800.24591/8–1145: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran ( Murray ) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 11—7:04 a.m.]
612. Mytel 594, August 8 and Deptstel 418, August 9. General Booth remains firmly opposed to American participation in Mixed Evacuation Commission at this juncture. He fears British and Soviets might try to use such body to alter schedule already in effect for withdrawal American forces. In particular he fears effort would be made to eliminate ATC (Air Transport Command) detachment at Tehran whose retention here he considers essential for communications with USSR at least so long as Jap war lasts. (I agree with this view since British and Russians would doubtless be glad to have field clear for BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation) and Intourist Air Services.) Booth further points out main British interest is probably to use us as buffer or cat’s-paw with Russians. It is, however, my [Page 393] understanding he would be prepared to join hi consultation with Allies after they have prepared their own general schedules.
Although I do not think Booth’s arguments are necessarily conclusive I do recognize their validity and am inclined to reiterate original recommendation that our participation should be limited to role of observers. It could be explained to Soviets and British that our own evacuation is already scheduled and in full swing and will be carried out as fast as practicable. We would naturally exchange full information with our Allies on progress.
In any case it is obvious PGC (Persian Gulf Command) will refuse even to act in capacity of observer unless instructed by War. If Department wishes Embassy to participate I suggest Department consult with War and make sure appropriate orders are sent direct to PGC since Embassy participation without PGC would be worse than useless.
Foregoing is based on assumption Jap war continues. British Ambassador seems to feel that immediate Jap surrender would solve evacuation problem and perhaps make Mixed Commission unnecessary.