Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

396.1–LO/5–350: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State

secret

London, May 3, 1950—2 p. m.

Secto 98. From Jessup. Second meeting Subcommittee on Near East took place yesterday morning with same participants as yesterday [May 1] (Secto 75).¹ Meeting covered following points:

1. Regional arrangements. Wright reverted question examination possible alternative forms of regional arrangement which had occupied group yesterday at British initiative. Specifically, he said UK had been examining idea of getting Near East countries themselves to make statement along lines of NAT. Wright admitted FonOff did not really feel such arrangement feasible for NE and then reverted suggestion made at yesterday’s meeting regarding statement which would give some reassurance to NE and perhaps other areas as well re nonexclusive nature NAT. We again suggested this was far-reaching question with implications extending beyond NE and that we felt it should be discussed with those responsible for NAT negotiations.

2. Arms and stability. Group reverted questions of arms shipments and reassuring statement re security area. Wright stated FonOff had considered on working level points which we had made yesterday. FonOff representatives then developed following points:

a. In considering arms shipment we need firm facts. UK chiefs of staff have recently made survey of relative strengths of NE states. It might be useful for US and UK to consider common arms policy and to transform present UK study into joint study, pooling information re present arms on hand and current applications. This would be reviewed periodically and would enable us assess rather wild statements being made by both sides.

b. Re our suggested statement on obtaining assurances from NE states (paragraph A 2, recommendations D 2 a²) FonOff wondered whether this could be adopted and carried further by adding that US and UK (and perhaps France) had decided institute joint consultations re arms applications and would issue arms to countries in accordance their needs.

Hare questioned feasibility foregoing, pointing out UK has treaty arrangements with number of states in area. He wondered whether we both could work from identical pattern. While we desire exchange information and may in practice consult jointly, he questioned advisability saying so publicly and thereby place ourselves in position where we publicly either had uphold or disapprove action of other. UK group, on Wright’s suggestion, produced draft statement embodying following elements: paragraph A 2 of recommendations D 2 a; paragraphs a and b above; and recommendation one of D 3.³ After considering this draft, it was agreed delete section containing suggestion re exchange information and joint consultation. Resulting draft declaration being telegraphed separately and we would appreciate Department’s comments.⁴ FonOff is sending text to UK chiefs of mission in NE for their comments on substance, timing and question French participation. We suggest Department may wish take similar action.

In group’s consideration of question of obtaining assurances from each NE state that it would not undertake aggression against any other state, FonOff representatives felt it might be preferable for UK obtain renewed assurances from each state immediately and then note fact in joint declaration that such assurances had been obtained. Hare pointed out that while we did not wish to be against virtue, nevertheless he thought that certain undesirable speculation might result among Arabs if UK suddenly made simultaneous approaches at this time all Arab state capitals in endeavor obtain such assurances. There would be suspicions UK motives, and subsequent joint action UK, US and possibly France might be prejudiced. Moreover, there might be difficulty obtaining such assurances from states to which UK has no present plans for shipping arms. On further reflection, Wright felt it would be preferable for FonOff consider obtaining assurances at present time from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt only.

3. PRA. Hare emphasized our concern re current situation and outlined our case along lines D16b.⁵ Wright indicated appreciation and agreement considerations which we had brought out. He felt this was matter on which Secretary should speak to Bevin and Schuman.

In subsequent discussion, group felt whole question of PRA contributions was one which might also be discussed other members NAT council during forthcoming meeting (Department please comment).

4. Saudi Arabia. Hare outlined our attitude re SA–Persian Gulf sheikhdoms border negotiations along lines D 15.⁶ FonOff “preliminary reactions” to our suggestion re direct negotiations between SAG and Sheiks with UK advising latter were: (a) this might constitute abrogation UK special treaty re sheikhdoms; and (b) balance of strength in negotiations would be on Saudi side, which might not be conducive fair settlement of problem. For its part, UK considering making fresh approach to SAG shortly after issuance joint statement which group now has under consideration re stability in area (section two above). FonOff feels this statement will be reassuring to Ibn Saud re his fears of Hashemite aggression and create favorable atmosphere for resumption negotiations. At time new approach, UK proposes reply last SAG note stating that provided SAG recognizes UK right to negotiate on behalf Sheik of Abu Dhabi and Sultan of Muscat in respect areas claimed by them, UK willing enter into joint study of frontiers with SAG, discussion of boundaries of individual states being subject to overall agreement on frontiers as whole.

Hare asked whether it would be possible associate any of officials of sheikhdoms with Fact-Finding Commission and FonOff representatives thought this could possibly be done. Re recommendation 4, FonOff representatives did not feel arbitration would be of much value unless facts first established. They did not think UK would object to arbitration once facts established, provided there were elements in situation conducive to lasting settlement. Foreign Office representatives will consider recommendation 5 and give us their views at subsequent meeting.⁷

[

Jessup

]

1. The meeting took place at 10:30 a. m. on May 2, in the India Office.

2. Paragraph A2 of the recommendations of FM D D–2a read:

   “2. He [Secretary Acheson] might also suggest to Messrs. Schuman and Bevin that the US, UK and France make public declarations that they will not permit the shipment of arms to any Near Eastern country unless the purchasing country gives to the supplying country formal assurances to undertake no aggression against any other Near Eastern state.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series)

3. Recommendation 1 of FM D D–3 suggested that the Foreign Ministers make separate statements conforming to the draft declaration quoted in footnote 3, p. 977.
4. The draft under reference was sent in Secto 106, May 3 (5 p. m.), not printed, and the Department of State informed the Delegation on May 4 in Tosec 93, not printed, that its preliminary reaction to the declaration was favorable although it would have preferred stronger language on maintaining the peace and stability of the Near East (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 151: Secto and Tosec Cables).
5. Not printed; it recommended that Secretary Acheson request a contribution of about $12 million from the British and $6 million from the French for the Palestine Relief Agency over a period of 18 months. Two earlier drafts of this paper, FM D D–16 and 16a, both dated April 17, neither printed, made the same recommendations. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series)

6. FM D D–15, dated April 25, not printed, made the following recommendations with respect to Saudi Arabia:

   • “1. The Delegation should point out to the British Delegation that the U.K. threat to return to the 1913–14 proposed line of demarcation appears as extreme as the Saudi Arabian claims.
   • “2. The Delegation should suggest to the British Delegation that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is not conducive to its orderly development and tranquility, and that the recent settlement of the Abu Dhabi–Dubai boundary by arbitral award sets an admirable example.
   • “3. The Delegation should suggest that a fact-finding investigating commission agreeable to the two governments might be able to reduce the field of differences between the Saudi Arabian Government and the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.
   • “4. The Delegation should also suggest that any remaining differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by means of a neutral commission of arbitration.
   • “5. The Delegation should suggest in a tentative and exploratory manner that it would be profitable if there were direct contact between the King and the rulers in the various Sheikhdoms with the British playing an appropriate advisory role.”

   A second draft of this paper, FM D D–15b, dated May 4, not printed, contained further elaboration on the settlement of the boundary dispute and stressed the United States support of the general British position in the Persian Gulf (CFM Files, ibid.).

7. For the Foreign Office’s views, see Secto 290, May 17, p. 1059.