740.5/8–2450: Telegram
The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State
617. We have mixed feelings re question posed Deptel 483, August 17. On one hand there are good reasons for admission GT1 in NAT. Considering NAT as collective security organization designed prevent aggression, admission GT appears highly desirable as deterrent outbreak this area any limited war on Korean model.
Considering NAT as military alliance, it appears to us from point view forces in being and of immediate military capabilities, GT would be distinct military assets rather than liabilities at least in short term view. We believe there are reasons why American if not NAT plans should include defense GT within our capabilities and our other commitments (L 612, July 26)2 especially because of strategic position Greece on flank potential USSR drive west and very considerable military strength GT which might be augmented by Yugoslavia.
On other hand if through GT admission to NAT it became public knowledge in Greece western powers did not plan commit substantial forces to defense this area, there would be great, perhaps dangerous, weakening popular support for pro-western alignment Greece. In this case even strong anti-Communist element population might move toward defeatism and there would be swing by other elements population toward neutral position advocated by fellow-travellers as well as considerable increase in effectiveness Communist propaganda. Regret to state our best opinion none of present Greek political leaders could be trusted not to reveal this aspect western powers military plans if he considered it politically, personally, or nationally advantageous to do so. Hence since it is entirely possible this information would become [Page 241] public knowledge we feel net effect including Greece in NAT likely to be more harmful than continued exclusion.
One qualifying consideration might be mentioned. Some Greek military including Papagos apparently feel in event major external aggression principal foreign assistance needed by Greece would be, primarily air power if Greek ground forces properly equipped, and if this forthcoming Greek forces alone or in conjunction Turks and possibly Yugoslavs (L 676, August 16)3 might hold out. Therefore if NAT powers were in position give Greek military satisfactory assurances this score possibility exists Greek politicians would not feel necessary or desirable to make public clamor this issue.
In these circumstances Department may wish explore all possible alternatives. One such would be to withdraw our previous opposition, to formation Mediterranean pact. This might have most of political and military advantages mentioned above and might meet immediate Turk demand. It would not necessarily involve same dangers of western powers defense plan becoming public knowledge in Greece with unfortunate results mentioned above.
Other possibility mentioned Embtel 324, July 29 is inviting GT military to attend meetings Mediterranean section NAT. This might lessen danger of NAT plans becoming public knowledge and consequent adverse local effects.
Finally should be stated there has been no great local pressure for Greek membership in NAT within past few months except connection with Turk request. If Turkish move unsuccessful, Greeks could be prevailed upon not to press for admission.
This telegram cleared with JUSMAG.