Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 44

Memorandum by the Canadian North Atlantic Council Deputy (Pearson) to the North Atlantic Council Deputies ¹

secret

London, November 17, 1950.

D–D/169

North Atlantic Reorganisation

1. At its New York Session, the North Atlantic Council asked the advice of the Defence Committee on a number of questions of organisation relating to the establishment of the Integrated Force. At the same time, the Working Group of Council Deputies arranged for groups of experts to meet in London this month to study reorganisation on the civil side, particularly in relation to production and finance.

2. During the Council’s New York Meetings, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested that enlarged responsibilities in immediate prospect gave new urgency to the problem of reorganisation of the structure of the NATO, particularly at the top.

3. This Memorandum sets out the Canadian approach to the problem based on two assumptions:—

(a) That there is a general recognition by member Governments that the increased responsibilities of the NATO now makes necessary some degree of reorganization, and that it is timely to examine the problem as a whole while certain particular aspects of it are under consideration;

(b) That, if possible any changes in the organization that may be necessary or advisable should be made without alteration of the Treaty, that is by appropriate revision of the “by-laws” of the NATO, so to speak, rather than by amendment to its “constitution.” (This, we think can be accomplished by revising previous decisions of the Council and the Defence Committee.)

4. Under the present structure, with three separate Committees of Ministers, the problem of coordination is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve simply through the Council Deputies. The NATO hierarchy of Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers does not correspond accurately to any precise division of responsibilities in the Governernment of member countries. Further, if the present Ministerial structure of the NATO is not modified, the increasing importance of production and supply problems may well lead logically to proposals for the establishment of a fourth body at the Ministerial level, to correspond with those on defence and finance.

5. The prospect of four separate Committees of Ministers, each composed of colleagues of equal status in their own Governments although three of the Committees are formally subordinate to the fourth, emphasizes the necessity for combining all activities of the NATO under one Supreme Council which would represent Governments. At such a Council, Governments might, according to their own domestic requirements and the nature of the agenda, be represented by one or more Ministers. (Representation by Prime Ministers should not be excluded. For example if the Council were to meet in Ottawa the Canadian Prime Minister might represent the Government of Canada.)

6. We recognize that such a solution would increase the number of persons attending Meetings of the Council. Nevertheless, the advantages to be gained by introducing into the highest body of the NATO where policy is formulated, Ministers directly responsible in their own Governments for defence, finance and supply seem to us sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of numbers. Further, the practice of meeting in Sub-Committees might make Council Sessions less cumbrous.

7. Such a reorganisation of the Council would confirm and enhance the prestige and importance of the Council Deputies which would then emerge quite clearly as the active continuing authority of the NATO. The Deputies would no longer be merely the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers as they are now at least in form. They would also represent their other Ministers concerned with North Atlantic matters; in fact, between Council Sessions, they would represent Governments and be in a position to speak for the NATO. It would not seem that any new directive would be required for this development. It could be taken to follow directly from the establishment of the “Council of Governments” which we have suggested.

8. On the military side, the reorganisation we have in mind would imply that the Standing Group would become directly responsible to the Council and, when the Council was not sitting, to the Deputies.

9. However, in view of the limited membership of the Standing Group, the Military Committee should be reorganised as a continuing advisory or consultative body of the Standing Group. This could be done by appointing the accredited representatives in Washington of all countries not members of the Standing Group as Deputies to their respective Chiefs of Staff. This reconstituted Military Committee would then meet with the Standing Group from time to time and its new terms of reference could provide that, on occasion, the Chiefs of Staff themselves could attend.

10. This redefinition of the functions of the Military Committee would contribute to a solution of the problem which the Council has asked the Defence Committee to examine, namely, establishing a close relationship between the accredited representatives and the Standing Group. The importance of this close relationship will of course become even more obvious when the Standing Group has been reorganised as, in effect, a Combined Chiefs of Staff.

11. By constituting the accredited representatives in Washington as a Continuing Committee, the provision of the Treaty for a “Defense Committee” under the Council could be satisfied. For this purpose the name might indeed be changed.

12. Our views on other aspects of organisation on the military side will be put forward during the forthcoming meetings of the Military and Defence Committees.

13. As regards the machinery best suited for the efficient and prompt attainment of NATO objectives in production and finance (and the same applies to the commodity field), we have reached no firm or precise conclusions. However, in these matters, as well, we would look to the Deputies of the reorganised Council to fulfil the co-ordinating role, rather than to the setting up of any new executive agency or agencies. As the Groups of Experts on Production and Finance will be meeting in London shortly, we prefer to wait for their recommendations on these aspects of the NATO.

14. Some of the questions that will require examination in this general field (as, for example, how best to draw on the experience of our OEEC Delegations in Paris) are, we believe, chiefly of concern to the European members. Canada, of course, will be very much interested in what course is proposed.

15. In general, we feel that those studying the organisation of our production and finance machinery and the relationship of OEEC to the NATO should take into account the broader problem of the general reorganisation of the NATO. We believe that the suggestions on the larger problem which we have outlined above may be helpful to these particular studies.

16. Under the Canadian proposals, the Defence, Finance and Economic Committees and the Military Production and Supply Board would have to be fitted into the simplified structure. In this connexion, and in order to disturb the present structure as little as possible, the Permanent Working Staffs in London of the MPSB and DFEC could be retained and made responsible directly to the Deputies. In other words, the members of what are now the Permanent Working Staffs, might become the Deputies’ advisers on production and finance. The present DFEC and MPSB would have become redundant.

17. We realize that proposals such as we have put forward for centralizing the organisation of the NATO will raise further questions which we have not attempted to answer. The locations and relationship of the Deputies and the Standing Group would have to be decided. These decisions would be of considerable importance. For our part, we would be inclined to have the Standing Group related directly to the Council and, therefore, on a continuing basis to the Council Deputies.

18. It would also be necessary to strengthen and probably enlarge to some extent the Secretariat of the Council and Council Deputies, on the one hand, and that of the Standing Group and Military Committee on the other.

19. There are a number of other questions of organisation which will require early decision. We believe, however, that, if the Council is reorganised as a Council of Governments, and the lines of responsibility and authority are thus firmly and clearly settled, the solutions to these other problems will be capable of easier and more satisfactory solution.

20. The general argument for drastic simplification of the NATO machinery at this time needs no further emphasis. As the scope and scale of activity increase and we pass from the planning stage to execution, the decisions to be taken at the top level will emerge as being primarily political—that is, questions which can be dealt with only by Governments and not by experts. For these reasons, we believe that the time has come to concentrate on one Council of Governments the full authority of the Organisation.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which stated that the Canadian memorandum on reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was being circulated for the information of the Council Deputies.