740.5/8–2450: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State
Depto 65. Following is Spofford statement totality country replies (Depto 661).
Deputies have now had opportunity study country memoranda distributed Tuesday.
Memoranda do not form clear or comprehensive picture. They are (perhaps due general terms in which my government made request) [Page 242] uneven in emphasis various factors and not uniform in approach. Nevertheless we think NAT partners should consider them with us and attempt at least to draw preliminary conclusions as basis for further action. Certain major factors in situation not yet known. Primary one is MTDP and its overall cost, without which firm target figure cannot be established. However, better to consider problem in general terms on basis information at hand, which though incomplete is best available, than to defer all discussion of over-all plan and contribution each of us proposes to make until refined figures of medium term plan are in hand. Time not commodity we can afford to waste.
Following indicates results of such analyses as we have been able to make. In light of standing group report, here is one basic criterion by which efforts should finally be judged: extent to which actions proposed add up to trained and equipped forces, in being or readily mobilizable, sufficient to meet needs of adequate defense North Atlantic community.
Look first at summation of country statements in terms of increases in combat forces. Many statements unclear this regard. Indicated increases in combat forces specific only in terms of divisions or lower units. Total army increases amount to blank divisions compared with present forces in being or mobilizable within three days, of blank divisions, including two US divisions in Germany. We have no figures which take account of considerable increases needed in air and naval forces.
Effective combat troops can only be made up of men who have received adequate training in specialized arms and equipment, and training in unit and larger formations. This true in ground and naval forces and even more in air forces. Under present systems of conscription and training our military advisers tell us it is hard see how strength of forces mentioned can be realistically achieved.
How do these plans for increases in forces compare with our best available estimate of what must be done. You are familiar with first approximation of total forces required for defense of Western Europe under original MTDP which standing group has called upon us to use as goal pending its revision and refinement. Indicated plans fall far short of requirements to extent of blank divisions on basis of original medium term plan. Safe to assume that even under revision of plan deficiency of large order will remain. This does not take into account required major increases in air and naval forces.
Very large required increase in ground forces—over and above those now in being—together with expanded air and naval forces, will call for major increases in defense expenditures for equipment and maintenance.
Against such requirement scale of additional expenditure indicated falls considerably short of what is needed. We hope further study in [Page 243] NATO will make estimates more accurate, but doubt refinement will significantly alter basic conclusions. Indicated total increase in defense expenditures over three-year period after deducting estimates of expected American aid, amounts to approximately dollars 3.5 billion. (These estimates do not include additional Canadian effort, memorandum on which received only yesterday.)
If external assistance were expected to make up entire difference between additional expenditures indicated in these submissions and full requirements of Atlantic defense, external contribution would be greatly disproportionate to indicated effort of European NAT members.
US can be counted upon to carry its full share of defense burden. Both executive branch and Congress expect to be assured full share of these heavy burdens will also be carried by Atlantic Pact partners. Clearly balances should not be sought by cutting total effort below what is needed. There is no advantage and there is absolute insecurity in doing only half defense job. We cannot expect our peoples to undertake sacrifices required unless they can be given real hope of genuine defense. Substantially greater effort in Europe must be made to fill gap between present plans and total needs.
If Congress appropriates additional sum for foreign military assistance requested by President there will be available for expenditure or obligation in fiscal year 1951 about dollars 4.5 billion for NAT countries. I cannot give any authoritative indication of what further assistance might be provided in succeeding years. This will depend in large part on evaluation by executive branch and Congress as to whether effort being made by other NAT countries is realistic and adequate, taking due regard of their respective economic potentials, and whether end results of all our efforts in terms of collective defense will be reasonably adequate. However, for purposes of present analysis, we have made arbitrary assumption that continuing assistance might be made available for next two years on same scale.
We have also sought to appraise magnitude of additional effort European countries might make without undue financial or economic strain. Total additional effort from resources of European NAT countries in order of dollars 10 to dollars 12 billion in next three years would not seem to present insuperable obstacles.
Gross national product of European NAT countries, now amounting to dollars 88 billion a year, can be expected to rise to dollars 100 billion a year within three years. Thus, additional effort just indicated amounts to only some 4 percent of GNP and would absorb only portion of anticipated increase.
Indicated increases in active military forces constitute only minimal fraction of civilian labor force of some 80 million. We recognize total effort may involve new strains on foreign payments position and [Page 244] perhaps other requirements for outside assistance, and US prepared consider measures to alleviate such problems when need demonstrated.
There are other factors to be considered in evaluation picture. One is question of how many American divisions and air and naval units US may make available for defense of Europe. My government is giving this question urgent and serious attention. But whatever US decides in this regard, in light its strategic commitments elsewhere our answer cannot alone be taken as substitute for realistic efforts by all NAT partners.
Important set our first year’s increment high enough to meet probable need. US has already set in course very large first year increment, more than doubling its pre-Korea defense budget, for its own and NFA [ NAT?] partners forces. We believe first year’s increment out of European resources planned on assumed total of dollars 10 to dollars 12 billion over three years is now needed. We cannot now say whether combined effort of this magnitude will be enough to achieve adequate defense. It is our judgment, however, that without an effort of at least this size, job cannot be done.
More detailed facts and figures can be better studied by working group. However, broad conclusions clear.
Objectives of our continuing discussion should be threefold: (1) to determine whether our collective defense efforts indicate that governments contemplate action adequate for defense of West; (2) if we conclude they do not indicate totality of effort required, that we may form some conclusions as to nature and extent of necessary further action; and (3) whatever our conclusions on foregoing may be, we should take steps immediately to translate additional efforts contemplated by governments into concrete results at earliest possible time.
Sent Department Depto 65, repeated info Brussels 51, Copenhagen 41, Luxembourg 15, Paris 303 for OSR, Rome 83, Ottawa 17, Oslo 33, Lisbon 27, The Hague 58, Heidelberg 22 for Handy; Department repeat Secretary Defense.
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