740.5/8–050: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Paris, August 9,
1950—8 p. m.
741. Department distribution as directed by Secretary’s Office. Bohlen and I saw McCloy and Bowie yesterday. We discussed Frankfort’s 962, August 3, as well as Department’s reply 949 to Frankfort August 4.1 This morning Douglas’ 784 to Department was received.
- 1.
- In general I agree with the basic and cogent reasoning in McCloy’s and Douglas’ telegrams. Viewing the matter from France, and remembering that this country is the key to continental defense, I would suggest a certain change in emphasis as contrasted with their recommendations of what should be done.
- 2.
- I believe that the most essential point at the present time (assuming a determination has already been made of the size and composition of forces required to defend Western Europe) is a commitment by US as well as by the UK (and if possible also by Canada) to increase considerably our combat troops on the continent by reenforcing those which the US and UK already have in Germany, I realize that such troops are not presently available but an immediate announcement of such an intention amounting to a commitment, would evoke a great feeling of confidence everywhere in Europe.
- 3.
- Once this is done, the matter of command should logically and quickly be settled. Personally, I believe that there should be a top commander for a NAT, as distinguished from a European, army. I do not think, however, that such a commander should be appointed until we have made a commitment to place at least five divisions of combat troops on the continent and have an engagement from the British regarding this troop contribution satisfactory to us. This supreme Commander should be an American. There would be many objections, which I need not point out here, to the naming of an American to exercise merely a regional authority, even though that regional authority was by far the most important one in the NAT framework. The question of regional command should be settled only after a supreme NAT command has been established.
- 4.
- I completely concur in the undesirability of constituting a German national army. Any plan for the utilization in a strictly military [Page 195] sense of German manpower, including any open move for incorporation of Germans into a European army, should be postponed until the subjects discussed in paragraphs two and three are settled.
- 5.
- I think we have tended to become confused on the question of the will to fight of the French and other continental nations. The important issue now is: Are they ready to make the sacrifices necessary to build up forces that would be capable of putting up an effective fight against an aggressor, and then will they have the spirit to use such forces effectively. This depends in turn upon the quality and amount of equipment required and the evolution and financing of a procurement program, the latter of which I shall deal with in a later telegram. It remains, however, evident that the so-called will to fight in every nation, no matter how brave many individuals may be is meaningless from a military standpoint unless they have at least a sporting chance of success.
- 6.
- In considering the complicated question of European rearmament and
American assistance we should recognize clearly that while our
objective is to build up as rapidly as possible the requisite
military strength in Western Europe to deter or repel aggression, in
the best of circumstances and whatever procedure is adopted, this
will not come into being for several years. Therefore in its early
phase, it is in large measure a political question whose immediate
purpose is to instill confidence in Europeans of its eventual
success in order to steady the European political scene and insure
and maintain common front of free nations against Soviet pressure
and threats. We should therefore not solely keep our eye on eventual
goal, but analyze every US decision or recommendation in the light
of its political effect in the immediate future when the process of
rearmament will not have progressed to the point where physical
military security will be a reality. It is with this consideration
in mind, from the point of view of France, that the following
actions which the United States can take at the present time are
suggested:
- a.
- A strategic plan endorsed by all the participating nations;
- b.
- A commitment of US, UK and possibly Canadian troops;
- c.
- An overall command (that is, a commander-in-chief and a high level staff organization) are the first problems to be solved. Afterwards, and as quickly as possible, there must be an allocation of forces sufficient to the task in prospect. It is at this point that the German armed contribution should be reviewed.
Sent Department 741, repeated info London 215 eyes only for Douglas, Frankfort 102 eyes only for McCloy.
Bruce