Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/11–1650: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, November 16, 1950—4 p. m.

Depto 182. From Spofford.

1. From the discussions thus far in the Deputies and conference with Douglas, McCloy and Bruce at which German situation was fully discussed in the light of Department’s cables thus far, fairly definite ideas emerged. Agreement was reached on general principles to be separately cabled. Following is my suggestion as to possible basis for proceeding.

2. The important attitude to be considered may be summarized as follows:

(a) French would like to accept something close to the American plan on condition that we can take some action toward European integration and in so doing save its political face. (This means something which would not lead Moch to resign and pull the Socialists out of government.)

(b) Continentals continue unsympathetic to the French proposals, but except for the mild Portuguese and Italian statements in Deputies meeting yesterday, they are reserving their positions and will presumably go along with any solution which is satisfactory.

(c) British position has not yet developed firmly, except it is clear they will continue strongly to resist plans for French political superstructure as condition to German rearmament.

(d) Situation is deteriorating in Germany as result of continued public discussion in Germany of remilitarization and failure to reach decision in NAT. The longer this hiatus continues the more difficult the German problem will become.

3. It is perfectly clear that the French proposals in their present form do not offer a basis for agreement. From what information we have here and without knowing of General Ely’s presentation, their military thinking does not seem to be far from US proposal except as to unit size. However, the principal difficulty with the French position is the continuing insistence upon the political superstructure, i. e., grouping of units in European Army under Continental (French) command, European Defense Minister and Eur Assembly. It is clear that these political conditions could not be met, even assuming concurrence by all concerned, without delay such as to prejudice or destroy the possibility of organizing the defense force. It nevertheless appears to be the fact that acceptance in some form of the reality or shadow of this political superstructure is the key to the French political situation and their present agreement to the substance of the military proposals.

4. The course which seems to offer the greatest if not the only prospect for early agreement appears to lie in splitting the immediate military arrangements away from the discussions on political superstructure. It might be possible to get the French to agree immediately to the essentials of the US military proposals if they were termed provisional in certain respects provided that during a “transitional” period there were set up strong NAT or tri-partite controls on recruitment of German manpower and procurement of German matériel and provided further that we would encourage negotiations as to the political superstructure by interested Europeans to be held during transitional period.

5. This would involve the following:

a. Immediate agreement on the military essentials of the US plan, including participation of German NAT units to RCT level, as suggested in Deptel 2507. During transitional phase there would be limited recruitment, registration and training of Germans by German Federal Agency controlled by an Allied Civilian Commissioner responsible to the HICOMs. Control of heavy matériel would be invested in National Defense Production Board. Foregoing arrangements would be adopted provisionally and would serve until superseded by arrangements developed within the framework of European political superstructure, or failing such arrangements, would be continued or modified as appropriate.

b. Agreement would be made concurrently which would permit the French to convene the European powers (including German representatives) and present to them more fully worked out proposals for the European political institutions. US would agree that if and to the extent such institutions met with the concurrence of the Europeans and were developed to a point where they could effectively take over some or all of the functions for which provisional arrangements were made, such functions would upon concurrence of the NAT be moved over into the European framework (e. g. control of all recruiting to European Defense Minister). It would be a condition that the political institutions to be so developed would operate within the framework of NAT and that their effectiveness as a regional grouping competent to assume the political and military responsibility involved would be judged by NAT when the time came.

c. If the French should not, after negotiations with their European partners, be able to develop these political institutions, the provisional arrangements would either become final or would be modified as appropriate through NAT action. In the meantime the situation might well have been clarified through the appointment of the Supreme Commander, the working out of the command structure and staff relationships, actual experience in dealing with the Germans, and possible changes in the French political climate.

6. The foregoing arrangements should appeal to the Germans since the essential arrangements which involve extensive controls are frankly provisional and transitional. Also, it does not involve any acceptance of French leadership unless and until the framework of the French institutions has been [thought] through and defined into some acceptable form with their participation. It should meet our views since it would permit the essentials of the US plan to be adopted immediately and at the same time set up a sufficiently specific medium of German participation to be satisfactory for purposes of military planning and inducement to the Germans. Whether it will appeal to the French depends upon how anxious they are to get on with the matter. The negotiations for European political superstructure which we should honestly encourage as in line with our known views as to European integration, might be a sufficient inducement. US position would be that form of political superstructure would be for Continentals themselves to agree upon so long as no delay or prejudice to effective defense involved.

7. All here agree that if we put enough pressure on the French they might ultimately drop their political superstructure, but that if this were done now the French Government would fall. Assume it is still the Department’s view that this should be regarded as a last resort.

The smaller nations should be satisfied with the provisional arrangements since they permit the immediate establishment of NAT integrated force. While they may be reluctant to enter into discussions with the French on the Continental political institutions, they should be willing to do so as long as they are not being subjected to the pressure of the present military urgency to force them into line. These negotiations could proceed without such pressure and might therefore stand a better chance of producing something. If they did not, no harm would have been done and our defense measures would have progressed in the meantime.

I believe it is important for me to make statement on US position in Deputies and to begin sounding out possibilities of agreement on tentative basis immediately. Would appreciate instructions and guidance on foregoing suggestions if possible by telephone tonight. There has been no time check foregoing with Douglas, McCloy or Bruce but believe it is generally in line with your views and Bohlen concurs in substance.

Sent Department Depto 182, repeated Frankfort 390 eyes only for McCloy, Paris 920 eyes only for Bruce. Eyes only. Distribution as directed by Secretary’s office.

[Spofford]