740.5/8–850: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
784. Eyes only for the Secretary and Byroade. 1. Last night Spofford, McCloy and I discussed generally substance Frankfort’s relayed cable to London from Department 640, August 4,1 and general European situation.
2. Concur completely in McCloy’s excellent analysis.
3. There are, it seems to me, three essential requirements to the creation of a European army of which German units would form an integral part instead of, as some advocate, a purely national German army. On previous occasions I have expressed the view, which McCloy also holds, that there are many dangers in the establishment of a German national army, even if the Germans desired one.
4. The three prerequisites to the organization of a genuine European army are: First, the assumption of command—of more than merely planning—by an American. Second, when available the commitment to dispose of several, possibly three or four, more American divisions in Europe. Much will depend upon the course of the battle in Korea, combined with the rate at which combat units can be organized and equipped at home, as to when this commitment can be made and discharged. Third, the despatch of several, possibly three or four more, British divisions to the Continent of Europe. This will depend upon fundamental modification of the present British assessment of the situation. The present emphasis, indeed the whole British defense program, is now related to augmenting equipment and improving its quality. Neither by implication nor express statement in my conversation with Attlee or in British publicity is there any disposition to organize what can truly be called combat units in the UK.
5. The first point, namely the assumption of command by an American, can be opposed and doubtless will be opposed on the grounds—quite aside from any opposition of purely American and US nature—that it will give the Communists an important handle to their propaganda in that it will accentuate their blaring declarations that the [Page 191] US is driving Europe toward war and has actually assumed command for this purpose. On the other hand the will to fight on the Continent which, unlike the situation in Britain where we can be confident it exists, lies largely dormant, not because the great majority of the French people and of the German people and of the Belgians and the Dutch prefer communism, but because they doubt that the Soviet hordes can be resisted. Their view is that there is practically no chance of their being successful in war. Since most of the people of western Europe intensely dislike communism and all its works but give no evidence of possessing a vigorous will to fight because of their conviction that they have no chance of winning in a fight, the problem is how to encourage the rebirth of a determined will to fight.
Except for the relatively rare individual, among most people the will to resist is related to their calculations of their chances of success. As the chances of success rise, the will to fight rises. As the chances of success fall, the will to fight falls. Therefore, if there is to be a will to fight in Europe we must convince them that the chances of success are reasonably good.
The assumption by an American of command would achieve several things including:
First, it would be outward and convincing evidence of our commitment to Europe, for he who assumes command of an army and the country whose representative wears the toga, is as responsible for defeat as for victory. This responsibility implies determination to win and therefore places heavier weight upon America for the defense of Europe. Accordingly, on this score assumption of command by an American would, I believe, be spur to the will to fight in France, in Belguim, in Holland, and in Germany, in fact throughout western Europe.
Secondly, an American commander would increase our ability to persuade, if not to do more than persuade, the European countries, including Britain and France, to correct some of the fundamental defects in their present systems. It would be not unrelated to such reorganization of effective military manpower, in the UK as to place Britain in a position where she could commit several more divisions to the continent. This too, would have an invigorating effect upon the Continental will to fight. The difference between two divisions in combat readiness, which is now substantially the state of the defense of western Europe, and ten or more divisions, is very great indeed on the ordinary Continental persons calculation of his chance to win.
Thirdly, the assumption of command by an American with truly European staff, etc., is in fact, I believe, necessary to the establishment of a genuinely European army, of which German units could, when this army is taking definite form and being, become an integral part.
6. The commitment by the US and UK—the second and third prerequisites—to station more divisions in Europe would obviously increase the chances of successfully resisting Soviet attack. These three [Page 192] measures: namely, assumption of command by an American, the commitment to place more American divisions on the Continent, the deployment of more British divisions on the Continent, altogether would, I believe, have profound influence on the Continental determination to fight.
7. There is another problem in conection with the organization of a genuinely European army. Shall it be under NAT, under WU or under some new organization, or as result of arrangements between NAT and WU?
There are already a great many organizations, too many, it seems to me. Looking at the problem through the eyes of a civilian, if there should be another general war, Europe will be the principal battleground for the ground forces, etc. The WU countries are the principal suppliers of infantry and armored divisions, etc., etc., at least during initial stages. McCloy says the Germans are not infatuated with NAT since, being in part middle European, they are disposed to look upon their association with it as an effort on our part to persuade them to fight for Canada, just as the French, in the absence of commitments of US and British ground forces, are reluctant to be the mercenaries for the rest of the Atlantic community. If this analysis be reasonably correct a relationship between WU and NAT, which would give the US an official status and which would obviate German distaste for NAT, might be the best answer. Whatever the answer may be, the problem exists.
8. There are, of course, the problems of production and procurement which are also of very great importance. This cable is hot directed to that particular aspect of the question.
9. If the Western World is to build up its defences and its will to fight is to resurge, I believe that something on the order of the four steps to which reference is made in this cable is essential and I believe that speed is important. If we want action by others in Europe we must ourselves take action in Europe and it must not be too little.
These views I have expressed [to] Spofford over the course of the last week or more. He will be able to elaborate on them upon his arrival.
Sent Department 784, repeated info Paris eyes only for Bruce 209, Frankfort eyes only for McCloy 123.