396.1 GE/5–454: Telegram
Heath–Jacquet Meeting, Geneva, May 4, 1954, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State
Secto 95. Repeated information Saigon 29, Paris 193. Limit distribution. This afternoon Heath spoke with Jacquet, French Secretary of State for the Associated States just before the latter’s departure to Paris to consult with his party (URAS) which, Jacquet said, was “getting out of line” and with Bao Dai and Prime Minister Buu Loc.
To the question as to how he saw the conference developing Jacquet replied “speaking not as a minister, but personally and very frankly”, he saw only one “possible peaceful solution”. That “solution” was national elections to be deferred as long as possible while the United States poured in money in economic aid on a scale almost equivalent to its present program of arms aid and budgetary support. He thought it would be unnecessary to have a cease-fire during this period of waiting for the elections. The Franco-Vietnamese forces were strong enough themselves to handle the situation in the south and center. In the north, the French would have to concentrate their positions perhaps in a zone 40 kilometers or so wide between Haiphong and Hanoi including both cities. He said he would not discuss Cambodia and Laos which presented a separate and lesser problem.
Partition, he said, was no solution. It would be rejected both by the Vietnam Government and the Viet Minh. France could not even suggest such a solution.
He then went on to say again, speaking “personally”, that the “solution” of deferred national elections was no true solution. Within a year or two after them, the Chinese and the Viet Minh would take over Indochina by military force.
The only real solution, he felt, would be for United States to intervene militarily in limited force on the side of French and the Vietnamese. He, of course, did not know whether the United States would or could so intervene. He felt certain that American intervention confined to furnishing air and naval support would be sufficient. If we were at all considering intervening, we should do so or decide to do so within the next two months. If delayed beyond that time, our intervention would occur “on the ruins” of the French military effort in Indochina and there would be bitter feeling in France over the delay. From his personal point of view, it was regrettable that we had not judged it desirable or possible to intervene to save Dien Bien Phu where the fortifications might fall even tonight.
[Page 689]Jacquet said that he personally was glad that the Secretary had decided to return to the States in order to present there the grave problems of Indochina and the Conference.