740.5/10–1450
Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State
(Matthews)
to the Secretary of State
top secret
[Washington,] October 14, 1950.
In connection with the preparatory work for the Defense Committee Meeting
on October 28th, I enclose two memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to General Marshall setting forth the Joint Chiefs’ views on: 1) The
Establishment of an Integrated European Defense Force; 2) The German
Contribution to an Integrated Force. These are the two subjects to be
examined by the Defense Committee on which we have the most direct
interest.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has expressed the strong hope that
our comments will be available sometime Monday afternoon so that General
Marshall can give them his consideration. The urgency
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stems from the fact that it is planned
that the U.S. views on German participation will be made available to
the Representatives of the Defense Ministers on next Wednesday.
We are preparing draft memoranda of comment on these two papers during
the week-end which I will discuss with Paul Nitze, George Perkins, Henry
Byroade and Doug MacArthur on Monday morning. We would thus hope to
discuss them with you some time Monday afternoon following your morning
meeting with the French.
We are also expecting further papers from the Chiefs which we are told we
may receive some time this afternoon.
In connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Military Command setup, you
will be interested to know that the Standing Group is now thinking in
terms of the following three High Commands under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization: 1) The Supreme Commander of SHAPE; 2) a High Command (Navy) for the
Atlantic Ocean; 3) a High Command (Navy) for the Mediterranean. This
explains the reason for the term “Supreme Commanders” in paragraph 10 of
the attached memorandum on Integrated Force.
[Annex 1]
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Washington, 13 October
1950.
Subject: Integrated Force in Europe (Establishment
of a European Defense Force).
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum
dated 2 October 1950,1 subject, “Integrated Force in
Europe”, wherein you request their recommendations, as a
matter of priority, on the concept of a European defense
force and the practical steps that should be taken to create
the force.
- 2.
- With regard to the concept of a European defense force,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed North Atlantic
Council Resolution C5–D/11 (Final)2 and have noted
particularly the principles enumerated in paragraphs 1
through 7 of that document. They are of the opinion that
these principles give reasonable expression to the concept
of an integrated European defense force. Inasmuch as these
principles in Resolution C5–D/11 (Final) are now overriding,
and as they are in accord with the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, it is not considered that the further development
of a statement by them regarding the concept of this force
would be fruitful. Accordingly,
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they recommend that you consider items
1 through 7 of Resolution C5–D/11 (Final) as an adequate
expression of the concept of a European defense force. More
detailed information on various aspects of the establishment
of this force will be presented in a series of papers now
being prepared which will deal with the various items and
sub-items to be considered by the Defense Committee.
- 3.
- Establishment of the integrated European defense force
will require, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the accomplishment of certain detailed steps among the first
of which is the designation of a Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe. Inasmuch as the Supreme Allied Commander should
participate to the maximum extent possible in the formation
of this force, it is considered essential that he be
appointed at once. Inclusive of this appointment, the
detailed actions considered necessary are listed below.
Certain of these steps can and should be undertaken
simultaneously, and the timing of others will depend on
progress. Therefore, with the exception of the first item,
in subparagraph a below, the
numerical order in which they have been placed is not
intended to fix the order of accomplishment. Parenthetical
notes have been added where pertinent to acquaint you with
current thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to
some of these steps.
-
a.
- Designate the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe at
once. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this
first step of the Defense Committee is a matter of
the greatest importance and urgency. They have
become convinced that, because of the unfolding
situation, the problem of rapid development of
European defense forces can be solved with that
degree of effectiveness which is now essential only
if an officer of the highest stature is immediately
designated to take charge of the task from its
inception. It is obvious that this officer should
previously have been agreed upon by the responsible
U.S. authorities.)
-
b.
- Issue basic directive for guidance of the Supreme
Allied Commander. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that this directive should consist of a
very direct and concise statement of the functions
and responsibilities of the Commander with the very
minimum of restrictive detail. It should be drafted
by the Standing Group and finally approved by the
Defense Committee.)
-
c.
- Designate the location of Supreme Headquarters
Atlantic Powers Europe (SHAPE). (There are a variety of factors
influencing this location. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
tentatively favor the location of SHAPE MAIN on the
European Continent. The location should be
recommended by the Standing Group with final
approval by the Defense Committee.)
-
d.
- Provide the Supreme Commander, Europe with initial
funds for establishment of SHAPE. (This is the responsibility of the
Defense, Finance and Economic Committee (DFEC).)
-
e.
- Provide an international staff and other necessary
personnel for SHAPE. (Requirements are to be submitted
by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe for final
approval of the Military Committee.)
-
f.
- Designate the forces which each nation is to place
under control of SHAPE initially and establish specific
dates on which this action will take place.
(Recommendations should be made by the Standing
Group for final approval by the Defense
Committee.)
-
g.
- Provide funds for operations of SHAPE for following
year, after consideration of budget prepared by the
Supreme Allied Commander. (This is the
responsibility of DFEC.)
-
h.
- Provide for formation of German forces and their
incorporation into the integrated force, contingent
upon North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreement.
(Details are being covered in a separate paper.3)
-
i.
- Establish commitments of additional forces for
peacetime assignment and of forces to be assigned on
mobilization. (These should be recommended by the
Standing Group for final approval of the Defense
Committee.)
- 4.
- It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
U.S. position concerning the integration of German units
into a European defense force has already been cogently set
forth at the recent meetings of the North Atlantic Council.
