Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Paris, November 17, 1950—2 p. m.

2789. ReDeptel 2556.¹

1. Interesting though its contents are, it was the opinion of all of us in London Wednesday that it would be impracticable to attempt to solve the problem under review by this treaty method.

2. There will shortly be forthcoming from our London meeting a joint statement of recommendations, and as I understood it each of us will also comment individually on the subject of a German contribution to Western European defense.

3. My comments are as follows:

a. On military side I am completely in accord that plan which is practicable as to unit strength, command structure, speed of implementation, et cetera, must be agreed upon or, failing that, imposed, provided that it safeguards in a reasonable manner the common prohibition against the recreation of a German national army and a German general staff.

b. In the political field, however (and recognizing that the military and political elements are interdependent and overlapping), I believe that in spite of the possible delays and obvious difficulties involved we should encourage and vigorously support French and other initiatives aimed at the further integration of Western Europe in order not only to achieve a community of effort as regards military preparedness, but with a view to reaching ultimate aims of even more significant importance.

c. An adequate defense against aggression constitutes an urgent priority. It should be calculated to maintain security and guarantee survival but it should also be conjoined with a political and social program designed to engage the imagination of free peoples and to offer a realistic prospect of stability and happiness in the future if and when military tensions abate.

d. The best instrument for this purpose is obviously NATO, and it would be admirable if the continental nations could be immediately and completely absorbed into this system militarily and otherwise. However, Germany presents a most difficult problem in this regard. If she were now to be admitted to full NATO membership, there are those who fear she would probably gravitate toward the Anglo-Saxon powers and attain a position that might well imperil her continental neighbors. The French feel it essential that continental understanding with Germany should precede any such wider association.

e. I suggest as a realistic policy that the US should grant its support to the broad principles of the Pleven plan provided the details can be adjusted in a fashion that promises effective results. We would favor these principles of European integration not as a final objective in themselves, but as necessary intermediate steps toward an eventually wider unity within NATO.

f. The decision which the adoption of such a course entails is a difficult one. The UK is temperamentally averse to any but a slow empirical approach to international problems. We ourselves are impatient of delays and want to translate our hopes quickly into realities. But neither ourselves nor the UK contemplate any surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational authority. The continental nations are not averse in theory at least to such a prospect. Let them therefore proceed with our help and encouragement to explore the French proposal, provided that high authority in military matters is subordinated to NATO. This is the only expedient manner in which the interests of these European states can be intermeshed for their own and our mutual defense in such a way as to weaken and perhaps sublimate the intense nationalism which has twice in a generation sucked us into its tragic vortex.

g. If we subscribe to the general principles of the Pleven plan I think we would find the French ready to yield on many of the details regarding German rearmament which they have heretofore advocated and that have seemed to us highly undesirable and unrealistic. Through negotiation our proposal and that of the French might be satisfactorily reconciled.

4. The following might be our line of action, while reiterating that the recreation of a German national army and general staff will not be permitted, but that German armed forces will be used for Western European defense.

a. That we endorse the underlying principles of the French proposal as a further step toward the integration of continental Europe.

b. That because of the delays inherent in the construction of the political edifice contemplated for this European army we insist that deliberations on this subject shall not defer immediate measures, including recruitment and possibly preliminary training of German troops on which the recent French memorandum was silent, necessary to bring German contingents rapidly into being.

c. That we do not object to the formation of a European army provided it is established on a sound military basis. That we will accept for the present the unit structure in such an army as being a regimental combat team provided, if experience proves this to be ineffective, we reserve the right to reopen the question [in] NATO.

d. That the European army shall be entirely within the chain of command of the over-all NAT military organization, on the same basis as armies of the US, UK, or other NAT members.

e. That in a European army there will be no discrimination against the Germans.

f. That the European Minister of Defense (or High Commissioner) shall not be vested with supranational powers.

g. It is evident that a multitude of questions as to details—some of them highly important—will have to be settled. This should be done by committees on which the non-participating NAT nations would be represented, probably by observers, and whose final findings would be subject to the approval or disapproval of the NAT council.

h. I do not feel at this point clear about how the question of the selection of a CINC of the European army and the choice of the Minister of Defense (or High Commissioner) might be regulated. There is a natural disposition on the part of the Germans as well as other European nations not to entrust both or even either of these posts to a Frenchman. Perhaps the selections should be made by a NAT organism.

i. The method by which without the creation of a German Minister of Defense the Germans themselves would make their contribution and service their military formations will require some ingenuity. Perhaps the three High Commissioners might operate in this sphere in conjunction with a representative of the West German Federal Government appointed by it for this purpose.

Sent Department 2789, repeated info London 680 (eyes only for Spofford and Holmes), Frankfort 303 (eyes only for McCloy), Eyes only. For distribution as directed by Secretary’s office.

Bruce

1. In telegram 2556 to Paris, November 11 (telegram 3525 to Frankfort for McCloy, repeated to London for Spofford and Douglas), not printed, Byroade presented an initial and tentative approach to German defense participation through a draft agreement between NATO countries and Germany. Byroade pointed out that this line of approach had not been seen by Acheson, and he asked the recipients to comment on whether they thought it had any merit. (762A.5/11–1150)