Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1 GE/4–2854

Memorandum for the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bowie)¹

secret

[Geneva,] April 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Consequences of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu

In response to your recent request CIA and State Department intelligence have prepared the following joint estimate of the consequences in France of the early fall of Dien Bien Phu.

1. We believe that the fall of Dien Bien Phu alone would not cause the collapse of the Laniel government or a radical change in French policy in Indochina so long as the Geneva conference offers some prospect of a settlement in Indochina. However, it would reduce the willingness of the Laniel government to continue the war. To the French public and parliamentary opinion this military defeat would represent the failure of the Navarre plan. It would strengthen the French belief that France cannot win in Indochina, and it would increase parliamentary pressure upon the French government to reach an Indochina settlement at Geneva. It would also reduce support for US policies in France, particularly if the Laniel government in its explanation of the military defeat should emphasize US refusal to provide air support for Dien Bien Phu and if the US stand at Geneva should appear intractable to the French.

2. The French people and government have concentrated their hopes upon Geneva for a settlement in Indochina. They have almost certainly abandoned hope that the threat of US involvement would force the cessation of hostilities or that a settlement might be obtained through US recognition of Communist China or Communist Chinese admission to the UN. The failure of these hopes and the fall of Dien Bien Phu might impel the Laniel government to press for US–UK approval of an Indochina settlement based upon a partition of Indochina or a cease–fire which would necessarily involve such a partition.

3. Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, we believe that the French government would announce that it was sending additional forces from France to Indochina, but that this announcement would be designed primarily to impress the Communist states at Geneva with French resolution. For the same purpose of strengthening the French hand in the Geneva negotiations, the French would continue to press the US for further support of the Indochina war, including commitment of US troops. On the other hand, we believe that the Laniel government fears the internationalization of the conflict in Indochina, because it would increase the risks of general war. However, if the Communists refused to negotiate an “honorable” settlement and demanded immediate French withdrawal from Indochina, we believe that the French government would probably accept, as a last resort, internationalization of the conflict in Indochina.

4. State and CIA feel strongly that the delegation has the best interpreters of the French political scene plus vastly greater detailed information. Hence, we express no opinion on a possible successor Prime Minister or the party line–up if the Laniel government falls. We see no reason to dispute Paris views that such a government would be neutralist and nationalist re European as well as Southeast Asian issues.

The above estimate was to have been discussed at today’s meeting of the IAC. We have been promised further word if this discussion reveals any differing views on the part of the other intelligence agencies.

1. Drafted by Joseph A. Yager and Chester L. Cooper, Research and Reference Officers to the U.S. Delegation.