Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 287
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Merchant)
Participants:
- Sir Harold Caccia
- C. A. E. Shuckburgh
- Livingston T. Merchant
Following the Secretary’s talk before lunch with Mr. Eden1 the three participants listed above adjourned for luncheon for the purpose of further discussing what specific steps the British and we [Page 578] might jointly take to shore up the French will. I told both of them that the British abandonment of the terms of the communiqué of April 132 had cut the legs out from under the Secretary’s project for an ad hoc coalition. I said they did not seem to appreciate that it was intended as a deterrent, which by creating restraints on the other side would reduce the risk of our being forced to intervene. They both denied that this would have been its effect. I replied that in fact the failure to create the coalition was actually increasing the risk of intervention. We argued this back and forth for a time.
With regard to the French we agreed that both our delegations should take every occasion to buck up the French and to attempt to get them to see Dien Bien Phu in proper perspective. They felt strongly, and I was inclined to agree, that the best course would be to get on with the Indochina negotiations rather than delay. They admitted that in the absence of their willingness to consider intervention there was little in the way of concrete support they could offer.
- Reported in telegram Dulte 13, Apr. 27, supra.↩
- For text of the communiqué issued following talks between Dulles and Eden on Apr. 13, see telegram Secto 2, Apr. 13, in volume xiii or press release 192 in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.↩