Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Near East and Africa, Volume VIII

891.00/8–2345

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] August 23, 1945.

United States Policy Toward Iran

I. The Background

Historically, relations between the United States and Iran were of minor importance, both from the American and the Iranian viewpoints, until 1941. During the entire course of Iran’s modern history, its foreign relations have been influenced principally by Russia and Great Britain, which have been engaged in a continuous struggle for political and economic ascendancy in Iran. The steady increase in Germany’s interest in Iran, beginning in the 1920’s, introduced a complicating factor into Iranian foreign affairs. The extension of German influence, and the failure of Reza Shah Pahlevi to reply satisfactorily to repeated Anglo-Soviet demands for the expulsion of German fifth-columnists, finally resulted in a coordinated invasion of Iran by Russian and British forces in August 1941.

A. Effects of Allied occupation of Iran. Iran’s occupation by British and Russian troops, subsequently augmented by United States Army service forces, had far-reaching economic and political consequences. The authoritarian government of Reza Shah Pahlevi was replaced, under his young son, by a weak, constitutional regime for which Iran was ill prepared by tradition or experience. Iran’s internal security forces collapsed, semi-autonomous conditions prevailed in the provinces, tribal security deteriorated, the administrative machinery of the government was disrupted, the morale of the population was badly shaken, foreign and domestic commerce were drastically curtailed, and an inflationary trend began.

Faced with this critical internal situation, the Iranians turned for advice and assistance to the United States, which had maintained a traditional policy of disinterested friendship toward Iran. This period, beginning in the autumn of 1941, marks the turning point in Irano-American relations, and the beginning of a trend toward ever deeper American interest in Iran.

B. American advisory assistance.⁷⁷ The American response to Iran’s need was sympathetic. Since 1942, the principal expression of the closer relations prevailing between the two countries has been the provision of American advisers in various fields of governmental activity, upon specific Iranian request. The largest of these advisory groups is the economic and financial mission, charged with supervision of finance, internal revenue, customs, price control and stabilization, rationing, collection and distribution of food and commodities, public domains, et cetera. A military mission is charged with the reorganization of the Iranian Army’s services of supply. A second military mission has for its task the reorganization and administration of the Iranian gendarmerie (rural police). Other Americans serve or have recently served as advisers in public health, pharmacy, municipal police administration, and irrigation.

C. American economic and military assistance. In addition to the adviser program, assistance has been extended to Iran in the form of goods essential to the maintenance of the economy and internal security of the country. Civilian goods, such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, motor transport, and tires, have been furnished through the machinery of the Middle East Supply Centre. Military goods in some volume have been supplied under Lend-Lease, as a result of recommendations from the American military missions.

This policy of assistance to Iran, from the American point of view, had for its immediate objective the desire to respond sympathetically to the appeals of a friendly nation. Its long-range objectives, however, were to contribute to the reconstruction of Iran as a sound member of the international body politic, and thereby to remove a future threat to Allied solidarity and international security.

D. Declaration on Iran. American interest in Iran was publicly acknowledged by our participation in the Declaration on Iran, signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt in conjunction with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This declaration acknowledged Iran’s contribution to the common war effort, recognized the special economic problems created for Iran by the war, pledged Iran such economic assistance as might be possible within the limits imposed by the war, promised consideration of Iran’s economic problems in the postwar period, and expressed the desire for the maintenance of Iran’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

II. Current Status of American Policy

The basic objectives of the American policy of assistance to Iran still obtain.

A. Current status of advisory program. Therefore the Department is continuing to extend its political and moral support to the two military missions and is endeavoring to find means of making available to the Iranian Government the supplies and equipment necessary to the implementation of the missions’ tasks. At the same time we are pressing the Iranian Government to give to the missions more effective administrative and legislative support, in the interests of internal security.

