[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)
secret
Washington, September 9,
1944.
Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our
objective is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment
of Germany or a harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to
devise protection against recurrence by Germany of her attempts
to dominate the world. We differ as to method. The fundamental
remedy of Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry of
Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed
only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact
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of the matter is that the Ruhr and the
adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his
program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are
proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is
“the total destruction of the whole
German armament industry and the removal or destruction
of other key industries which are basic to military
strength.”
In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he
says:
“This area should not only be stripped
of all presently existing industries but so weakened and
controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future
become an industrial area—all industrial plants and
equipment not destroyed by military action shall either
be completely dismantled or removed from the area or
completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed
from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly
wrecked.”4
I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given
in my memorandum dated September 55 which is already before the President.
I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be
elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources
constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of
Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction
and from want of production, the concept of the total
obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My
insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available
for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly
Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the
trusteeship of its products—I am not prepared at the moment to
discuss details of method—constitutes a treatment of the problem
in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue
that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth
within proper channels is to destroy any hope for the future of
the world. I believe that the education furnished us by the
Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of interest which
such a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that
we can be trusted to deal with the problem. The unnatural
destruction of this industry would, on the other hand, be so
certain, in my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans
that we would create friends both in this country and abroad for
the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the world are
thoroughly antipathetic to them.
The other fundamental point upon which I feel we differ is the
matter of the trial and punishment of those Germans who are
responsible for crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed
by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to
death by the
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military
without provision for any trial and upon mere identification
after apprehension. The method of dealing with these and other
criminals requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure.
Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least the
rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Eights, namely, notification
to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within
reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not
mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce
any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in
a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization,
will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it
will afford the most effective way of making a record of the
Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to
terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.
I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi
officials, we should participate in an international tribunal
constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences
against the laws of the Rules of War in that they have committed
wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the
prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been
upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of
judicial action against the Nazis.
Even though these offences have not been committed against our
troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our
share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have
committed crimes in subjugated territory should be returned in
accordance with the Moscow Declaration6 to those territories for trial by national
military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under
the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any
means whereby military com missions may try and convict those
responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before
and during the war which have no relation to the conduct of the
war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a
violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in
which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would
be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any
foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who
were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.
The above are the two main points with which I differ from the
proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Partition
I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the
matter substantial consideration I have, as yet, come to no
conclusion
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as to
wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively
with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with
the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on
this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous
effort toward separation of the country into two or more
groups.
Amputation
I understand that there is some general recognition of the
probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of
Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but
that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the
Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing
with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland
and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of
the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though
my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the
burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more
territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire
practically intact, with a reduced population and already
possessing a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy-Briey area.
To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and
German-bred people would create another problem in the balance
of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in
the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the
Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect
be an international barrier between France and Germany.
There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the
personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary
of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting
irritations of no fundamental value and, indeed, of considerable
danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which
I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at
least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary
responsibility for the administration of the occupation.
As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which
is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be
recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the
memorandum submitted by the Secretary of State at the meeting of
the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a
modification of subparagraph 2 (h) of
that memorandum and certain other additions on which I hope we
can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.
[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)
secret
[Washington,] September 9,
1944.
Suggested Changes in Cabinet
Committee Recommendations as Stated in Paper September
4, 1944
To paragraph 2 (a) should
be added the following:
“At least for an indefinite period Germany shall be
denied the means or power to manufacture or design
aeroplanes or gliders of any sort whether military,
commercial or private, and Germany shall have no license
to operate any airlines. During this period no schools
or courses for the study of air flight in any form shall
be permitted.
“All machines, plants and other instruments which are peculiarly adapted to the
manufacture of arms and lethal weapons of any sort shall
be dismantled or destroyed.”
Paragraph 2 (b) should be
rewritten to read as follows:
“Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and
associated organizations should be effected immediately
and all members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called security or
political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activity
they may have operated, substantially if not all members
of the S.S.
organizations, and others who are suspected of having
taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration
of war crimes, should be apprehended and held for
further disposition. Prompt and summary trials shall be
held of those charged with such crimes and punishment
should be swift and severe.
“Studies should be instituted at once to determine the
procedures to be followed in such trials, and they
should be cleared with the British, Russians, and French
as quickly as possible, so that they can be communicated
to the appropriate occupying authorities without
delay.
“All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of
race, color, creed, political activity or opinion,
should be annulled.”
To paragraph (e) should
be added the following:
“The territories of Germany which are to be ceded to
other countries are understood to be all or most of East
Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the
Rhineland and the Saar is closely connected with the
treatment of the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view
of the United States that a strong control over the
products of this area must be maintained by means of
some form of international trusteeship of its products
and resources. It should not be obliterated as an
industrial productive center, but it must be actively
managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely
taken from German domination.
“On the other hand no efforts shall be made to rebuild
any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission
is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations
authority.”
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Substitute for paragraph (h) the following:
“The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1)
the permanent elimination of German economic domination
in Europe and (2) the conversion of German economic
capacity in such manner that it will be so dependent
upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own
devices reconvert to war production.”
