396.1 GE/4–2854: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva1
[Extract]
priority
Tosec 32. For Yager. NIE 63–54, Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu approved by IAC today,2 has following conclusions: 1. The fall of Dien Bien Phu would have far reaching and adverse repercussions but it would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union military and political situation in Indochina. As a consequence of the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the morale of French Union forces would receive a severe blow. A crucial factor however in the military situation thereafter would be the reliability of native units particularly the Vietnamese. There would almost certainly be increased desertions and the possibility cannot be excluded that the native components of French Union forces might disintegrate. However, we believe that such disintegration would be unlikely during the ensuing two or three months, and that for at least this period the major part of the native troops would probably remain loyal. 2. Assuming no such disintegration, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not in itself substantially alter the relative military capabilities of [Page 601] French Union and Viet Minh forces in Indochina during the next two or three months. The French stand at Dien Bien Phu has produced certain compensatory military results. It has prevented the overrunning of Laos and has resulted in the inflicting of casualties upon the Viet Minh comparable in number to the total French force committed at Dien Bien Phu. The bulk of Viet Minh forces released by the fall of Dien Bien Phu would probably not be able to move, regroup, and re–equip in time to be employed in new major operations during the next two or three months although some lightly equipped infantry battalions might be made available more rapidly for operations in the Delta region. 3. Although the Viet Minh have a substantial capability to organize demonstrations and carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in the major cities of Indochina, we believe that French Union forces could maintain control in those cities. 4. The political consequences in Indochina of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be considerably more adverse than the strictly military consequences and would increase the tempo of deterioration in the over–all French Union position in Indochina, particularly in Vietnam. There would probably be a serious decline in the Vietnamese will to continue the war and to support the Vietnamese military programs. However, we believe that general collapse of French and native governmental authority during the next two or three months would be prevented by the continued existence of organized French Union forces and the hope among Indochinese that the US might intervene in Indochina. 5. We believe that although the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not immediately lead to collapse of the French Union position in Indochina, it would accelerate the deterioration already evident in the French Union military and political position there. If this trend were not checked, it could bring about a collapse of the French Union position during the latter half of 1954. It should be emphasized that this estimate does not consider the repercussion of major decisions in France or Geneva and elsewhere, which could have a decisive effect on the situation in Indochina.
DRW preparing an IE on DBP repercussions in France. In general content this IE will estimate Laniel government not likely fall and if it should go out of office likely to be succeeded by Cabinet of similar orientation. You understand fourth paragraph joint OME—OIR view on this subject cabled Cooper is Agency view only and not ours. No firm date our estimate but should be available you first part next week.
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- Drafted by Rothenburg and Lydman of OIR.↩
- For the full text of NIE 63–54, dated Apr. 30, 1954, see volume xiii.↩