With respect to the Financial Mission, the Department is aware that its economic benefit is steadily diminishing, and that the present weak Iranian Government is unable and perhaps unwilling to afford it the support and authority necessary to the accomplishment of its objectives. The Department, therefore, is currently giving consideration to the withdrawal of the mission, provided this can be accomplished without contributing to the political and economic instability of Iran. It should be emphasized, however, that the Financial Mission is not an official United States Government mission, each of the American advisers having been employed individually by the Iranian Government. The Department’s role in regard to this mission has been to advise both the members and the Iranian Government when appropriate.

B. Economic assistance to Iran. In the meantime, other forms of economic assistance are being provided. With the termination of the mission of the Persian Gulf Command for supply to Russia, large quantities of American installations and equipment are being or will soon be declared surplus.⁷⁸ In conjunction with the surplus disposal authorities, the Department is undertaking to make available for purchase by the Iranian Government such equipment and installations as may be necessary to facilitate restoration of Iran’s economy and to augment the capacity of the Trans-Iranian Railway in a manner consistent with Iran’s expanded postwar needs. In this connection, the Department is requesting other American Government agencies, which have priority rights to such surpluses, to re-examine their needs with a view to waiving their claims to specified surpluses in favor of the Government of Iran. Moreover, the Department is undertaking interdepartmental discussions directed towards insuring the operational stability of the Iranian railroad system, by endeavoring to obtain for the Iranian Government remuneration for the services which it extended to the Allies in transporting supplies to Russia.

C. Attitude toward evacuation of Iran. Political assistance is being rendered with respect to the Iranian Government’s request for evacuation of foreign troops. The Department’s attitude towards this request has been sympathetic, since the withdrawal of foreign forces is regarded as an essential preliminary to the restoration of Iran’s administrative stability and economy. Accordingly the Department has indicated to the British and Soviet Governments its attitude of sympathy towards the Iranian request, and, through consultation with the War Department, has endeavored to expedite the departure of American forces. These efforts have been furthered in the Potsdam commitment calling for evacuation of Tehran, and the Department has recommended American participation on the Mixed Evacuation Commission in Tehran, which is designed to implement that commitment. It is hoped that the Council of Foreign Ministers will be able to expedite the complete evacuation of foreign troops from Iran.

D. Attitude toward Allied censorship in Iran. The Department has endeavored on a number of occasions to effect the relaxation or abolition of Anglo-Soviet political censorship controls in Iran,⁷⁹ which also constitute a limitation on Iran’s sovereignty. These controls, chiefly exercised by the Russian authorities, prevent the dissemination of unbiased news to and from Iran. In accordance with its general interest in free access to news and its desire to assist Iran in recovering its independence, the Department will continue to urge the Soviet and British Governments to effect the immediate abolition of all censorship controls in Iran.

E. Results of American aid policy. This policy of political and economic assistance to Iran has had beneficial results. During the war, the provision of economic advice and essential commodities contributed to the tranquilization of the country and thereby helped to insure the uninterrupted flow of supplies to Russia. The efforts of the military missions in some measure restored the organizational stability and the morale of Iran’s internal security forces. The presence of American missions to the Iranian Government, as an expression of the United States’ interest in preserving the latter as an entity, had a stabilizing effect upon the population and perhaps served as a moderating influence upon the British and Russians.

F. American commercial, aviation, and petroleum interests. American national interests in Iran are not being disregarded.

It is desired that American trade with Iran be restored and expanded as rapidly as possible. In this connection, the Department is endeavoring to indicate to the Iranian Government the desirability of relaxing its monopolistic controls, which extend to foreign trade, raw materials, the major part of Iranian industry, and foreign exchange. American business interests are already reopening trade channels with Iran, and have expressed interest in participating in development projects. At present American interests are bidding on a large municipal power project in Tehran, and it is probable that American companies will endeavor to construct certain irrigation projects for the Iranian Government.

