Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

secret
niact
London, April 13, 1954—3 p.m.

4523. Repeated information Paris niact 622. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Paris for Secretary’s party. Following is résumé of my final meeting with Eden this morning:

. . . . . . .

5. Korean phase Geneva Conference.1

(A)
I said we had two basic thoughts: We must carry ROK with us in any proposal which we put forward at Geneva since without their acceptance proposal was meaningless.
(B)
We regard Geneva as serious negotiations and while not over hopeful wish to try for settlement involving unification and independence at [of] Korea, therefore we should have some give in our position so that we can make concessions. We should not give up all our trading possibilities. While we would fully consult with other 16, US should have pretty much control of tactics. The Communists at Geneva will show a single will and if all 16 try to quarter-back operation we will get nowhere. Since US seems to have principal responsibility for trying to reach agreement and bringing ROK along we must have a tactical flexibility.

I outlined our view on opening position at Geneva based on UN Commission designed to oversee Korean elections explaining that this Commission’s work had been interrupted by aggression in 1950 and that we could make a plausible and honorable case that it should carry on with the task given it by the UN. I recognized this would not be acceptable to the Communists but felt that we could stand before the bar of world opinion in putting it forward. Eden said that my presentation cast different light on situation, thus far he had only seen reports that we intended to have elections in North Korea and not in South Korea. Propagandawise this would be a very difficult position to maintain and he stressed the importance of carrying not only British but world opinion with us. He said UK had been thinking of a German type formula similar to Berlin. In light of my comments, however, he felt UK might be able to support opening position I had outlined above. He believed Communists would come forward with specious proposals and UK would like to counter with something that [Page 96] seemed eminently reasonable but probably would not be accepted by Communists. He had not liked what he heretofore understood US proposal to be since he thought it tactically unsound to put forward a case which would be shot down and then produce another proposal. Now that he understood the proposition we had in mind he felt much better. He asked whether we could spell out for his people our presentation and I told him we would be glad to do so, and could probably discuss it in Paris next week.2 (Alex Johnson should draw up draft of US presentation at Geneva for my consideration next Monday).3

Selwyn Lloyd4 doubted that we would obtain unified Korea and asked whether we envisaged other measures which might make the armistice safer and more durable. For example, if the neutrals on UN Commission were no longer willing to remain in Korea what would we do and what would replace UN Commission. I said we would also give thought to this point.

. . . . . . .

[Dulles]
  1. This was the only substantive discussion on the subject that took place during Dulles’ talks in London and Paris.↩
  2. See the record of the tripartite meeting in Paris on Apr. 22, p. 127.↩
  3. Apr. 19. The draft referred to is not printed; for Dulles’ presentation of the U.S. position at the special briefing meeting on Apr. 20, see the memorandum of conversation by Brown, p. 119.↩
  4. Minister of State in the British Foreign Office.↩