Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 265
Memorandum on Tripartite Talks in Paris, April 21–24, 19541
Résumé of Informal US-UK-French Preparatory Talks in Paris on Indochina Phase of Geneva Conference
1. Participation
The French indicated that their preliminary thinking does not favor formal participation of the Associated States. If they participate, the French do not see how the Viet Minh could be excluded, although the presence of the Communist puppet governments of Cambodia and Laos could probably be resisted. France feels the problem could best be handled by giving the Associated States and the Viet Minh (and perhaps the Laotian and Cambodian puppet governments) a special status as limited conference participants deriving in essence from the immediacy of their conflict of interests. They would be neither full participants nor observers but their representatives would be readily available for participation as the occasion required, thus avoiding any discussion of the legal basis of these governments and confrontation across the conference table. In order to avoid the Five Power connotation and to keep the Conference as small as possible the French are inclined to favor the Big Four, Communist China, Burma and Thailand as the participating powers.
The Vietnamese Foreign Minister, now in Paris, told the French he fully expected the French to propose Vietnamese participation but to object to the expected Soviet proposal for Viet Minh participation and to try instead to get the Ho government considered under a different status from Vietnam. We and the UK stated our hope that the Associated States would not only be invited but would accept. The UK prefers keeping participation down to the Big Four, Communist China, the Associated States and the Viet Minh only, citing the anticipated pressures from Commonwealth countries and others if participation is extended beyond Indochinese borders. All agreed it would be difficult to keep out the Viet Minh, the French adding that they would accept the Viet Minh presence only under the Berlin formula that it did not involve recognition.
2. Possible Military Settlement
In general terms, the French position is apparently in the direction of finding, as the first step, some basis for a cease-fire on purely military grounds with political negotiations to follow. The French military [Page 551] experts are studying Laniel’s March 5 cease-fire conditions (Attached) to determine the needed guarantees and safeguards which could achieve Laniel’s objective of guaranteeing the security of the French and Associated States forces and other friendly elements. The French believe, however, that Laniel’s conditions would be viewed by the Communists as too harsh and would, therefore, not permit sufficient latitude for negotiating purposes. Hence, the French are thinking of securing the psychological initiative by first offering to disengage Laos and Cambodia from the military scene (i.e. by mutual withdrawal of all forces from the two countries except for the basis of Xieng Khouang and Seno which the French are permitted to garrison under the terms of the Franco-Laotian treaty. They emphasize that French Union forces could be moved by air within little more than an hour to any point endangered in Laos if the Royal Army was unable to cope with the situation.) Then consideration would be given to a possible cease-fire in Vietnam.
The British were not too concerned and thought it might at least give the French a talking point initiative in the negotiating process.
The French seemed to think there could be a cease-fire in Indochina without a political settlement, as was the case in Korea. They apparently attach considerable importance to recent expressions of goodwill and a desire to be of service from the Soviet Ambassador in Paris. They emphasize their thinking on the subject, however, is tentative only.
3. Timing of Indochina Phase
All agreed that timing (and participation) must be resolved by the Big Four Ministers. The French hope the issue will be raised as soon as possible at Geneva.