Office of the Historian

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Bonsal Memos”

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)1

secret
[Paris,] April 22, 1954.

Indochina Phase

prospects for “united action” in indochina2

The purpose of this paper is to examine the political prospects and implications of a military “united action” in Indochina which would add sufficient military assets to the present Franco-Vietnamese forces to ensure a defeat at least of the Vietminh regular divisions.

The Franco-Vietnamese effort in Indochina has to date been based upon the following factors:

(1)
A military strategy3 involving the destruction of the Vietminh regular divisions during the 1954–55 fighting season by a Franco-Vietnamese striking force to be built up eventually to some 20 Groupes Mobiles or regimental combat teams. About half these units would be constituted by the French expeditionary corps and the remainder would be the best elements of the Vietnamese National Army. (The proportion of Vietnamese soldiers involved would, however, be considerably in excess of 50% owing to the large numbers of Vietnamese included in French expeditionary corps units). The assumption has been that once the Vietminh regular divisions had been defeated or dispersed, the Vietnamese military and civil authorities would be able to handle the remaining rebel elements and restore peace and security throughout the country.
(2)
A political strategy involving the creation of an independent Vietnamese Government with all the attributes of sovereignty and the association of that Government in a French Union conceived of as a group of sovereign states freely banded together to further their [Page 549] mutual interests. This French Union concept has probably been the major factor in keeping French parliamentary support for the war effort in Indochina above the danger point.

The impact of an application of “united action”, i.e., effective US air and naval support for the Franco-Vietnamese forces would be as follows:

1)
On the military plane, a recognition of the failure of the earlier strategy. In other words, a demonstration of the fact that the French expeditionary corps of 180,000 men and the Vietnamese army of perhaps 200,000 men plus massive U.S. end-item assistance are not strong enough to defeat a purely Vietnamese Vietminh army of 300,000 (of whom about 100,000 are regulars), supported by considerable but nevertheless comparatively small Chinese Communist assistance in end-items. Not only is the Navarre plan for decisive military results in jeopardy, but it also appears from recent indications that General Navarre may not even be able to maintain a stalemate. In other words, “united action” will be not only designed to achieve an early victory in this eight years war but also to avoid a very possible defeat of the Franco-Vietnamese forces.
2)
On the political plane there will be three major implications:
(a)
From the point of view of France, a demonstration of the fact that France is either unable or unwilling to do what is necessary to defend the French Union against aggression;
(b)
That the attempt to form, in accordance with the Bao Dai formula, a strong nationalist Government and army in opposition to the Vietminh has failed;
(c)
That whatever regime may be established in Vietnam depends for its existence less on its own political force and military power or on that of the French Union than on the factor of US willingness to intervene forcibly when and as necessary. The possibilities open to the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists for an infinite variety of guerrilla, terroristic, sabotage and generally subversive activities with a strong nationalistic appeal would be infinite.

Conclusion: Every effort must be made to convince the French and the Vietnamese that a failure to achieve success within the present framework, a failure to furnish all the means necessary to that end (including French conscripts and a major stepping up of American material aid) would be suicidal from the point of view of French interests generally, of the interests of the current Vietnamese regime and of free world interests in the Far East. The “united action” alternative, useful as it may be in improving the chances of a negotiated settlement, is a very poor second choice, if carried to the action stage. Its ultimate political success seems highly dubious both in terms of Indochina and in terms of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East generally.

Philip W. Bonsal
  1. Bonsal was an adviser to the United States Delegation to the Geneva Conference and was traveling with Secretary of State Dulles on the way to Geneva.↩
  2. For documentation on “United Action”, see volumes xii and xiii.↩
  3. The Navarre Plan.↩