Since the only serious opposition to the integration of
German units was voiced by the French representatives and
since the U.S. position continues to be that of a
non-concurrence in any integrated force which does not
provide for German participation, and in view of the fact
that the determination of the German contribution must
remain subject to further international negotiation, the
concepts set forth herein should be accepted as the U.S.
position only in the event of favorable resolution of the
question of German participation. Further details as to the
inclusion of German forces and production resources for the
defense of Western Europe will be furnished in a separate
position paper, “Contribution of Germany to Defense of
Western Europe”,4 agenda Item 4, for the
Defense Committee meeting.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the Resolution
C5–D/11 (Final) wherein the Council requests, inter alia, that the Defense
Committee consider and recommend to the Council, as a matter
of urgency (subparagraph f):
“The channel by which the higher direction of the
integrated force as regards political considerations
upon which strategic decisions should be based, can
most effectively be conveyed by the Council to the
military agencies of the NATO.”
- 6.
- The fundamental requirements are that this channel must
enable the expeditious flow of political guidance to the
military agencies
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when required; it must reassure the sovereign NATO countries of proper
continuing civilian influence; it must ensure a full
audience for each country; and it must not hamper unduly the
operations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe when
appointed.
- 7.
- It appears that the Council of Deputies, being the only
higher civilian NATO body
in the chain of control in continuous session, should be the
sounding board for political considerations. As such, the
Council of Deputies should furnish political guidance to the
Standing Group as appropriate during the time when the
Defense and Military Committees are not in session.
- 8.
- It is considered that the Standing Group, upon receipt of
such political guidance, should ensure its reflection in
strategic direction to lower military agencies. In the event
that political guidance appears militarily unacceptable or
in conflict with strategic concepts previously approved by
higher NATO agencies, the
Standing Group should immediately request guidance from the
Military Committee.
- 9.
- It is not the intent that these measures abrogate or
infringe on the responsibilities of the Defense Committee or
of the Military Committee. In order that these organizations
can suitably discharge their functions, the Standing Group
shall keep appropriate records of communications from the
Council of Deputies and of Standing Group action thereon for
the information of the Military and Defense Committee at
their call.
- 10.
- It is considered that the channeling of political guidance
to the Supreme Commanders through the Standing Group would
provide the necessary freedom of action for these
operational commanders within their agreed terms of
reference.
- 11.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the above views be
coordinated with the Secretary of State in order to
establish the U.S. position on this question to be
introduced at the October meeting of the Military
Committee.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (
Ret.)
Secretary
[Annex 2]
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
Washington, 13 October
1950.
Subject: German Contribution to an Integrated
Force.
- 1.
- In response to your memoranda of 11 October 1950 and 12
October 1950, regarding West German contribution to the
integrated force,
[Page 376]
there is submitted herewith as Appendix “A” a copy of the
proposed tentative draft of the resolution with changes
recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated in the
usual manner.5
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the purpose of the
paper is two-fold: first, to justify a West German
contribution primarily in the form of ground combat
divisions rather than labor troops and fortifications;
second, to present a method by which the contribution can be
made.
- 3.
- In proposing the addition of details to the working group
draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have omitted specific
details of procurement of equipment from non-German sources.
If questions on procurement are put by the Defense
Ministers, the Department of Defense position should be that
it is the present thinking of the Department that a Military
Assistance Advisory Group will be established in Germany,
the Germans will submit their deficiency requirements to
that Group, and thenceforth the matter will be processed
through Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) channels in the usual
manner. A report on the effect of German arming on MDAP allocations is contained
in Appendix “B”.6
- 4.
- In addition to the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend that you utilize the following as a basis for
discussion at the forthcoming meeting:
-
a.
- The North Atlantic Council has concluded “that the
defense of Western Europe will require full
utilization of manpower and productive resources
available from all sources” (Document C5–D/11
(Final)); and the United States considers that an
adequate defense of Western Europe without using
German manpower and production resources would be
most difficult, and that any satisfactory defense of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries of
Western Europe must therefore include Western
Germany.
-
b.
- In utilizing German resources the United States
opposes any resurgence of German militarism, in
accordance with the Council’s conclusion “that it
would not serve the best interests of Europe or of
Germany to bring into being a German national army
or a German general staff” (Document C5–D/11
(Final)).
-
c.
- German forces should not be developed at the
expense of other Allied forces nor should they be
permitted to develop at a rate or to a degree that
would constitute a threat to Allied security.
-
d.
- The longer Germany is excluded from contributing
to the defense of Western Europe the greater will be
the ultimate danger of the
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creation of a German National
Army, and, in the meantime, German economic power
without the burden of additional defense costs will
probably surpass that of the other European
states.
-
e.
- It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to convince the United States Congress and American
people that sacrifices must be made to rearm Europe
and assist in its defense while, at the same time,
available German resources are not utilized.
-
f.
- The United States position continues to be that of
nonconcurrence in any integrated force which does
not provide for German participation. Therefore, if
agreement is not reached in the forthcoming meetings
of the Defense and Military Committees of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization on the question of the
immediate initiation of the organization of German
military units within the integrated force for the
defense of Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are firmly of the opinion that the United States
course of action for the conduct of a war against
the USSR, including the magnitude and extent of the
United States contribution to the defense of Western
Europe, should be reexamined by the United
States.
- 5.
- In the event that a deadlock develops at the Defense
Committee Meetings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that
the plan in Appendix “C”7 hereto might be proposed as
additional intermediate steps toward the eventual creation
of German divisions, with the clear understanding that these
are preliminary steps toward our objective. Similar action
should be taken by the British and French in their zones,
pending authorization for the creation of German
divisions.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (
Ret.)
Secretary
