762A.5/S–950: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
359. While we agree that question of rearmament of Western Germany possesses numerous ramifications, and that in approaching it [Page 193] we cannot afford to disregard the probably well-founded susceptibilities of such countries as France, we would be inclined to doubt Bevin’s assumption (intel August 7, 5 a. m.1) that per se “West German rearmament might be direct incitement to Kremlin to attack.” Neither do we believe that decision on this crucial point can be postponed until France and Belgium are strong enough to match a rearmed Germany.
It seems quite clear that we face a period of indeterminate duration in which an uneasy balance of forces might at any moment be upset by precipitate Soviet action. Europe and the NAT nations in particular form our main resource for holding in check the march of Soviet imperialism. In our opinion West Germany, with its enormous strategic and other importance, cannot be left naked and defenseless for an indefinite period without increasing the risk of having the whole country fall into the hands of the Soviets (far more dangerous for the French than the creation of a West German armed force).
Neither, on the other hand, is it desirable for us to make possible the resurgence of German militarism with all the undesirable connotations that evokes for Western Europeans.
We should think that the NAT mechanism offers the best way out of this apparent dilemma. Thus we believe it highly desirable that NAT forces in Western Germany be rapidly enlarged, the clear aim of such an increased force being to discourage or make difficult and costly, any Soviet putsch in the direction of the west. At the same time, it would seem logical for us to begin to make full and early use of West German industrial production for nonmilitary items, to which principle the French apparently are in agreement (intel August 3, 4 a. m.).1
By the same token, the establishment of a West German “police force,” would seem to offer an effective means of countering the threat of the East German para-military force not in a state of being. We would suggest that this police force be built up, in terms of size, armament and training as the exact counterpart of the Soviet-sponsored force, but that, to prevent any German endeavor to capitalize on its existence for a resurgence of traditional German militarism, it be integrated into the NAT machinery.
As for the fear that the Kremlin would react to these moves by immediate aggression (a) we have already repeatedly been charged in the Soviet press with having taken active steps to create a “black Reichswehr” and of plotting to turn Germany into a place d’armes, (b) the Soviets in any case will determine whether or not to move militarily in Europe on the basis of their estimate of military consequences and we cannot predicate our preparations on the hope that a soft answer turneth away wrath.
[Page 194]Department pass London, Paris, Frankfort. Sent Department 359. Repeated info London 89, Paris 81, Frankfort 53.