396.1 GE/5–554: Telegram
President’s News Conference, Washington, May 5, 10:30 a.m.:1 The Department of State to the United States Delegation2
Tosec 76. Following statement was read by President at press conference today:
With the return of the Secretary of State from Geneva, there will of course be a series of conferences on foreign affairs both within the Executive Department and between the Secretary of State and bipartisan groups of the Congress. Because of these forthcoming conferences [Page 692] and the probability that the Secretary of State will himself have something to say, and because, also, of the delicate nature of the issues now pending before the Geneva Conference, I shall limit my comments on the Indo-China situation to a brief written statement.
United States foreign policy has consistently supported the principles on which was founded the United Nations. A basic expression of this policy was the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948. The United States believes in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collective action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle, has entered into regional security agreements with other nations. Examples are the Inter-American Agreement, the NATO Agreement, and a whole series of Pacts in the Pacific. These arrangements are invariably to assure the peaceful security of the contracting nations and to prevent likelihood of attack; they are not arrangements designed primarily for waging war.
The Geneva Conference, now nine days old, has produced no surprises. The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded.
It has not been a “five-power” conference as the Soviet Union tried to make it.
It has not involved establishing express or implied diplomatic recognition by the United States of the Chinese Communist aggressors.
The Korean phase of the Conference has been organized. Here the Communists came up with a scheme for Korean unification which was a Chinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany. Under their proposal no election measures could be taken without Communist consent, and there could be no impartial supervision of the election conditions or of the voting.
This scheme was rejected for Germany. Secretary Dulles tells me that it is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and United Nations members which took part in the Korean War under the United Nations Command now represented at Geneva.
The Indo-China phase of the Conference is in process of being organized and the issues have not yet been clarified. In this matter a large measure of initiative rests with the Governments of France, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which are the countries most directly concerned.
Meanwhile plans are proceeding for the realization of a Southeast Asia security arrangement. This was publicly suggested by Secretary Dulles in his address of March 29th. Of course, our principal allies were advised in advance. This proposal of the Secretary of State was not a new one; it was merely reaffirmation of the principles that have consistently guided our post-war foreign policy and a reminder to [Page 693] interested Asian friends that the United States was prepared to join with others in the application of these principles to the threatened area. Most of the free nations of the area and others directly concerned have shown affirmative interest, and conversations are actively proceeding.
Obviously, it was never expected that this collective security arrangement would spring into existence overnight. There are too many important problems to be resolved. But there is a general sense of urgency. The fact that such an organization is in process of formation could have an important bearing upon what happens at Geneva during the Indo-China phase of the Conference.
The countries of the area are now thinking in constructive terms, which include the indispensable concept of collective security. Progress in this matter has been considerable and I am convinced that further progress will continue to be made.
Following are questions and answers:
Q: Secretary Dulles has drawn his sharpest criticism since taking office because of what some people are contending is a major diplomatic defeat for American foreign policy at Geneva. Do you have any comment on that?
A: You can’t count a battle lost that is still going on; but I would say further United States’ foreign policy, like the foreign policy of all other nations, is designed in this belief: that it serves the enlightened self-interest of the country that it is supposed to reflect, that it is drawn up in favor of.
Now, we continue to work along that line. If any ally disagrees or if someone with hostile intent is able to put over some idea of his, you continue to work; you never give up working persistently and as intelligently as you know how for the best interests of the United States. So there is no such thing as acknowledging a defeat in the execution of foreign policy, as I can see it.
Q: Are you fully satisfied with Secretary Dulles’ handling of the Geneva negotiations, and do you expect him to return there?
A: The need for his return or not returning will be determined by himself. After all, he is a mature man and an experienced man.
I would say this: I would never answer a question with respect to anyone, did he over a period of weeks act exactly, let’s say, according to standards of perfection.
I will repeat this; Foster Dulles, in my opinion, is the greatest Secretary of State in my memory, and he has my unqualified support in what he is doing, and so far as I know, I have agreed in advance to every policy he has ever brought forward.