123: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:30 p.m.]
2097. In course of 2 hour and half conversation with Foreign Minister yesterday morning I presented nine notes:
- 1.
- Requesting entry of U.S. experts into two German banks in liquidation.
- 2.
- Inquiring re Safehaven developments.
- 3.
- Inquiring whether the Argentine would turn over some 39 German spies;
- 4.
- Requesting detention of Ludwig Freude.19
- 5.
- Inviting the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ attention to the non-closure of Die Zeitung.
- 6.
- Requesting any information the Argentine authorities might have re clandestine entry of Nazis into Argentina, particularly on the U–530 and U–977.
- 7.
- Suggesting that censors no longer require that international telephone conversations be held in Spanish and that Spanish translations of cables be filed.
- 8.
- Reiterating Embassy’s willingness to negotiate re disagreements in connection with moving picture matters.
- 9.
- Referring to a special flight to transport penicillin to which no reply has been received.
I particularly emphasized the importance of notes re Freude and German spies.
Minister for Foreign Affairs was effusive in promises re all points raised. It remains to be seen how much he may be able to accomplish.
Minister for Foreign Affairs spontaneously stated he had already ordered removal of new offensive posters and confiscation of paper attacking me as well as arrest of Blanca Luz Brum who published them.
Cooke declared he had entered Cabinet on specific condition that there would be free and honest elections no later than first Sunday of April 1946 and that if at any time he felt this promise was not going to be fulfilled he would forthwith resign. He reiterated ardent desire for friendliest relations with U.S. which he hoped to implement thru compliance with all obligations assumed at Mexico City in respect of: (1) control of Nazis; and (2) establishment of genuine democracy in this country and requested my “frank” views in both particulars. I replied that he was entirely accurate in his analysis that both were vital. I said first was relatively clear cut situation which could be remedied by taking necessary concrete measures; while as for second, that likewise would be simple since all that had to be accomplished was for country to return to constitutional representative democracy [Page 410] and that could be readily and quickly done. However, it was made far more difficult by all of the intangibles. For instance, every political party and every class of society and calling in Argentina had made characterizations of present Govt. and those views were shared by American public opinion. In other words, so long as great majority of Argentine people did not have confidence in their own Govt. it would be difficult to create confidence amongst American people necessary to bring about cordial relations. Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agreed and expressed hope that since Perón, in order to become a candidate with any chance of success, would have to go to Radical Party Convention, he could be defeated in that gathering.
Most interesting was his flat statement that Navy as well as Army was completely Nazi, the latter, moreover, having been completely surrounded by German Nazis and that if Germany had won war it would have required only a telephone call for Nazis to have taken over entire country (sic). He also said when taking office he had received carte blanche to liquidate Axis influences and activities.
I emphasized to Minister for Foreign Affairs before leaving that it would be very helpful if he were able to take specific measures before I departed with regard to some of the matters I had referred to him. He replied I would go to Washington with concrete accomplishment in all these matters.
It is my conviction in connection with latest developments that fundamental point to remember is that Perón (with his clique) is Fascist-minded dictator who will not change his spots even though he may shift tactics. Cooke is probably anxious, if only for selfish ends, to take specific measures needed to meet charges of noncompliance. I therefore intend to press most vigorously in every sector for extirpation of Nazi activities and influence. Basically this will either secure action we wish taken against Nazi or will demonstrate that Argentines were insincere in signing final act Mexico City. It will also either drive Perón into democratic corner, where he will probably fall of his own weight or will further unmask his philosophy which should equally weaken him. Paradoxically fall of Cooke, a friendly Foreign Minister, because of failure to comply with Mexico City resolutions would probably help rather than hurt democratization of country.
Foregoing is motive for my statement reported in separate in clear telegram.20