PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Geneva Conference”
Memorandum by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State
I had a long and private conversation with Chauvel after luncheon today on a personal basis. He gave me his own estimate of the French situation as follows:
The news which the French received the middle of last week that Dien Bien Phu would probably fall in a few days caused an emotionalism in Paris bordering on hysteria. The fact that Dien Bien Phu has not yet fallen has given a little time for further reflection on the part of those French officials who believe that capitulation would be a disaster for France. The problem, as these officials see it, is, in essence, that of gaining time. However, when Dien Bien Phu falls, there is apt to be a wave of emotional defeatism in the parliament and among certain members of the Cabinet which will result in sweeping the Laniel–Bidault team out of office and the formation of a new government dedicated to the proposition that its single mandate is to get out of Indochina. Mendes–France might head such a government. Such a government would also probably be unwilling or unable to push ahead with EDC.
Chauvel said that quite frankly the only hope that Bidault and Laniel see is in rapidly getting on with the Secretary’s proposal for united action in Southeast Asia. He asked whether anything was being done in Washington in the way of consultations or otherwise to get on with the project. He stressed when Dien Bien Phu falls the present French Government must have something to point to to offset the loss of Dien Bien Phu. In other words “There must be something on the fire even if it isn’t entirely cooked.” If there is something in prospect, the present government could point to it and would be much more able to prevent the French parliament and certain leaders being swept away by an emotional wave which would lead them to decide quickly and immediately to abandon Indochina. While obviously armed intervention would be the best thing to be able to point to as evidence that France had gained support from the US, and possibly others, in Indochina, he understood that this was probably not possible because of the attitude of the UK. The next best thing to point to would be a declaration of common purpose such as was envisaged by you. This declaration, as he understood it, would proceed by setting up ad hoc machinery for political and military consultation looking to see what might be done with respect to the defense of Southeast Asia, including Indochina. If it were not possible to get such a declaration, [Page 582] it would still be useful if a public announcement that representatives of the states who have vital security interests in Southeast Asia were consulting with a view to the defense of Southeast Asia. Obviously this latter device would have less appeal than the first two, but it was still something which the French Government could point to. If they had nothing to point to, he did not know what would happen. He said very frankly that neither Laniel nor Bidault knew what the effect of the fall of Dien Bien Phu would be, although the atmosphere in Paris yesterday and today was substantially better than it had been last week during our visit. This however could change with dramatic suddenness with the loss of Dien Bien Phu. When Dien Bien Phu falls, a sudden and violent reaction leading to the disappearance of the Laniel–Bidault Government must be avoided if at all possible. French leaders must weigh the advantages of getting out of Indochina against the great disadvantages in terms of France’s long term interests, but to have time to reflect, they must have hope, and such hope can only come from the prospect of some form of united assistance to France in Indochina, and the US alone can supply this.
He said that Bidault and Laniel’s efforts now are to exercise a calming influence on the situation in Paris. Bidault’s terms of reference at Geneva which the Cabinet approved last Saturday were that outwardly at least the French should treat Geneva like any other international conference. They should stand pat in the first instance on the Laniel cease fire proposals of March 51 and should not go running helter–skelter to the Communist side with a series of new proposals. This would simply lead the Communists to believe that they were on the run and would cause them to raise their ante. In other words, they should wait for the Communists to come to them with propositions and then weight [weigh?] these propositions rather than leading with their chins. The Cabinet agreed to the foregoing on the basis that the U.S. was the key to the situation and that there was considerable hope that U.S. aid would be forthcoming.
Chauvel said that when the Secretary visited Paris two weeks ago the French had been apprehensive that he would ask them then to agree to certain specific courses of action which would give the appearance that France, prior to Geneva, committed itself to a course of action which made any negotiated settlement of Indochina impossible. They were therefore not only relieved but very pleased with his proposal and with the communiqué which was issued.2 They felt that the communiqué would indicate to the Russians and the Chinese that [Page 583] courses of action were being studied, although not definitively decided upon. This was why they had agreed to the establishment of a working group of interested states in Washington. Since the Secretary’s visit two weeks ago, the situation had evolved very considerably and now that the Geneva Conference had begun, the French felt that it was possible and understandable in terms of their own public opinion to proceed ahead with the establishment of some form of ad hoc international machinery to examine the possibility for outside action in the defense of Southeast Asia. He recognized that the British were opposed to doing anything but hoped that he could persuade them or [to] do something of some kind that could be pointed to by Bidault and Laniel even if the British would not come along. He emphasized repeatedly that it was desperately important to have something to point to before the time when Dien Bien Phu had fallen.
He said that he had recommended to Bidault and the latter had agreed that in any talks he has with Molotov dealing with a solution to Indochina, he should continue to stand pat on the Laniel proposals and wait for a Communist counter–proposal. Such a counter–proposal would be examined on its merits and would of course have full consultation with us and the British. He said that Bidault believed that if Molotov could be led to expect that if the Communists did not let up in Indochina the war would be expanded, this would be one of the best means of keeping pressure on the Communists. I gathered that Bidault is toying with the idea in some future conversation with Molotov with remarking that if Dien Bien Phu falls, a situation will arise involving additional outside support for France in Indochina with the inevitable possibility of extension of conflict. In other words, to imply that if the Communists do not wish to expand the war and have the U.S. and possibly others join France, they should not try to carry Dien Bien Phu by assault.