740.5/9–1950: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
priority
Secto 82. Sixth meeting NAC fifth session, September 18, continued discussion from morning session.
Lange stated greatly impressed by argument in favor of integrated force and realized far reaching consequences of US decisions. Norway would never wish obstruct action on matter Big Three and many other NATO countries had agreed. Essential that in future notice such far-reaching questions should be given through deputies so could consult parliaments before meeting. Stated did not now have authority commit government. Certain constitutional and legal issues must be studied but hoped will be overcome. Trusted proposed recess will give enough time take decision. Hoped enough flexibility in planning under Unified Command take account particular factors, such as Norway’s remoteness and common frontier with Russia. Stated not clear how integrated force linked with German question.
Acheson replied to questions raised by Lange in morning. Explained impossibility giving advance notice on proposals (basic issues were raised by French August 17 note). French attached deepest importance to study and US went to work right away. President formulated US policy only Saturday before meeting started.
Re Lange’s first question, Secretary stated US meant entire area covered by treaty. No one at this time could say just how would defend, since this would depend upon circumstances, including forces available. Re second question, not contemplated Supreme Commander and staff would have any authority over forces intended for but not yet allocated Unified Force. However, should have important voice in talking to representatives of governments on standard to be met. Presumably Supreme Commander could refuse troops if not properly trained, or service up in matter of weeks. Re forces already committed by governments to Unified Force, his authority should be very great, prescribing training in detail.
Re regional planning groups, Secretary stated proposal should have very little effect on North Atlantic Ocean Group whose functions would not be absorbed by staff working on land forces. There should be close relationship, however. Unable state effect on other regional groups. If integrated force and staff created, this staff would perform many functions, including planning. Since planning now function of regional groups, their work must somehow be brought into combined staff.
Acheson referred to statements re closer relationship between Standing Group and non-members. Recognized was important problem and [Page 331] agreed must be worked out. Stated problem required professional advice and Council consideration.
Acheson replied to Lange’s query as to tie between integrated force and German proposal. US proposal was most earnest effort to reply to French August 17 note. US proposed certain changes considered essential in creating the required force in time likely to be available. US has requested Council’s views on integrated proposal. Can’t say what happens if Council turns down. However, no sense in having commander with no troops to command, or vice versa. If US proposal not acceptable, we will work to find something else which will meet objectives. However, do not believe US would be fairly treated if Council prepared to talk about only certain aspects of US proposal but not others.
De Kauffmann generally subscribed to Lange’s statement. He needed inform government and hoped be possible give answer next meeting.
Cunha stated government saw no objection to German participation on terms proposed by US. On integrated force, posed several question:
- (a)
- Which countries would contribute forces and who would decide how many?
- (b)
- Could Supreme Commander station national units in another country?
- (c)
- Does central production body guide, help or act as action body?
- (d)
- What effect would US proposal have on NATO?
- (e)
- Which US statement should be considered authoritative, the oral or written statement?
Acheson replied that (a) hoped all countries would want to contribute forces but governments would decide; (b) Commander could hardly move troops into or out of a country without that governments consent; (c) Production body would be action body, to give guidance and help nations; (d) Relationship should be defined; (e) Countries should study all US statements as expressing our position.
Cunha indicated must consult Parliament which does not meet until November. Expressed regret defense entire Iberian Peninsula not assured. Not opposed in principle to integrated force, but must reserve on national participation, creation commander and on central production body.
Bevin made statement authorized by Cabinet recapitulating Saturday position. UK agrees necessity for Unified Force and Supreme Commander. Does not feel desirable spell out details command and constitution integrated force now since Defense Committee should work out for Council. Re German participation, government accepts principle, subject to agreed conditions, some of which already indicated by US. Agree with US view that entire problem must be worked out over time and agreement in principle doesn’t mean that German units could [Page 332] be formed immediately. Suggested next stage would be for Defense Committee to appraise best ways for Germany to help and examine problem with German Government. Proposed we reply to Adenauer stating that High Commissioner authorized ascertain in what ways Germany can best help defense freedom in Europe against aggression. High Commissioners would then report to Council. Warned government against overestimating psychological and political risks, stating must face these.
Schuman proposed resolution for Council to request Big Three to ask High Commissioners to examine condition under which Germany could contribute to defense through defense works, fortifications and airfields, for report at next meeting.
Acheson objected to reference to High Commissioners, stating more appropriate address request to three governments. Schuman agreed so modify.
Bevin questioned wisdom picking out isolated military problem in absence military appreciation entire situation. Stated not too concerned over provocation generally, but if proceeded build defense lines before forces available might invite attack.
Acheson agreed strongly with Bevin. Considered it mistake pass such resolution. Would inevitably become known and anticipated bad reaction to knowledge we were asking Germany provide day labor on defense. Should consider connection entire military problem.
Schuman stated government would be required in 10 days take decision in principle on use German manpower. Would be more difficult for French Government act favorably on that unless this immediate step taken. Considered there was tendency to neglect installations and be hypnotized by manpower.
Acheson stated preference for no Council action and discussion of proposal by Foreign Ministers.
Schuman withdrew proposal and indicated would raise in Foreign Ministers.
Council agreed minor editorial changes in draft communiqué be referred to deputies, who were authorized prepare and issue final draft.1
Council recessed, subject to recall by Chairman.
Department pass priority Brussels (pass to Luxembourg), Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris (pass OSR), Rome, Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, London, Heidelberg for Handy, Department Defense.
- For text of communiqué, released to the press September 19, see Department of State Bulletin, October 2, 1950, p. 533. See ibid., p. 532 for a statement by Jessup on September 24 concerning North Atlantic Council discussion of proposals for an integrated army in Europe.↩