751G.00/4–2754: Telegram
Dulles–Molotov Meeting, Geneva, April 27, Noon: The Secretary of State to the Department of State1
priority
Dulte 15. Repeated information Moscow 16. Eyes only Ambassador. Eyes Only Acting Secretary. Molotov called on me at noon April 27 at his request. He was accompanied by Zaroubin and Troyanovsky. Merchant was with me.
Molotov opened immediately by handing me single copy in Russian of eight page note which he described as Soviet reply to US note of March 19 containing our atomic energy agency proposal.2 He said that it contained Soviet Union views on this proposal and also dealt with Soviet atomic proposal of December 21. It was agreed that after I had read note in translation we might usefully meet again before my departure for Washington.
When this matter concluded, Molotov made no move to raise other subjects with me (as I had rather expected he might). I inquired if he would object to my speaking on Indochina. He indicated he would be most interested.
I said that whereas neither of us were belligerents, matter was of direct concern to both. I recalled my suggestion to him at Berlin that I was fearful of chain of events starting in Indochina with far–reaching consequences which United States did not desire and assumed Soviet likewise did not desire. I said that my concern had not been diminished by events since Berlin, and that there had been created in our minds growing fear that large aggressive movement might be under way vitally affecting our interests. I said I did not myself see clearly any solution, but hoped Molotov might see a possible solution [Page 580] which would avoid undesirable consequences to which I had alluded. I said that I hoped we could find ways of avoiding a growing sense of crisis and the belief that enlarged struggle was almost inevitable.
Mr. Molotov replied with great seriousness that Soviet Union had but one interest in this case which was to contribute to establishment of peace in Indochina. He felt first step was to hear both sides. Molotov said no country, including far away Soviet Union, wished enlargement Indochinese war and he stated his belief that in this respect a great deal depends on United States policy. He said it should be possible by serious attention at Geneva to find solution.
Molotov then briefly reported his talk with Bidault an hour earlier on composition conference (which talk is being reported at length in separate telegram3).
In summary, he stated his view that participants should be Big Four plus Communist China plus three Associated States plus Viet Minh and these nine delegations might agree later on adding other Asian nations with India notable possibility as country particularly interested in Indochina and in position wield conciliatory influence.
I replied that I thought it indispensable that some at least, and, perhaps, all of the Indochinese authorities he had mentioned should have opportunity to participate. I hinted that Indochinese perhaps lack sufficient experience in international affairs to be able alone to find proper solution. I concluded by saying that I would be happy to have the benefit of any idea regarding substance of an acceptable solution before I returned to Washington, and suggested that he might pursue matter at a later meeting when I had had opportunity to study note he had just given me.
After some further inconclusive discussion of subject, Molotov took his leave having failed to rise to any of the flies I had cast.
This, however, does not mean that visit had no significance. Obviously, Molotov would not have to come to see me merely to be a messenger boy to deliver Russian text note. I gather he was anxious for opportunity to see whether I had any substantive suggestions to make to him.
Compared to his appearance at Berlin, Molotov appeared tired and unwell.
At luncheon with Eden and Bidault following this talk, I gave them both gist of this conversation and Bidault reported in full his earlier talk with Molotov on composition Indochina conference.