Editorial note

It was not Roosevelt’s practice to make a record of his private conversations with Churchill or to have minutes prepared by subordinates who were present on some of these occasions. There are therefore no American minutes or memoranda of conversation pertaining to most of the Roosevelt–Churchill meetings during the Second Quebec Conference. It is known, however, that at various times during the Conference the two Heads of Government discussed the following subjects in addition to those noted later in this volume with reference to specific meetings:

1.

Tripartite meeting. For correspondence before the Second Quebec Conference with respect to arranging a Roosevelt–Churchill–Stalin meeting, see ante, pp. 10–12; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 3–5. Woodward, p. 307, states: “During the Quebec Conference the Prime Minister and the President had been considering another meeting of heads of governments but the President could not leave the United States until after the election.” It may have been at Quebec that Roosevelt suggested The Hague as a possible site for a tripartite meeting. See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 215; Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. I, p. 257. The meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin eventually took place at Yalta in February 1945.

2.

Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France. For the minute on this subject which Roosevelt and Churchill initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see post, p. 469. Eden, p. 553, prints the following diary entry with respect to one of the Roosevelt–Churchill meetings on that date: “Incidentally I also tried today to get President and P.M. to recognise French as Provisional Government. A pretty hopeless discussion, each going off in turn on a tirade against de Gaulle. W[inston] did however go so far as to say that he would rather have a de Gaulle France than a Communist France, a distinct advance!”

3.

Lend-lease for France. For the recommendations on this subject which Hull and Hopkins sent to Roosevelt at Quebec, see post, pp. 419, 420. For Roosevelt’s decision at Quebec to postpone action on the matter, see post, p. 423. According to the account of the Quebec Conference which Morgenthau later gave to Hull and Stimson on September 20, 1944, Churchill was present at a discussion in Quebec of this subject. A memorandum on the September 20 meeting prepared by Harry Dexter White recorded that Morgenthau said that Churchill “was also strongly opposed to giving lend-lease aid to the French.” [Page 296] (See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 139.) A memorandum on the same meeting prepared by Assistant Secretary of War McCloy recorded: “Mr. Morgenthau said it was quite apparent that Mr. Churchill was violently opposed to the United States making any Lend-Lease arrangements with France, and the President seemed to fall in with this.” (Stimson Papers)

4.

Cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research. Although no memoranda have been found of conversations held at Quebec on this subject, the following information is recorded in a memorandum of September 22, 1944, by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, concerning a meeting held at the White House that day:

“The President then started discussing the subject [atomic energy] quite generally. . . . The President was very much in favor of complete interchange with the British on this subject after the war in all phases, and apparently on a basis where it would be used jointly or not at all. He told of some of his discusions with Mr. Churchill at Quebec along these lines. . . . The President’s own statements in regard to post-war collaboration with Britain on the subject were very general indeed, but went very far. He pointed out his belief of the necessity for maintaining the British Empire strong, and went into some of the methods by which this could be brought about, which are not pertinent to this subject. As usual there were a number of other non-pertinent matters such as statements in regard to the discussions at Quebec.” (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 185)

In a memorandum of September 23, 1944, Bush stated that Lord Cherwell, who had been present at the meeting described above, “had made remarks which showed that he had been present at at least some” of the Roosevelt–Churchill conversations at Quebec on atomic energy. (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 186)

5.

Aid to the Warsaw resistance. For documentation originating at the Quebec Conference on this subject, see post, pp. 396 ff. Eden, p. 552, records that “Poles” constituted one of the subjects of discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec on September 14, 1944. According to a Polish report of an Eden–Mikołajczyk conversation held at London on September 19, 1944, “Mr. Eden said further that at Quebec both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had considered that the change in Stalin’s position on the matter of assistance to Warsaw [see ante, pp. 202, 203] was a good omen; in their opinion it was due to their own resolute stand against him on that matter.”1 (Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, p. 390) According to a Polish report of a Churchill–Mikołajczyk conversation held at London on September 29, 1944, “Churchill explained that the question of further support for Warsaw had been one of the items discussed by him with President Roosevelt at Quebec and that it had eventually been decided to do everything feasible so far as the Anglo-Saxon Powers were concerned.” (Ibid., p. 396)

6.

