Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/9–1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[New York,] September 19, 1950.

Participants:	Secretary of State
	Mr. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador
	N. L. Anschuetz, GTI

Ambassador Erkin came in to see me this morning at 9:15, at my request, in order to learn the decision of the NAT Council with regard to the Turkish request for membership in the Council.¹

I explained to the Ambassador that the Council had requested me to communicate the Council’s proposal to the Turkish Government. I made the following points:

(1) The Turkish request has been seriously considered by the Council.

(2) The Council recognized the importance of Turkey’s role in the free world and in the vital Near East area.

(3) The Council unanimously concluded that it was essential to develop real strength within the framework of the present Treaty Organization and that it was impossible to make additional commitments or extend the Treaty arrangements in any way at this time. Therefore, the Council could not accede to Turkey’s request for membership.

(4) The Council was aware that Turkey does, in fact, enjoy substantial international support by virtue of its treaties with France and the UK, the public statements in which the US has expressed keen interest in the maintenance of Turkish independence, and the considerable military assistance which Turkey has received and continues to receive from the US.

(5) The Council believed, however, that Turkey deserves some measure of reassurance and, therefore, has directed me on behalf of the Council to invite Turkey, if the Turkish Government so desires, to associate itself with such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean area. I informed the Ambassador that if the Turkish Government accepted this proposal the Defense Committee would be authorized to take measures to implement it.

At this point I handed the Turkish Ambassador a note verbale² in which I said I had jotted down briefly the terms of the Council’s proposal. I added that, as the Secretary of State of the United States, I hoped very much the Turkish Government would find it possible to accept it.

After reading the note the Ambassador said he did not understand how Turkey could be expected to participate in the defense of the Mediterranean without some prior political commitment. I pointed out to the Ambassador that the proposal of the Council was that Turkey should participate in the “planning” for the defense of the area and that I did not consider that this constituted any weakness in the proposal. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a Soviet attack against Turkey under conditions which would not bring on a general war. In my opinion, the USSR would not make the mistake of providing the US time to prepare itself and, for this reason, the USSR is not likely to mount a major attack elsewhere in the world without also attacking the US. Such an attack, if it comes, would probably be against the US, Western Europe, and Turkey simultaneously. We would all be in it together.

The Turkish Ambassador seized upon this theme and pointed out that the community of free nations is desperately seeking to develop moral and military strength. Turkey has moral strength and, thanks to US assistance, Turkey has military strength. Turkey is therefore well qualified to make a contribution to the strength of the Western European Powers, but these Powers are not prepared to make any commitment to Turkey in turn. The Ambassador said that he would of course transmit the Council’s proposal to his Government but that in his personal opinion, the Council’s reply would be unsatisfactory to the Turkish Government. I replied that I realized that the action of the Council would probably be considered unsatisfactory by the Turkish Government and added that, in the final analysis, anything short of full membership in the Pact would be considered unsatisfactory. I felt, however, that this was a move in the right direction.

The Ambassador said that he was greatly disturbed at the probable reaction of the Turkish people, who are very proud. He said that the USSR and everyone else knows that the US has made no commitment to Turkey. When it becomes known that the NAT Council has denied the Turkish request, of which all the world is aware, the disappointment of the Turkish people will be very great. He said that he was fearful that the USSR might now be encouraged to believe that the NAT Powers had, in fact, no fundamental interest in Turkey and that this might have dangerous implications for Turkey. He added that under these circumstances it was possible that the USSR will make a strong bid for Turkish friendship. The Ambassador thereupon reiterated that he was afraid the Turkish Government would find the Council’s solution unsatisfactory.

I called the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that the US Government was not responsible for making public the Turkish request for membership and pointed out that international commitments could not very well be made on the basis of articles which appear in the newspapers. I said, furthermore, that I disagreed that the USSR would be likely to interpret the Council’s failure to accept Turkey as an indication of lack of interest in Turkey. On the contrary, I felt the Council’s proposal would make the USSR sit up and take notice. I agreed, however, that it is impossible accurately to forecast Soviet reaction.

The Ambassador then inquired whether anything more could be done in this matter. I said that if the Ambassador meant whether the Council would reconsider its decision at this time, the answer was “No”. The Ambassador then inquired whether it would be possible for the United States to make some kind of a unilateral commitment. I replied it would not be possible for the United States to make any additional commitment at this time. We already have too many commitments. Nonetheless, the United States aided Turkey when no one else would help and has continued to provide assistance for more than three years. I recommended that the Turks not get nervous like the French and talk about commitments. Essentially what we all desired of Turkey was that Turkey remain strong and maintain its determination to preserve its independence. The Turkish people are brave and have, for centuries, fought as necessary to maintain their integrity. I told the Ambassador that Western Europe must endeavor to establish an integrated military command and an integrated military force within the next twelve to eighteen months and that we must develop adequate strength within the framework of the present Treaty arrangements before we can think in terms of enlarging our commitments. At this moment, strength on which to base new commitments is just not available.

At this point the Ambassador, who was obviously not happy, thanked me for receiving him. As he departed I reiterated that the Council proposal is a good one and that I hoped the Turkish Government would accept it.

1. The substance of the NAT Council directive to the NAT Defense Committee, which set the procedure followed by Acheson in his presentation of this matter to the Turkish Ambassador and later to the Greek Ambassador, was transmitted by Acheson to Washington in his Secto 24, September 17, not printed (396.1 NE/9–1750). For text of the proposed directive see footnote 10, p. 1218.
2. Printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 16, 1950, p. 632.