Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Davis) to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Robertson)
top secret
[Geneva,] 4 May 1954.
Subject:
- Outline of U.S. Position and Tactics on Indochina Question at Geneva.
Reference:
- Paper on above subject submitted by Chairman of the Indochina Working Group, dated May 3, 1954.1
- 1.
- The referenced paper gives me concern because, in general terms, it tends to suggest favorable consideration of U.S. participation in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement.
- 2.
- I continue to believe that, while we should seek to influence the course of the negotiations, as required by paragraph 29 (quoted on page 1 of the reference) of NSC 5405, the U.S. should, nevertheless, have no part in the negotiation of an undesirable Indochina settlement.
- 3.
- Our present position as stated by General Smith this morning is, of course, entirely sound. Every effort should continue to be made to brace up the French to the end that they accept the practicability of continuing the war as against the impossibility of any “settlement” that would not lead now or shortly to the loss of Indochina.
- 4.
- The question is, how to influence the course of negotiations
without being tarred with a sell-out brush. It seems clear to me
that we should, in addition to continuing the effort to rally French
morale:
- a.
- Obtain U.S. authorization on highest levels now that we take a firm position with the French that we shall not accept any unsatisfactory terms (terms leading now or shortly to the loss of Indochina); and that we shall definitely disassociate ourselves from any such negotiations.
- b.
- Make every effort now to obtain French agreement neither to offer nor accept any terms, or negotiated modifications of terms, that would amount to an unsatisfactory settlement.
- c.
- Let the French know now that we shall not be a party to an unsatisfactory settlement.
- 5.
- The foregoing is based on my opinion that it would be illusory to believe that our association with unsatisfactory terms could, even at best, alter appreciably the fact that the terms were unsatisfactory; and that there could be no better way to encourage a French sell-out than to give them any impression, now or later, that any form of sell-out would have U.S. blessing or support. Conversely, the actions recommended in paragraph 4 above have a better chance of preventing agreement by the French to unsatisfactory terms than would our helping them in the crime.
- 6.
- I realize, of course, that we must await French reaction to the fluid military situation in Indochina before reaching firm conclusions as to what the French position may be. Meanwhile, however, we shall be helping to encourage the development of a French sell-out position if we imply in any way that we might go along with it.
- 7.
- In consistency with the foregoing, I strongly recommend with respect to the “Decisions Required” in the referenced paper that the U.S. by no means get entangled in the predictably unsatisfactory results of negotiations by submitting its own proposals.
- 8.
- You may regard this memorandum as political. I submit it because I regard it as political-military. In any case, it reflects the viewpoints of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
A. C.
Davis