Draft of a joint message to Stalin regarding the Polish Government. According to a Polish report of an Eden–Mikołajczyk meeting held at London on September 19, 1944, Eden “read a draft joint telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, which was to be sent from Quebec. This telegram contained a strong appeal to Stalin not to allow a very unwelcome disparity of views and conduct between the Principal United Nations on the Polish question to arise from the recognition of and support to various governments, and also asked him to facilitate an understanding with Premier Mikołajczyk, whose government was enjoying the full support of the Anglo-Saxon governments. Mr. Eden did not know whether this text had been actually sent to Moscow, or what the final draft of this telegram was, but it was anyway couched in warm and sympathetic words for Poland. He added that, according to the provisions made at Quebec, M. Mikołajczyk should again go to Moscow, accompanied by some members of his Government, in order to come to a final agreement with the Soviet Government on his further plans, and from there go direct to liberated Warsaw, in order to set up a new government.” (Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, p. 390) According to a Polish report of a Churchill–Mikołajczyk meeting held at London on September 29, 1944, Mikołajczyk asked whether Polish problems had been discussed at Quebec, and “Churchill replied that, apart from the joint telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, laying stress on the Polish-Soviet agreement, and apart from the question of support for Warsaw, other questions had not been discussed in view of the full concurrence of views.” (Ibid., p. 398) The message to Stalin which Eden read to Mikołajczyk on September 19 was presumably a draft telegram provisionally agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on September 18 (post, p. 491), but never actually sent.

7.

Appointment of Harold Macmillan as Acting President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. For the letter of September 14, 1944, in which Churchill proposed this appointment to Roosevelt, see post, p. 417; cf. ante, p. 42. Although the fact that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on the Macmillan appointment was not announced until November 10, 1944, a telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt dated October 22 referred to the agreement reached at Quebec that Macmillan would be given this appointment. See post, p. 418, fn. 2.

8.

Disposition of Italian overseas territories. For the text of a memorandum by Hull on this subject which Roosevelt gave to Churchill at Quebec, see post, p. 408. According to a note attached to this memorandum after Churchill returned it, Roosevelt told Churchill that the latter might keep copies of the memorandum and that Roosevelt “wanted an answer from the British on it.” See post, p. 418, fn. 2.

9.

War criminals. For a minute on this subject which Roosevelt and Churchill agreed upon at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see post, p. 467. Morgenthau told a group of his colleagues in the Treasury Department on September 19 that the “question of war criminals” had come up in his hearing at Quebec, but that he had said nothing on the subject. (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

10.

Convening of an international conference on world organization in late October 1944 It appears from Morgenthau’s diary entry for September 15, 1944 (post, p. 370) and from Mackenzie King’s notes on a tripartite luncheon meeting on September 16 (see post, p. 383) that [Page 298] Roosevelt and Churchill had considered the convening of an international conference on world organization, as a sequel to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, late in October. The state of preparation for such a conference, however, was not sufficiently advanced, and it was only at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that agreement was reached to convene such a conference in April 1945. See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.

11.

Territorial settlements in central and southeastern Europe. For a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto of Austria on a conversation which he had with Roosevelt at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see post, p. 367. According to this memorandum, Roosevelt told the Archduke that the President and Churchill had noted, in working on their papers at the Quebec Conference, that Austria and Hungary “would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes”. Transylvania seems to have been discussed specifically by Roosevelt and Churchill, and also the importance of keeping the Communists out of Hungary and Austria. The discussion of these questions presumably took place in the light of the armistice with Rumania, which was signed at Moscow early on September 13, 1944, while Roosevelt and Churchill were at Quebec.

12.

British meat purchases from Argentina. For two memoranda by Hull on this subject which Roosevelt gave to Churchill at Quebec, see post, pp. 393, 394. Roosevelt’s representations to Churchill on this matter, presumably at Quebec, are also mentioned in post-Conference correspondence relating to a contract for the purchase of Argentine meat by the United Kingdom. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 362–363. Morgenthau told a group of his colleagues in the Treasury Department on September 19, 1944, that “the question of the Argentine” had come up in his hearing at Quebec, but that he had said nothing on the subject. (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

13.

Publication of the Phillips report on India. On July 25, 1944, the British Minister at Washington (Campbell) had protested the publication, in Drew Pearson’s “The Washington Merry-Go-Round” column of that date, of a large part of the text of a confidential report of May 14, 1943, from Ambassador William Phillips to Roosevelt, and the “leak” of this report had been a matter of continued discussion between United States and British officials in the period before the Second Quebec Conference. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. V, pp. 239–247. Phillips called on Roosevelt in Washington on September 30, 1944, at which time Roosevelt told him that he had taken the matter up at Quebec and considered it finished. (Memorandum, Gray to Hull, September 30, 1944, 851.00/9–3044)

14.

Indochina and the French role in Far Eastern military operations. For pre-Conference memoranda which Hull submitted to Roosevelt on these subjects, see ante, pp. 249, 261. On January 1, 1945, Roosevelt informed Hull that he still did “not want to get mixed up in any Indochina decision” or “in any military effort toward the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese”; that he had “made this very clear to Mr. Churchill”, presumably at the Quebec Conference; and that action was premature from both military and civil points of view. See Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. VI, p. 293.