Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

396.1–LO/5–250: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State

secret

London, May 2, 1950—noon.

Secto 75. From Jessup. First meeting subcommittee on Near East took place yesterday afternoon with Wright, Furlonge, Evans, Sheringham for UK and Hare, Palmer, and Utter for US.¹

Wright opened meeting by referring international situation as developed previously in conferences with Jessup. He then referred to US–UK conferences in 1947 and 1949 which had accomplished for NE area what current talks designed develop for all geographic areas. He assumed basic objectives set forth during those conferences still obtain and Hare confirmed they did.

Wright then passed to number specific problems which UK thought might constructively be discussed during course current bilateral conversations. These points, not all of which on agenda and on some of which British thinking obviously undeveloped, may be summarized as follows:

1. Iran, which UK considers one of soft spots in defense against Communist expansion in NE and which may constitute increasing temptation to USSR.

2. Turkey, to which UK has been giving much consideration. Foreign Office consider Turkey as solid and fighting country and has given much thought question whether anything additional might be done to buttress situation there. Turks have been informing UK that they would like regional agreement and they hoped that US and UK may be able to do more to consolidate Turkish position. For its part, UK has been wondering whether it might be worthwhile consider associating both Turkey and Egypt in some sort Eastern Mediterranean defense arrangement. Wright understood consideration which made it difficult for US to associate itself in such arrangement and then launched into rather rambling discourse on possible other forms NE pacts, such as (a) one in which Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa might participate; (b) defense arrangement, without political commitments which might take form either of defense committee including some or all of NE countries, which would study with UK and US what would be done in event of war, or alternatively, association of some or all NE countries with some organ of NAT.

Hare stated that we had not come prepared to discuss Turkey which is not on agenda but would be glad consider any ideas UK might have. With regard regional pact, we have felt our commitments in Europe of such nature and scope that we can’t be sure at this point what they will add up to. We have been approached frequently by both Greeks and Turks, but our policy of not taking on any additional commitments at this time remains constant. Turkey had also raised question of possible interlocking effect of tripartite Anglo-French-Turkish agreement with NAT, but it was our feeling that the relation between these pacts not sufficiently clear to draw any conclusions in principle but rather that any possible related application would depend upon specific circumstances as they arose. Re defense arrangement along lines (b) above, we have taken line we do not see how staff talks could be undertaken seriously and constructively without prior political agreement.

Wright replied UK had been proceeding on same assumption, but he wondered whether we should not look at question again. He felt we must find some means of associating certain countries with NAT as we wish to avoid giving impression exclusive character NAT. He had no specific suggestions to make with regard this problem as applied NE but he thought it was something we might profitably look into during course next few days in connection with any statement on NAT which might emanate from conference. Hare agreed re undesirability of giving impression exclusive character NAT and observed question arose not only re NE but other areas such as South Asia. He suggested this was matter on which might be brought attention those responsible for NAT negotiations.

3. Palestine. Wright observed there were several questions which might be discussed, including the supply of arms and a reassuring statement with reference security area. UK representatives in field expressed doubt regarding possibility any stable arrangement in area without UK–US guarantee of frontiers. There was also question of status quo in area and whether any change would result in stability.

Hare stated that we particularly wished discuss these subjects. With regard to arms question, we would like to assure ourselves both US and UK are proceeding from same premises in their consideration of this problem. This question not only important from point of view future peace and stability of area, but delicate from public relations angle. Particularly we wish to inquire whether our analysis to effect; that trend in NE away from war and toward peace is in conformity British estimate and also to assure ourselves that British shipments of arms to NE, particularly to Egypt, were clearly directed to fostering security of area.

Wright replied UK view chances of resumption hostilities in NE as remote in foreseeable future. He discounted military capabilities any Arab state. While intentions present government of Israel not aggressive he thought influence of extremist elements, pressure generated by unrestricted immigration and economic unviability of Israel combined to make more likely possibility Israeli expansion than Arab aggression. Nevertheless, he saw no danger in foreseeable future. Regardless of potentialities, it was important recognize mutual fears and suspicions prevailed on both sides.

Hare agreed that question of fear was important factor and stated that we had two specific suggestions to make to assist allaying those fears: (a) address statement to arms question itself (which he outlined along lines contained D–2²) and (b) general reassuring statement along lines D–3.³

Wright seemed generally interested in and receptive to these suggestions, but in discussion that followed other members of Foreign Office raised series of objections and doubts including following:

They doubt desirability of French participation, stating that French influence in area at low ebb and that their participation would have weakening effect. Wright inquired whether we were irrevocably decided on tripartite declaration and whether choice is between this and no declaration at all. Hare replied his instructions call for tripartite statement but for discussion question with French only after prior conversations with UK. If Foreign Office opposed French participation, we would like have their reasons. Wright observed if French not included it would be necessary delay issuance statement until after conference in deference French sensibilities.

