Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Secretary’s memoranda of conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting¹

secret

Paris, April 22, 1954—4 p.m.

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Johnson
  • Ambassador Heath
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Admiral Davis
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Achilles
  • Mr. McBride
• U.K.
  • Mr. Eden
  • Mr. Caccia
  • Ambassador Jebb
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Reilly
  • Mr. Nutting
• France
  • M. Bidault
  • M. Schumann
  • General Ely
  • M. Parodi
  • Ambassador Chauvel
  • M. de Latournelle
  • M. de Margerie
  • M. Baeyens
  • M. Lacoste
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Folin
  • M. Andronikoff (interpreter)

Reply to Latest Soviet Note on Geneva

M. Bidault² opened the meeting by stating that there was no fixed agenda and as the host he would make the first statement. Referring initially to the tripartite reply to the Soviet Note regarding the inviting powers for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, M. Bidault read a U.S.-French draft of a reply (See Tab A).³ He stressed the need to reply clearly to the false Soviet allegations regarding composition of the Geneva Conference. He stressed that it had always been understood that special responsibility devolved on the four Berlin powers, and that in any event we should not open the Geneva Conference by violating the basis of the understanding on which the meeting was set up.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the draft be put in the positive rather than the negative sense and that it should stress the fact that the Geneva Conference must be held on the basis under which it was established at Berlin. M. Bidault and the Secretary agreed with this thought.

Participation in Indochina Phase

M. Bidault then passed to the question of participants in the Indochina phase of the Conference, and said that we might consider as a formula the four Berlin powers plus the three Associated States and the limitrophe states of Communist China (already invited), Thailand and Burma. He said that there was a problem which did not involve the French Government but rather the Vietnamese Government in the presence of the Vietminh. He said that Vietnam was, of course, an independent Associated State within the French Union and whose Government would strongly prefer that Ho Chi Minh not be present. Therefore the French position will be to oppose the presence of the Vietminh and to propose an invitation to the three Associated States. If the first French position is rejected by the Soviets, the second French position would be to accept Vietminh presence in some restricted capacity. If the Soviets insist on the same status for Ho as for Vietnam, the French Government will consult the Bao Dai Government before taking a position. Therefore, the French position, after proposing full participation for the Associated States, if the Soviets press the point, will be to seek some formula which will give the appearance of avoiding Vietminh participation at the same level.

The Secretary commented that there was one question not bearing on the substance of this problem but on the Note we had agreed upon. He said that the sentence which stated that all participants should be equal after the Korean and Indochinese talks had got underway might block the French search for some different status for Ho, which could give the appearance that he was not on the same level as the Vietnamese Government. The Secretary noted that perhaps we could claim that the Vietminh delegates did not represent a state, while the Berlin communiqué had specified that invitations would be extended to representatives “of other interested states”, but he did believe that the sentence in question might make it more difficult to create any special and subordinate status for the Vietminh.

M. Bidault stated that France does not consider the Vietminh a state though the Soviet Union, which has recognized the Ho regime, and the Communist Chinese who help it do. He noted that France considers the three governments of the Associated States which received thirty-three votes for admission to the UN and with whom France maintains diplomatic relations as the only legitimate governments of the area. He said that, by the French definition, the idea that only states should participate would exclude the Ho regime. However, he would accept the presence of Ho if it would facilitate the end of the Indochina war, even though he could not be considered a representative of a state. He was particularly anxious to avoid the de facto acceptance of Ho which we had avoided at Berlin.

French Reaffirmation of Independence of Associated States

M. Bidault continued stating that the text of the Note which he had read seemed to reject clearly the Soviet proposal, and reaffirmed the special status of the four powers. He then said he was making a separate supplementary proposal, and read a statement regarding French reaffirmation of the independence of the three Associated States. The statement, after reaffirming the full independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, stated the resolve of the French Government to safeguard the freedom of the Indochinese peoples, and guaranteed that France would do everything possible so that they could exercise this independence, and live at peace. France also was resolved to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Associated States, and to prevent all attempts at disrupting the status of independence which had been freely accorded them. M. Bidault concluded that this declaration by the French Government would supplement the declaration of July 3, 1953.⁴ He said that this had not been shown to the French Government yet, but he felt the Cabinet would approve it.