The Department, in accordance with its policy of assisting in the development of commercial aviation, is pressing the Iranian Government to sign the Chicago aviation agreements⁸⁰ and the proposed bilateral agreement.⁸¹ Because of the present weakness of the Iranian Government, it is doubtful whether it will undertake to sign the agreements in the near future. However, the Iranian Government has given informal assurances that it will extend to American commercial aviation temporary landing and traffic rights in Iran, regardless of whether the Iranian Government signs the air transport agreement in the immediate future. From the Iranian point of view, the recently formed Iranian Airways Company has indicated its desire to obtain American equipment and operating personnel, and the Department is endeavoring to assist the company in this respect.

With regard to the possibility of assisting in the development of American petroleum reserves outside the Western Hemisphere, the attitude of the Iranian Government towards the granting of further oil concessions to any foreign interest is somewhat uncertain, since the Soviet Government has made it clear that it desires to acquire petroleum concessions if they are granted to any other foreign power. However, the Iranian Government has given the Department assurances that, in the event that it decides in the future to reopen negotiations for concessions in Iran, American applications will be given consideration.⁸²

III. Future Policy

A. Deterioration of Iran’s internal and international position. In the course of the past year, certain modifications in Iran’s internal and international position have occurred, which directly or indirectly affect the application of American policy to Iran. Of these modifications, the most important is the intensification of the traditional Anglo-Soviet conflict for supremacy in Iran, which had been subordinated temporarily to a policy of outward cooperation in the interests of military expediency. Apart from the obvious effects of this conflict upon Anglo-Soviet relations and upon Allied solidarity, it is reflected in Iranian internal affairs in the form of a steadily widening politico-social schism between leftist and conservative forces, which makes impossible the maintenance of governmental stability and administrative continuity in Iran. With the progressive weakening of the Iranian Government, a political vacuum is being created in which continued foreign interference is inevitable. Because of the weakening of the Iranian Government, moreover, the American advisers’ tasks of strengthening and stabilizing the Government have been rendered difficult through lack of adequate support and authority.

With the termination of supply to Russia through the Iranian corridor, the Government is also faced with critical economic problems with which it is unable to cope, such as resettlement of labor, reconversion of industry, transition from an inflated to a rapidly deflating economy, and the general problems arising out of the relaxation of war-time economic controls.

The disturbing developments which are taking place in Iran make it increasingly clear that Iran threatens to become one of the major security problems of the future, and one of the great threats to Allied solidarity, unless there can be achieved both the reconciliation of British and Soviet interests and the stabilization of Iran’s internal affairs. The formulation of American policy towards Iran, therefore, will be governed in the future, as at present, primarily by the requirements of international security.

It would appear, however, that the present means of implementing American policy require re-examination.

B. American policy toward Iran as an international problem. Although the Department has for some time been considering the possibility of reorganizing the American advisory program on an inter-governmental basis through an amendment of Public Law No. 63,⁸³ the advisability of attempting to continue a unilateral American aid program on a long-range basis is now open to question. The ideal solution would be the formation of a tripartite advisory commission, on which the two great powers which have enduring interests in Iran would also share the responsibility for and participate in the stabilization of Iran and its reconstitution as a strong nation. While the Department is fully aware of the obstacles which stand in the way of the achievement of this goal, it will continue to take the initiative in seeking to attain this objective, and in seeking to impress upon the British and Soviet Governments the multilateral character of the obligation towards Iran.

C. American policy toward Iran’s internal problems. As a corollary, this Government will also attempt to encourage the Iranian Government to assume the responsibilities and functions of a sovereign state, and to establish a legitimate and strong government which will be representative of the population and effectively responsive to its needs. It will also urge the Iranian Government to reconcile the political and separatist differences which now threaten to produce a fragmentation of Iran.

D. Implementation of American policy. In pursuit of these objectives, consideration should be given to the initiation of conversations in the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Iran’s economic problems in the postwar period. Should such conversations give promise of effecting any real cooperation for the betterment of Iran, the Department would consider the advisability of offering to replace its unilateral advisory program by an Anglo-Soviet-American program or a broader United Nations program dedicated to the reconstruction of Iran. This would constitute an effective implementation of the economic guarantees of the Declaration of Tehran.

