Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–1650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, November 16, 1950—4 p. m.

Depto 183. Following is draft of proposed joint reply to Department for your consideration and comment.

“Bruce, McCloy, Spofford and I have reached following conclusions on question of German participation in defense of Europe in meeting here November 15 (Embtel 2845 to Department November 15, repeated Paris 910, Frankfort 388).¹

1. The dilemma now confronting us is fundamentally political rather than military in nature.

2. Any solution must be completely within NATO framework.

3. Within this framework we could, and in our opinion, should, accept in principle and take a benevolent attitude toward the concepts of continental political institutions provided their development is not permitted to delay or weaken development of integrated North Atlantic defense.

4. In exchange for this the French should agree to:

(a) Immediate initial steps toward recruitment and training of German forces and that such steps should not be limited to purely planning activities, and

(b) Whatever size military units NATO authorities consider genuinely effective.

5. Assuming that a satisfactory solution can be reached on the basic political issue (see point 3 above) question of size of units should not present an unsurmountable obstacle.

6. Since any plan which we might be able to agree to must be acceptable to all concerned, including the Germans, we should insist that German contingents be on equal terms with those of other countries and that they are not discriminated against in any way.

7. Since time is working for us in France but increasingly against us in Germany a provisional or transitional agreement will probably be necessary. Essential agreement should be of a nature to:

(a) Persuade Germans to start the remilitarization process.

(b) Save French face and give them more time, and

(c) Lead toward military sound defensive arrangement.

8. Incidently, European rivalries such as German reluctance to accept French commander for European Army and general continental reluctance to accept British commander would pose additional problem which might be solved only by appointment of North American, at least initially, atlhough we do not favor this.”²

Sent Department Depto 183, Paris 921, Frankfort 391.

[Douglas]

1. In telegram 2845, not printed, Douglas informed Washington that the Embassy in London, in collaboration with Spofford’s office, would prepare a message setting forth the conclusions of his discussions with Bruce, McCloy, Spofford, Bohlen, Holmes, and Achilles on the subject of German troop participation (740.5/11–1550).

2. In telegram 2790 from Paris, November 17, Bruce submitted to Washington the following suggested changes in this draft: 1) “Add following sentence end paragraph 3: ‘This would involve acceptance of European Army.’”2) “Paragraph 4(b), substitute for (b) follows: ‘A review by NATO of military needs if after experience with regimental combat teams they prove ineffective.’”3) “Paragraph 6 insert at end of sentence between ‘any’ and ‘way’ word ‘military.’ It would then read ‘in any military way.’”4) “Paragraph 7 (b), say ‘save French face and give them more time to work out their political institutions.’”

   Spofford, in his telegram Depto 194 of November 18, not printed, said he had no objection to Brace’s suggested changes except for his sentence “This would involve acceptance of principle of European army” which Spofford suggested should read “This would not preclude emergence of European army.” Spofford said the Council Deputies might react negatively to any appearance of pressure toward entering discussions aimed at forming a European army with attendant political institutions. (740.5/11–1850) In his telegram 2855 from Paris, November 20, not printed, Bruce accepted Spofford’s substitute phrase (740.5/11–2050).