Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State

secret

London, May 3, 1950—10 p. m.

Secto 114. Third UK–US bipartite meeting subcommittee on Near East took place yesterday afternoon¹ with same participants as in previous meetings with Allen and Edmonds² replacing Furlonge and Sheringham for UK.

Group considered following questions:

1. Eritrea. UK failed produce paper and recommendations D–13 used for basis initial discussions.³ Foreign Office representatives concurred recommendation 1 and 2, observing, however, it might be necessary modify our present position in some respects if necessary effect Italian-Ethiopian rapprochement. Wright emphasized importance of getting Ethiopians and Italians together as condition precedent to Italy playing role in future of Africa. Re 3, Foreign Office felt we would probably have indication re commission’s report before submission to IC and that there might be advantage in endeavoring get Ethiopia and Italy together at this point in order hold conversations as far in advance of IC meeting as possible.⁴ Once question gets in hands of IC, problem of working out bilateral agreement will be vastly complicated. They also felt question location conversations should be left alone until we have had opportunity examine feasibility getting two sides together before IC meeting. They agreed re 4, feeling we could endeavor obtain support our position provided there was at least minority report in favor partition or, alternatively, an Ethiopian-Italian agreement involving partition. Re 5, group thought that on basis recent reports word “unlikely” should be deleted. Foreign Office representatives agreed substance this paragraph but felt that we should both begin consider possible alternative solutions which might be acceptable in event not practical pursue our present position. They thought we might look at following suggestions: (a) partition but with association east Eritrea with Ethiopia on federal basis along lines suggested by US at last session GA,⁵ (b) partition with East Eritrea placed under Ethiopian trusteeship. It was agreed set up sub-group to consider possible alternatives and also to examine question guarantees for Italian community Eritrea, which guarantees Wright emphasized would be essential to Sforza⁶ in selling Italian public solution along partition.

Wright stated Stafford⁷ has reported from Geneva Commission might balk in incorporation west province in Sudan and might approve partition only if UK continues administer this territory. He emphasized problem which this would pose for UK, especially from financial point views. As guidance, Foreign Office has told Stafford UK would be extremely reluctant take on this commitment, but if Commission insists UK would examine question.

2. Libya. Hare followed line D–17.⁸ Wright emphasized financial aspects along usual lines. He emphasized particularly that Pelt⁹ willing go along on question strategic rights only in return for financial assistance. He had already taken this line with UK and would, presumably, raise subject with US to make it clear his cooperation in assisting US to obtain strategic requirements Tripoli would be conditional upon US rendering such financial assistance to Libya. Wright reiterated UK willing and anxious assist US in any appropriate way with Tripolitanians in obtaining our strategic requirements, but that financial assistance is key to problem. Hare took line recommendation B of D–17.

Wright recalled both US and UK have felt that most desirable form for future Libyan state would be loose federal structure. He wondered whether there had been any change in US attitude and Hare confirmed there had not.

3. Egypt. Wright reviewed common appreciation this problem arising from 1947 talks. Hare confirmed there had been no change our basic attitude since that time.

Wright stated UK faced at present time with 2 alternatives: (a) Allow treaty to run on until 1956 without making any effort get longer term agreement and then face up to problem at that time; or (b) negotiate fresh agreement between now and 1956.

In assessing situation and determining how best proceed, UK has constantly kept 2 factors in mind. First is attitude of King,¹⁰ who at present time is favorably disposed in principle to settlement with UK on treaty question. Second factor is character of government. Unless national (i. e. all-party coalition) government in power any agreement acceptable UK doubtful value since opposition party likely repudiate. At present time, Wafd¹¹ in strong position of power. Although this falls short of optimum favorable conditions, it nevertheless enhances responsibility present regime.

Last year Bevin decided tackle problem by making ad hoc arrangement re strategic rights which might make for more favorable atmosphere for treaty negotiations and perhaps obviate altogether necessity for treaty. Slim¹² paid visit Egypt at that time and had helpful conversations with King and Sirry Pasha.¹³ King has now suggested Slim be sent out again and, although decision has been delayed by Bevin’s illness latter now thinks it would be useful and will talk to Slim shortly re possibility.

In this connection British have been wondering whether it might be advisable scrap treaty altogether and have bilateral or perhaps multilateral regional arrangements along lines Wright mentioned yesterday (Secto 75). Primary objective would be some kind of ad hoc defense arrangement with political umbrella such as that which might be provided by associating certain states in area with certain of NAT machinery.

Meanwhile there are 2 additional outstanding UK-Egyptian problems: (a) Financial agreement. UK would like make long-term agreement on sterling balances and get away from present system of annual arrangements; and (b) Sudan. UK considering possible timetable which would provide progressively for (a) Government of Sudan broadening its base; (b) Majority of Sudanese members in Executive Council; (c) Withdrawal all British Government members from Council; and (d) Sudan eventually negotiating its own future with condominium powers, thus removing question from arena UK-Egyptian negotiations.

