Office of the Historian

751G.00/4–2854: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva1

top secret
priority
Washington, April 28, 1954—5:43 p.m.

Tedul 16. Following is R. Cutler’s summary of principal points made by the President in his talk with Republican leaders, April 26, 1954.

  • “(1) The United States would not intervene with combat forces in the Indochina conflict, except as part of a grouping of interested nations formed to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. The forming of such a grouping would provide a basis to ask Congress for the necessary authority to intervene.
  • “(2) The United States is doing everything to get concerted action in Southeast Asia. At first, it was thought that the U.K. would be likely to join in such concerted action, but more recent news indicates a negative position on Britain’s part. Today the outlook seems pretty grim.
  • “(3) There does not now appear to be any great need for the United States to provide ground troops, for it should be possible adequately to train the large indigenous population for ground combat.
  • “(4) If there is to be intervention in Southeast Asia, such intervention should come before the French and indigenous troops are defeated. It will be a harder job to intervene later on. But it would be [Page 600] a ‘tragic error for the United States to go in alone as a partner of France in this struggle.’ The effort of the United States is to get up a regional grouping, of which it will act as a part. Our principal role would not be to use ground forces.
  • “(5) The United States holds to its determination to lead the free world into a unity which will make further inroads of communism impossible. As the complicated situation in Southeast Asia continues to evolve, the Executive will continue to consult with the Republican leaders of Congress. None of us should permit ourselves to be misled by day–to–day details. Nor should we try now to decide what will be the measure of our participation. We should keep an open mind, and decide on the basis of the facts existing at the time when decision has to be taken.
  • “(6) Should our allies prove unwilling to go along with us in a fair sharing of responsibility, we might have to take a fresh look at the whole situation. It does not make much sense, however, to talk about returning to a ‘Fortress America’ position. What has happened at Dienbienphu shows the result of trying to defend yourself in a position of isolation. The United States can never safely rest in such a posture.”
Smith
  1. Drafted by Kitchen of S/S. For another summary of this meeting, see extracts from James Hagerty’s diary, Apr. 26, in volume xiii.↩