396.1 GE/5–454: Telegram
The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 89. Repeated information Paris 186. Reference Secto 76, repeated Paris 172.1 We told Margerie today that continued French failure to advise us of their thinking on possible armistice proposals despite their almost daily statements for last two weeks that they would communicate them to us shortly was giving rise to suspicions that French were holding out on us and might be concocting proposals with British. He was wryly amused and assured us that French had had no contact with British on subject and that they were almost as annoyed with British as we were for preventing progress toward united action and for talking about partition.
Margerie explained that sole reason they had not communicated any proposals to us was that they had so far been unable to agree upon any among themselves. He commented on mutual dislike of Bidault and Jacquet and said delegation had so far been unable to get both their agreement to anything, which augured ill for obtaining Cabinet approval. He repeated earlier indications of French thinking that they would like to propose complete evacuation by Viet Minh of Laos and Cambodia to be followed by cease-fire arrangements in different parts of Viet Nam at different times under international control with regrouping of French forces in key areas. He felt satisfactory arrangements might be made for Laos and Cambodia much more quickly and easily than for Viet Nam but one problem was to avoid impression in France that government was ducking difficult Viet Nam problem which was most acute militarily. He indicated full realization of near impossibility of preventing communists from profiting by any ceasefire or armistice arrangement but said that in a thoroughly bad situation it was necessary to seek course with least evil consequences and he repeated hope France could make proposals early in Indochina phase with US support. He was told US would much prefer to support French proposals than to oppose them but that our policy was still that anything short of prosecution of Navarre plan to victory was not good enough. He said that was “large order” but nevertheless believed [Page 690] we would not be “too unhappy” over French thinking if it crystallized along its present lines. He added that if we did not like it, we would not, unless we were prepared to intervene militarily, be in too good a position to object to French making it. He reiterated that they would give us their thinking as soon as it had any status whatever and that he would urge Bidault to undertake or authorize fullest and soonest consultation with us.