751G.5/4–2754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

top secret

Dulte 11. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Re Tedul 9.1 If you think wise, please explain to the President that I withheld delivery his message to Laniel2 during my talk with Laniel last Saturday evening, because I felt that delivery approximately coincident my oral appeal would bring reaction of overpressuring France, and also make it seem that what I had said was prearranged rather than informal and spontaneous. French officials as well as public are extremely sensitive over whatever might seem to be an effort on our part to keep France fighting, while we ourselves are unwilling to join the fighting by air measures which the French believe would be limited and would save Dien-Bien-Phu. Also, it would be doubtful wisdom to [Page 579] put either President of Republic or President of Council in a position where if he publicly urged continuance of the struggle, this could be represented as being done not spontaneously but under pressure from the United States.

As you know, I do not share French official or popular estimate of the situation, but that estimate is a fact which I know the President would want us to take into account.

Dulles
  1. In telegram Tedul 9, Apr. 26, Under Secretary Smith informed the Secretary that the President had “approved and accepted your redraft of message to Coty to be sent immediately following fall of Dien Bien Phu, both as to context and timing.” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 264) For the text of the President’s letter to President Coty of France, May 7, see volume xiii or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 463.
  2. For the President’s message to Laniel, transmitted to the Secretary in telegram Tedul 7 to Paris, Apr. 24, see volume xiii.