In implementation of the Tehran Declaration’s guarantees of Iranian sovereignty and independence, the Department will continue to press for the rapid abolition of Allied censorship controls, evacuation of all foreign forces from Iran, and restoration to Iran of those communications facilities which still remain under Allied control. Once these are restored, it will endeavor to assist Iran in the maintenance of their operational stability, so as to prevent any power from having a pretext for assuming their operation or control. From a broader point of view, moreover, it will make every effort to prevent the development of any situation which might constitute a limitation on Iranian sovereignty, such as the situation implicit in the Russian desire for access to the Persian Gulf, or any attempt by a third power to exploit the internal difficulties of Iran for its own expansionist purposes or in pursuit of a policy of regionalism.

[In telegram 649, August 24, 1945, 2 p.m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that on August 14 Iranian gendarmes overpowered a party of five Kurds and seized various papers including a map of a proposed independent Kurdistan embracing parts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. He also stated that the “Iranians are firmly convinced whole program is Soviet inspired and directed and they take very serious view of matter.” (891.00/8–2445)

In several telegrams beginning August 19, 1945, the Ambassador reported desertion of 37 Iranian army officers and enlisted men from the garrison at Meshed and their interception by Iranian gendarmerie, with several of the deserters being killed or captured, at Gunbad in the Soviet zone. Soviet authorities thereupon informed the Iranian commander at Meshed that no activity by his forces would be permitted inside or outside Meshed, and prevented two Iranian army planes from landing at Meshed. They also refused to permit reinforcement of gendarmes at Gunbad, forbade the gendarmes there to use their arms under any circumstances, and forbade the gendarmes at Sari to move about. In telegram 670, August 30, 1945, 10 a.m., the Ambassador reported:

“General situation in Iran is tense with Iranian authorities obviously highly nervous. They apparently fear serious outbreaks of rioting, if not worse, under Soviet inspiration and are greatly disturbed by Russian attitude.… MinFonAff yesterday sent FonOff official to see me to express Govt’s grave concern. He said in addition to incidents already reported Govt was disturbed by refusal of Soviets to permit dispatch 100 gendarmes to Shahsavar, where trouble threatens between farmers and town workers.

FonOff says it has been trying for 3 days to discuss matters with Soviet Embassy, but Ambassador Maximov is away and Chargé d’Affaires⁸⁴ apparently deliberately evades invitation to call at Fon-Off.… Sepahbodi says Russian obstruction nullifies Iran Govt’s efforts to maintain security.” (891.00/8–3045)

In telegram 679, September 1, 1945, 10 a.m., the Ambassador stated that “200 gendarmes were despatched from Tehran for Shahi on August 20, but were stopped at Firuzkuh by Russians and ordered to return Tehran. Force is now encamped between Tehran and Firuzkuh while Iranian authorities are trying, so far unsuccessfully, to negotiate clearance from Soviet Embassy here.” (891.00/9–145)]

77. See documentation on the Millspaugh, Ridley, and Schwarzkopf Missions, pp. 526–538.
78. For documentation on the disposition of American fixed installations and other surplus property in Iran, see pp. 566 ff.
79. For information on the termination of Anglo-Soviet censorship in Iran, see bracketed, note, p. 583.
80. The International Civil Aviation Conference met at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944. A General Air Convention, an Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, an International Air Services Transit Agreement and an International Air Transport Agreement were opened for signature on December 7, 1944. For text of the Convention, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1591, or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1180; for texts of the Agreements, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 469, 487, and 488, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1516, 1693, and 1701.
81. For information on this subject, see bracketed note, p. 584.
82. For documentation on advice by the Department of State that oil companies postpone the sending of representatives to Iran to discuss concessions, see pp. 581 ff.
83. Approved May 3, 1939, 53 Stat. 652.
84. Akhad Alekper-ogly Yakubov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Iran.