements for Geneva conference.

2. Method of delivery note concerning interpretation Berlin decision depends primarily on how three governments from point of view public opinion wish to handle subject. If it is desired to make three-power demonstration, emphasizing our interpretation Berlin decisions, preferable method of delivery would be by three Ambassadors personally calling separately on Molotov. It would be difficult if not impossible to keep fact of calls by three western Ambassadors on Molotov secret and it would probably therefore be necessary to reveal to press purpose of calls. This would necessitate statements from three governments in order to insure public understanding of issue involved. On other hand if governments wish merely to keep record clear with Soviet Government without publicity, delivery by messenger as has been done in past without personal call by Ambassadors would offer best chance of keeping matter confidential. French Ambassador favors method of personal delivery since he feels demonstration of western solidarity is enhanced by personal call of Ambassadors whereas British Ambassador is in general more inclined to delivery by messenger. Provided three governments are prepared to deal with publicity on contents of note and difference with Soviet Government on interpretation Berlin agreement, I see considerable merit in personal delivery, but only on that basis. Would appreciate guidance before final decision on method delivery. British and French Ambassadors communicating along similar lines with London and Paris.⁴

Bohlen

1. Dated Apr. 9, p. 89.
2. Dated Apr. 9, p. 88.
3. See footnote 2, supra.

4. The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 647, Apr. 11, to Moscow:

   “Your 1234. Department would prefer personal delivery by three ambassadors and for its part would be prepared deal with question of publicity if necessary. However French and British may be reluctant make any public statement at this time. Department would not wish agreement on and delivery of note delayed by question of publicity in connection with delivery of note. Therefore if in judgment of three Ambassadors not possible make delivery without revealing purpose calls and French and or British are not now willing make public statement along lines of note you are authorized agree delivery by messenger.” (396.1–GE/4–1154)

   On Apr. 12 and 13, Ambassador Bohlen informed the Department that the British and French Governments preferred delivery of the notes by messenger rather than by a personal call. He also said that he had an appointment to deliver the aide-mémoire to Kuznetsov on the morning of Apr. 14 (telegrams 1241 and 1250 from Moscow; 396.1–GE/4–1254, 4–1354).