762A.5/10–1550: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State
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2009. Eyes only for the Secretary and Ambassador Bruce. No distribution except as directed by Secretary’s Office. Clappier,1 Bourbon-Bousset and De Margerie2 asked me to come to see them personally this morning on a matter of great importance and urgency. They said [Page 378] in accordance with decision of last Cabinet the various ministers were considering individually possibilities of dealing with the impasse which had arisen in connection with German rearmament. Without in any way committing Schuman directly, they made it clear that he was considering a possible French initiative along following lines for presentation at Cabinet meeting on October 18 which is to deal with this question. They also indicated Pleven and René Mayer3 were in sympathy with this idea but anticipated some resistance from other members of government, in particular Moch. They impressed upon me importance of maintaining absolute secrecy in this matter and particularly requested that no intimation of the line of Schuman’s thought should be given to Petsche or Moch in Washington.
Clappier gave me outline of thinking of Quai d’Orsay which might form basis of Schuman’s presentation as follows in rough translation:
Verbatim text “Faithful to its policy of union in which it has taken the initiative in Europe, France remains convinced that present task of European nations is to organize their defense and to take to this end the necessary measures, particularly in the financial sphere, by the establishment of a common defense budget.
This can only be assured by the nations which are members of the Council of Europe and by the powers which are disposed to associate themselves with these nations.
Since Germany is a member of the Council of Europe, France will not refuse to undertake a study concerning the possibility of a German contribution to the organization of the defense of Western Europe.
This possibility (éventualité) shall become definite (se précisera) when the formation of the unified forces recently decided by the Atlantic Council will have entered into the area of an accomplished fact and when the implementation of a substantial part of the programs fixed for the signatory powers will have been achieved.” End verbatim text.
Clappier elaborated on this general thesis as follows:
- 1.
- The general idea was an initiative comparable in every respect to the Schuman Plan by France in the sphere of Western European defense.
- 2.
- That this initiative could only be undertaken if and when the Schuman Plan had been successfully negotiated, which he expected would be decided one way or the other within one month’s time. He personally estimated that there was about 80 percent chance that Schuman Plan would be adopted. The principal difficulty as has already been reported is the equalization of costs, especially in relation to the high cost of Belgian coal production.
- 3.
- That immediately following the successful negotiation of the Schuman Plan, France would make an announcement somewhat along lines of above memorandum, while welcoming English or other participation [Page 379] they expect it would be an initiative for the creation of a European continental army within the North Atlantic framework and together with British and American forces would form one of the components of the defense of North Atlantic area in Europe under the general control of the staff discussed at New York.
Clappier said that what was necessary was some indication, obviously without any commitment whatsoever, as to whether or not this possible solution of the German rearmament impasse would be favorably regarded by the US Government. He said that it was anticipated that this suggestion if advanced at Cabinet meeting on October 18 would run into some opposition of other members of French Government and that a private indication from US that its general lines were not unacceptable would be necessary before Schuman would present it since obviously this would be one of the first questions asked at Cabinet.
In reply to my questions, Clappier indicated the following:
- a.
- As in the Schuman Plan, within the framework of this proposal Germany would enjoy a status of equality, subject of course to the restrictions and controls which already existed as a result of the tripartite occupation and which could only be changed by tripartite action.
- b.
- He did not anticipate any difficulty in regard to Brussels Treaty commitments since in French view the development of the Atlantic Pact is already radically altering the organizational structure of the Brussels Treaty without affecting its political commitments.
- c.
- He saw no contradiction between the idea of a combined staff discussed at New York which an American might head and the concept envisaged by this proposed initiative since the possible European army thus created would be under the NATO staff setup for Europe.
- d.
- With reference to last paragraph and timing, Clappier stated that by next July it would be possible to estimate what progress had been made in implementing the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council and he believes that by that date the study period could come to an end and the possibility of implementation could begin. He mentioned in this connection that if in July it was apparent that the ten divisions planned under the French military program would be in existence by end of 1951 he felt this would satisfy the requirements of the last paragraph of above memorandum.
It is clear that this is a FonOff idea which has already been discussed with Schuman and which he is thinking of putting forward at Cabinet meeting on October 18 but is understandably reluctant to do so unless he has some indication as to the US attitude.
My personal opinion is that this idea has obvious merit in that:
- 1.
- It would commit France (if the Schuman Plan is successfully negotiated) within a very short time publicly to principle of German participation in defense of Western Europe.
- 2.
- Being a French initiative it would go far towards mitigating, as did the Schuman Plan, the internal political opposition which anything connected with Germany can so easily raise in this country.
- 3.
- It would, if taken seriously and in good faith by French Government, probably be acceptable to German sentiment as we discussed last week with McCloy through the promotion of the idea of a continental European army within framework of the North Atlantic Pact.
- 4.
- If successful, together with Schuman Plan, it would mark tremendous advance toward European union.
- 5.
- If undertaken seriously and in good faith by French Government, the time lag between announcement and actual implementation would be no greater than I understand was indicated by the Secretary at New York in connection with actual execution of German military contribution to defense of Europe.
The drawbacks, however, I see as follows:
- 1.
- It might turn over to a purely European (probably continental) group the responsibility without US participation for the vital question of German military contribution to European defense and should the study and negotiations envisaged in this program bog down, it might be difficult for us to intervene successfully.
- 2.
- Given the French sentiment on this subject, it might easily turn into a purely delaying actions which would result in the waste of possibly as much as nine months to a year in working out German participation.
- 3.
- It is almost certain to encounter strong opposition from Great Britain who following its attitude on Schuman Plan would almost certainly refuse to participate and probably might obstruct from outside.
- 4.
- It would postpone the decision on eventual German participation from the October 28 meeting of Defense Committee until some later date depending on when the negotiations on Schuman Plan would be successfully concluded.
Clappier, De Margerie and Bourbon Bousset emphasized the vital necessity of complete secrecy on this matter if anything along those lines is to be done at the Cabinet meeting on October 18.
I told Clappier that I obviously was in no position to indicate what would be the reaction of my government to Schuman’s idea on this problem but would transmit it to Washington with the maximum guarantee possible of secrecy and would get word back to them possibly by telephone from London or by personal return if necessary before Cabinet meeting on 18 October.
Apart from myself only Bonsal in the Embassy has knowledge of this subject. I am leaving under instructions for London tonight but expect to return to Paris at latest Tuesday evening and will call you (Bruce) by telephone Monday evening at 5 p. m. London time (11 a. m. Washington time).