740.5/9–2050: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the President
priority
Secto 36. Personal for the President from Acheson. Since my telegram to you of September 14,1 we have kept you informed of developments from day to day both on NAT and the meetings of the three [Page 336] Ministers and the GA. This telegram attempts to give you some impressions of my own from these various meetings.
- 1.
- In the first place in the NAT Council our discussion there, as I thought would happen, did not end on Saturday and had to go over to Monday.
Out of these discussions came these general conclusions, one of which at least represents a change of position.
The French throughout the meeting merely reiterated views which I reported to you before, and I think made clearer than before the fact that the difficulty lay in Paris and, specifically in the Socialist Party and even more specifically with Moch. As a result of the discussions and the views of all the other Ministers, Moch will be here tomorrow. The British are also bringing Shinwell, who because of his Socialist convictions has influence with Moch.
The British did change their position as a result of communication with London. They are now prepared to accept the principle of German participation in a united defense force and to work out the details as speedily as possible.
So far as the rest of the countries were concerned, although we started out with varying degrees of hesitation, I think we ended up with very little doubt indeed that all of these countries accepted the principle and would join in its application.
However, as the discussion went on, it became clear that in some cases, Norway and Denmark, for instance, and Portugal to a minor extent, the implications of a united force had to be very carefully considered. Their geographic position made it clear to them that they will want to be sure how much of their own force would be retained for the defense of their own country and how much would be used for general operations on the continent. They also wanted to know to what extent the supreme commander would direct his strategy toward defending their particular countries. Of course, no one could answer this latter question. Therefore, they wanted to consult their governments, which is wholly understandable.
The result of our meetings is that during the recess all of us will consult our governments and one another and will meet again next week. At that time I think the idea of an integrated force will be accepted by all and that the idea of German participation in it will be accepted by all except France, unless our discussions in the next few days with Messrs. Moch and Shinwell bring about a change. As to the chances of this change, the various European Ministers assure me that they believe that the French will be able to alter their position in a matter of a few weeks; whereas McCloy hears from the French that Moch is coming over here in a very negative attitude of mind and will be hard to deal with.
[Page 337]As I analyze this situation, it seems to me that we should clearly differentiate in our minds what we can get the French to agree to in extreme secrecy and what we can say about the situation both in the supposed secrecy of the Atlantic Council and in the communiqué. I should advise that we press the French very hard in private and that we should be as moderate as possible in public. McCloy shares this view thoroughly. He believes that the immediate future is very critical in Germany and that the High Commissioners must have enough leeway to talk with Adenauer in a constructive and not in a negative way. It seems to me that we cannot accept any French position which puts us back to the position of the twenties, when we were adamant in not making any concessions to the Germans who were on our side, and then yielded under pressure to the Germans who were against us. If, however, the French will tell us they will enter on a program I do not think we should push them too far in public confessions.
[Here follow, in sections 2 and 3, statements of progress in the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and of the U.N. General Assembly on September 18 and 19.]
Please let me have your thoughts either directly or through Webb whenever you think that what we are doing needs molding or direction in view of the problems with which you are dealing, or whenever you think we are not carrying out your wishes.2
I talked with the General3 over the telephone today, and it seemed to me like old days once more.
- Secto 8, p. 301.↩
- In a memorandum dated September 21, not printed, Webb reported on his conversation with President Truman on that date as follows: “The President read the attached report from Secretary Acheson [Secto 36] and seemed well pleased with it. He asked me to tell the Secretary that he had no suggestions to make at this time and that as long as he was able ‘to attract the votes’, that was the important thing.” (740.5/9–2150)↩
- Reference here is almost certainly to General of the Army George C. Marshall, newly installed Secretary of Defense.↩