4. Haifa. Wright asked whether we thought UK alone or UK and other powers should press Iraq further on Haifa pipeline and Egypt on Suez Canal problems. He said Foreign Office had concluded that in case Iraq, no government could survive reopening pipeline. Re Egypt, UK has conflicting advice re legality Egyptian closure Canal to Haifa-bound tankers. Hare emphasized our views re Iraqi angle as set forth recommendation A (a) D–11.¹⁴ Re Egyptian angle, Hare stated we maintain Egyptian action illegal but we have no suggestion as to how to cope with situation. Wright said UK similarly has run out of ideas and is now waiting until it has reconciled legal view.

Question IPC concession was discussed accordance D–11. Wright expressed interest and desire pursue matter further.

1. Held at 4:30 p. m. in the India Office.
2. Roger Allen, Head of the African Department, and Cecil J. Edmonds, Minister, of the Foreign Office.
3. FM D D–13, dated April 18, not printed, recommended (1) that the United States and United Kingdom maintain their position on Eritrea and concert efforts to secure its adoption in the General Assembly, (2) that the Italians and Ethiopians talk directly to each other about Eritrea with United States and United Kingdom assistance, (3) that the best time for such talks would be after the Commission on Eritrea reported to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, (4) that the United States and United Kingdom obtain support for their position on Eritrea as soon after the report is submitted as is practicable, and (5) if the Commission recommends a solution not acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom, that they should consult to determine their future course of action (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series).
4. Further documentation on the work of the Commission on Eritrea and the problem of the former Italian colonies before the Interim Committee of the General Assembly is scheduled for publication in volume v.
5. For documentation on the United States position on Eritrea at the fourth regular session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ii, pp. 361 ff.
6. Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister.
7. Frank E. Stafford, member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, stationed at Geneva.

8. Not printed; FM D D–17, dated April 15, recommended:

   • “A. If Mr. Bevin discusses the problem of securing our joint strategic requirements in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in the process of establishing an independent Libya, it is suggested that you [Secretary Acheson] pursue the following course:
     • “1. Assure Mr. Bevin of continued United States support for securing British military requirements in Cyrenaica.
     • “2. Express satisfaction that the British Foreign Office (subject to Cabinet approval) and Mr. Pelt have been able to work out a satisfactory formula for proceeding with the constitutional development of Libya.
     • “3. Express confidence that the United States and United Kingdom Governments will continue to work closely together in negotiations for the establishment of an independent Libya. In the process, of course, we will concert our efforts for the conclusion of the necessary treaties with respect to British needs in Cyrenaica and United States military facilities in Tripolitania.
   • “B. If Mr. Bevin points out the need of Libya for financial assistance, it is suggested you mention the following:
     • “1. The United States plans to provide substantial Point Four assistance to Libya, particularly Tripolitania, when that program is approved by Congress.
     • “2. The Department is considering ways and means for providing other financial assistance for Tripolitania.”

   In two subsequent drafts of this paper, FM D D–17/1 and 1a, dated April 24 and 27, respectively, neither printed, these recommendations remained unchanged (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series).

9. Adrian Pelt, United Nations High Commission for Libya.
10. King Farouk of Egypt.
11. The Wafd party had won 225 seats in the elections on January 13, 1950, thus obtaining a large majority in the House of Deputies.
12. Field Marshal William J. Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
13. Husein Sirry Pasha, Premier of Egypt before the January elections, became Chief of King Farouk’s personal Cabinet in January.

14. The recommendations in FM D D–11, dated April 21, not printed, read:

    • “(A) If the British and/or French raise the Iraq Petroleum Company-Haifa pipeline issue, the U.S. Government should maintain its position that (a) in view of the existing negative Iraqi attitude, tripartite intercession should not be taken without the injection of some new element into the situation, (b) proposals for diversion or transfer of pipe and/or equipment to Arab territory are appropriate for company rather than tripartite decision and action. If the pipeline issue is raised, the U.S. Government should use the opportunity to state that overall Iraq Petroleum Company problems with Iraq are of more immediate concern to the U.S. Government than the pipeline problem and warrant immediate tripartite attention. Renegotiation of the IPC agreement should not be linked with the opening of the Haifa pipeline.
    • “(B) The U.S. Government should informally State its belief that Iraqi dissatisfaction with the benefits received from the development of the Iraq Petroleum Company concessions constitutes a source of serious instability in the Near East. The U.S. Government believes that Iraqi complaints are to a large extent justified and in view of the policy control exercised by British and French Governments over the Compagnie Française de Petroles and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company, the U.S. Government should endeavor on an informal basis to obtain British and French approval for increasing the benefits realized by Iraq from the development of the Iraq Petroleum Company concessions. Iraq should be assured that (1) scheduled production increases will be accomplished, (2) minimum demands for increased royalties should be met by IPC in order to provide Iraq with increased revenues required for development purposes, and (3) increased company attention, expenditures, progress and publicity should be devoted to minimizing the miscellaneous sources of Iraqi dissatisfaction with the manner in which Iraq oil resources are being developed.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series)