396.1 GE/5–454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)
Participants:
- Ambassador Pote Sarasin, Ambassador to Washington and Member of Thai Delegation
- Philip W. Bonsal
Subject:
- General Conference Topics
The Thai Ambassador lunched with me. He raised the question of participation in the Indochina phase of the Conference. I told him [Page 687] that, so far as I was aware, the initial organization would be on the basis of nine countries, i.e., the four Berlin powers, the three Associated States, the Vietminh and Communist China. I said that it was not excluded that at a later date other interested states would be invited.
The Ambassador stressed the importance of an extremely close contact between the Thai Delegation and ourselves regarding developments at the Indochina discussions. I agreed fully and said that I thought we would wish to arrange for a regular machinery for contacts of this kind. After some discussion we arrived at the very tentative personal conclusion that presumably the British would brief the Commonwealth countries (Australia and New Zealand) and the US would keep Thailand and the Philippines up to date on Indochina developments. The Ambassador will discuss this further with Prince Wan.
The Ambassador was pleased to note that conversations are about to begin in Washington in which the Thai representatives (the Chargé and the Military Attaché) will participate and at which ways and means of strengthening the Thai military position will be examined. The Ambassador said that if necessary he himself would be glad to fly back to Washington. He could be replaced here by someone from the Thai Foreign Office.
The Ambassador expressed the view that the unsatisfactory British attitude toward the concept of “united action” was not due so much to opposition to what we had in mind as to a desire to maintain an apparent independent UK and British Commonmealth position to avoid any appearance of ready acquiescence in American proposals no matter how meritorious they might be. I expressed interest in this analysis. I said that whatever the reasons, British reluctance to proceed vigorously with the “united action” concept was making the whole problem of developing a strong free world position at Geneva and in Southeast Asia more difficult. He said that he agreed but he expressed confidence that the British would eventually line up with us and that they would get considerable Commonwealth support. He asked me about the attitude of Australia and New Zealand. I said that I had no information about New Zealand but that it was my impression Australia was fully aware of the urgency of a united free world attitude in the face of the Communist design to seize all or a part of Indochina.
In speaking of Cambodia and Laos the Ambassador expressed the view that he expected the relations of those two countries to grow ever closer with Thailand.