795.00/5–554: Telegram
Dean—Briggs—Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 5, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation
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45. Sent priority Department 1115, repeated information Tokyo 657. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Ambassador Briggs and Dean called on President early this morning. Acting Foreign Minister Cho, Minister of Defense and Prime Minister present. Reference Geneva’s 39,1 explained probably intransigent attitude USSR and Chinese Communists at Geneva and apparent small possibility agreement and therefore imperative necessity free world standing together and presenting united front and united proposal which would command unquestioned free world opinion. Told him we were prepared to stand firm on basic principles set forth in plan B and urged him to authorize Pyun accept without necessity of any [troop withdrawal?] as condition to holding of elections in both North and South.
We were interrupted by necessity his going to make scheduled public appearance at children’s festival and will go back at 2 p.m.
They are all sincerely troubled by provisions in plan B which presupposes simultaneous elections in North and South although Chinese Communists in North have only begun to withdraw according I and IV plan B.
Referring to supposed free elections elsewhere, where Soviet troops present, they asked if we seriously believed it would be possible to hold anything like free elections in North so long as Chinese Communist troops still in North or North Korean troops remain unsurrendered. They ridiculed idea of a civilian organization such as UNCURK, even though enhanced by numerous civilian observers, bringing about free elections and again cited experience east European countries.
They cannot understand why, since Chinese Communists are aggressors and UN forces were invited by UN and ROK, there should be any corresponding withdrawal from South as envisaged by IV [Page 203] and President insists we are merely paving way for repetition 1949 withdrawal and 1950 aggression. Cites long experience General Hodge2 in attempting to get Soviets to agree and to carry out anything even when agreed.
They are also fearful that next step after elections in North with Chinese Communist armies present would be demand for coalition government which they say Korean people would never accept. They also feel simultaneous elections somehow constitute reflection on existing ROK Government which they regard as sovereign and as so recognized by United Nations after free elections. (Plan not very clear that ROK constitution remains in effect throughout. Believe II (e) (g) bothers President as presupposes North Korean legislation and cooperation Communists.)
Urged President keep open mind and not to draft anything before we return at 2 p.m. At that time will urge necessity revised instructions to Pyun along line your 39 and that it is an essential favorable American public opinion re ROK that we stand together at Geneva. They have basic fear that plan B is merely first step in whittling-down process. President made long plea for collective security pact for entire Pacific with instantaneous striking power. Fact ROK Government was not included in Secretary’s recent discussions still rankles.
Do you think possible amend plan B by making provision for Chinese Communist withdrawal much more specific before elections actually held? Such as: “Before elections are held under observation of UNCURK all Chinese forces shall have been withdrawn from Korea, or such withdrawal shall have taken place to the point where UNCURK shall certify that the remaining Communist troops constitute no threat to the holding of democratic elections free from intimidation”, or some similar general provision. Believe President will also want same assurance about North Korean Communist army. Again, since ROK is sovereign and not the aggressor they can’t understand why they should be stripped of protection in order to get aggressor out if they desire United Nations forces stay.
Fundamentally, they don’t trust any piece of paper either the Soviets or the Chinese or North Korean Communists will sign. They further believe once paper signed, we will urge them to cooperate even though Soviets do not in order satisfy world opinion which will leave them in undefendable position.