The Secretary inquired whether the statement which M. Bidault had just read would be appended to the Note to the Soviets which we had agreed upon earlier in the meeting. M. Bidault said that the statement which he had read regarding the independence of the Associated States was, of course, intended only for the French Government to make, and that this was just a rough draft, not intended to be issued right away.⁵

M. Bidault continued stating that insofar as the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference was concerned, Communist China was so far the only invited power, though she was clearly not an inviting power. He said we were sure to have a long and difficult fight on this issue with the Soviets at Geneva. He noted that the French position was in entire agreement with the U.S. stand.

Reverting to the draft note which he had read at the opening of the meeting, M. Bidault stated that the essential word in the sentence regarding the equality of all participants after the talks got underway was the word “commence”. The Secretary stated that we might want to have some states as observers, so it would be preferable to omit the sentence entirely. Mr. Eden indicated that it would be better to stick as closely as possible to the terms of the Berlin agreement to avoid creating other problems, and thus he also favored deleting the sentence. M. Bidault agreed to omit the sentence and the text of the Note was amended accordingly.

M. Bidault stated that it was essential that there be Tripartite agreement on various problems before the opening of the Geneva Conference and accordingly he asked for a frank expression of the views of his colleagues, stating that he would later give his own frank opinions.

Collective Defense in Southeast Asia

The Secretary stated that last week in Paris and immediately before in London we agreed that our Governments and other interested States in the area would study a collective defense of Southeast Asia. In the view of the U.S. Government, these talks should now proceed as exploratory conversations as soon as practical without delineating initially the scope of the exact final number of participants in advance. He compared the situation with the initial talks which led to the formation of NATO, noting at first, a small group of countries had been involved, that the framework had later expanded and had continued to expand ever since.

The Secretary added that some States were so obviously involved that they could be easily identified while others, such as the United States, were not so immediately threatened but realized the danger in the long run. Whether other States not immediately threatened recognized the danger as we did was not clear as yet. None of this precluded initial talks as laid out in the London and Paris communiqués. The Secretary noted that Thailand, the Philippines and Australia had confirmed their willingness to proceed with talks, while he was under the impression that New Zealand had also accepted. The Secretary said we envisaged initially talks by our political representatives possibly receiving advice from their military advisers as desirable. He was well aware of the delicacy of the task but believed it was essential regardless of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu, and of the campaign in the Tonkin Delta though the situation would, of course, be more urgent if these battles were lost.

The Secretary concluded that the knowledge by the Soviets that a common defense system was in prospect would strengthen our hand at Geneva and help convince the Soviets that they should come to a reasonable agreement. He said this was not for action within a matter of days, but that he would like to hear from the British and French Governments along the lines of last week’s communiqués. The Secretary said that he reserved the right to talk later on details of the Geneva Conference. In view of the NATO meeting tomorrow⁶ which we all had on our minds, and over which M. Bidault must preside, the Secretary suggested that we meet again on Saturday morning⁷ to discuss the Geneva Conference.

M. Bidault stated that unfortunately he had a meeting of the Cabinet on Saturday morning, and that he was obliged to meet with the Ministers to fill them in before the opening of the Geneva talks. The Secretary suggested that in this event that they meet on Saturday afternoon.

[Here follows the remainder of this document; for text, see page 127.]

1. Telegraphic summary of minutes transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 6 from Paris, Apr. 23. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101. “Indochina”; copy also in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 239)

   On Apr. 19 Secretary Dulles in personal messages contained in telegrams 3749 to Paris and 5508 to London suggested to Bidault and Eden the possibility of meeting at Paris on Apr. 22 to discuss preliminaries regarding Geneva. (110.11 DU/4–1954)

   For the portion of these minutes pertaining to the Korean phase of the conference, see p. 127.

2. In telegram Dulte 5 from Paris, Apr. 22, Secretary Dulles informed Acting Secretary Smith that for “background you should know that at tripartite meeting this afternoon Bidault appeared totally exhausted mentally and unable to preside coherently. He is obviously under great strain as a result of developments I reported in my earlier telegram to you today [French leaders considered Dien Bien Phu situation hopeless; see Dulte 2, Apr. 22, in volume xiii.] and infirmity due to this rather than other causes.” (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”)
3. Tab A is printed with the portion of these minutes pertaining to the Korean phase; for text, see p. 130.
4. See footnote 3, p. 537.
5. See telegram 3985 from Paris. Apr. 21, p. 541.
6. Apr. 23.
7. Apr. 24.