740.5/10–1650
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have reviewed the Memorandum of October 13th addressed to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of German contribution to the integrated force and Appendix A1 thereto which contains the changes recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the draft memorandum for the North Atlantic Council on the same subject.
I consider both the memorandum and the appendix thereto, to be in general satisfactory, subject to the following comments.
With reference to the memorandum of October 13, my first comment refers to Paragraph 3 and is a matter of detail. The second sentence of that paragraph leaves the impression that U.S. agencies alone will be involved in meeting deficiency requirements of the Germans. A suggested method of correcting this impression would be along the lines of the following two sentences: “If questions on procurement are put by the Defense Ministers, the Department of Defense position should be that this matter will be handled by the appropriate NATO and U.S. agencies concerned with assistance. It is the present thinking in the Department that the United States, for its part, would establish a military assistance advisory group in Germany.”
It is suggested that the thought expressed in Paragraph C on Page 2 of the memorandum would be appropriate for inclusion in Appendix A and might profitably be included therein before distribution to representatives of other nations.
The concluding phrase of the sentence of Paragraph D expresses an important thought but in such a manner as to invite argument that Germany could play her role merely by assuming vastly expanded expenditures in support of others; i.e. occupation costs. If this thought is used it might be expressed as follows: “and, in the meantime, in the absence of a sense of mission in the defense field commensurate with a dignified role therein, she will be free to profit while other economies are heavily burdened in the defense effort.”
The subject matter of Paragraph 4F of the memorandum is one of increasing concern to me. We are in complete agreement on the necessity of having German participation in the integrated force for Europe. We have likewise agreed that the essentiality of German participation was such that we would make it a condition precedent to our support of the entire integrated force concept. I do not propose [Page 382] that we change our position in this regard at this time but rather suggest that we leave open the possibility of a reexamination of our position on this matter as time proceeds. If there is continued delay of securing agreement of the French Government to the plan which we have placed before them, we will rather quickly arrive at a situation where we must, under our present position, delay our moves for support of the integrated force. When that moment arrives, it may be that delay in creation of the integrated force will not appear to be in the best interests of the United States. This would be particularly true if we were convinced by that time that the French Government would be able, within a relatively short period of time, to agree to German participation in the force.
It would likewise be desirable, from my point of view, if we could postpone decision on the substance of Paragraph 5 of the memorandum until a later date. The question of the desirability of the submission of an alternate plan for proceeding in Germany is difficult to decide pending further development of the French attitude prior to the meeting of the Defense Ministers. This bears somewhat on the thinking expressed in the paragraph above and represents the major policy decision before us. I believe we should continue to examine and develop all possible alternative methods of procedure, including that proposed by the JCS based upon the plan of General Handy.
In the consideration of alternate plans or intermediate steps that might be taken in Germany, it is most important that we bear in mind the political situation in Germany and the current expression of opinion of many of the German people. In our opinion the latitude available to us in attempting to find a method of proceeding to which the Germans will respond is not great. It is clear for instance that the Germans do not wish steps taken on a purely national basis for the provision of armed units while at the same time there would be little support for a solution which does not afford them a substantial measure of equality. The plan of transformation of Labor Service units to battalions for attachment to Allied forces in Germany has the disadvantage of not meeting the second criteria above, especially as the plan for German Divisions in the integrated force has received great publicity.
[Here follow six paragraphs containing suggestions of a minor nature relating to Appendix A.]
It is assumed that Appendix B and C are not intended for distribution to the representatives of other nations.
Sincerely yours,