Statement, as presently worded in our draft, might be interpreted as freezing status quo in NE. Some members of UK staff felt that some territorial change in NE inevitable and that use of force inherent in situation, mentioning specifically possible succession difficulties in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Hare took strong exception this attitude arguing that its acceptance would constitute turning clock back in resolution of problems in Arab world. We stressed effort being made in UN and otherwise to develop concept peaceful and orderly solution of international difficulties. He mentioned as example US attitude on Iraqi-Syrian union.⁴ We don’t oppose change per se but feel it should be by orderly process.

Wright stated these questions not being raised because UK disagreed with principle of suggestions but merely to bring out some of the problems inherent in situation and which they thought we should consider before deciding issue of such statement. He said Foreign Office representatives would consider our suggestions which would be taken up at subsequent meetings.

Regarding British policy of withholding arms shipments to Israel, Wright said British chiefs-of-staff and Foreign Office sympathetic to idea of making appropriate sales of arms but it had been found inadvisable thus far to modify policy due primarily special British relation with certain Arab countries. Here again Wright seemed more open-minded on this subject than his colleagues who could see only adverse considerations in any relaxation of present policy. Wright said that British were particularly concerned re shipment of potent items such as jets and tanks which he said were what Israel really wanted. We asked whether relaxation which would indicate British impartiality would be helpful and observed would be extremely undesirable to be placed in position of British being regarded as purveyors to Arabs and US to Israel. Wright agreed wholeheartedly.

Some Foreign Office representatives also took attitude that any type of declaration or statement valueless since would not be credited by either Arabs or Israel. Hare took position that if this defeatist policy were accepted, there was no hope for stability in NE. It was true that words not backed by intentions would be valueless, but if UK and US really made up their minds and could take firm stand, none of NE states would be likely to flaunt it.

Following is summary of foregoing:

1. Both sides reaffirmed basic points on which agreed 1947 and 1949.

2. Both sides agreed possibility counteract impression which might be created in NE and also other areas regarding exclusive character of NAT.

3. UK would study our suggestions re recommendations D–2 and D–3 including question French participation.

4. UK felt it would be desirable to study possibility some form NEA regional arrangement. We said we would be glad to have any ideas they may have regarding this suggestion.

Group will consider Saudi Arabia and PRA tomorrow morning and Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea afternoon.

Would appreciate receiving soonest information re proposed action Iran, since British desire discuss as matter of urgency.

[

Jessup

]

1. Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department; Trefor E. Evans, Joint Secretary of the Middle East (Official) Committee; Joseph Palmer II, Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in the United Kingdom; John E. Utter, Second Secretary at the United States Embassy in France and Assistant to Assistant Secretary Hare during the preliminary meetings.
2. FM D D–2, “Arms Shipments to Arab States and Israel,” dated April 3, not printed, recommended that the United States suggest to the French—an exchange of information on arms shipments, to the British—that they review their arms program for Egypt, and trilaterally—“(a) French and British statements that they are keeping close watch on the Palestine situation, and (b) that US, UK and France obtain formal assurances from Near Eastern countries that arms shipped will not be used for aggressive purposes.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series) A second draft of this paper, FM D D–2a, dated April 20, recommended the same suggestions (CFM Files, ibid.).

3. The declaration in FM D D–3, “Near Eastern Security,” dated April 24, not printed, read:

   “The Government of ——, deeply interested in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East, reaffirms its policy of constant support of the political independence and territorial integrity of the states in that area. It continues unalterably opposed to the violation of the frontiers of states through external force. The Government of ——, should it receive reliable information that any Near Eastern state was preparing to violate existing frontiers or armistice lines, would take most immediate action, both within and without the United Nations, to prevent such violations.” (CFM Files, ibid.)

   A second draft of this paper, FM D D–3a, dated April 28, not printed, contains, a similar declaration (CFM Files, ibid.).

4. The United States attitude on an Iraqi-Syrian union was set forth in FM D D–12, dated April 25, not printed, which recommended that the Western states should allow the situation to develop without interference, but they should state their “opposition to any attempt to prevent the two countries from making their own decision.” (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series)