Roosevelt Papers
The Secretary of
State to the President
[Washington,] September 8,
1944.
Memorandum for the
President
In line with our personal conversation about answers to questions
that Churchill might ask, I herewith attach several documents which
deal with the titles indicated. I believe they will be of some use
to you.
[Attachment]
The Secretary of
State to the President
top
secret
[
Washington,]
September 6,
1944.
1
Memorandum for the
President
As of possible assistance to you in your conversations with Mr.
Churchill, I attach memoranda concerning the following
subjects:
[Here follows a numbered list of the titles of ten Department of
State briefing papers.2]
[Annex 4]
Department of State Briefing
Paper
Germany: Partition
In discussing the partition of Germany as set forth below, it
should be made clear that these views on partition do not, of
course, exclude
[Page 121]
the
question of major and minor frontier adjustments affecting
present German territory (East Prussia, Danzig, etc.).
This Government has not to date given its representative on the
European Advisory Commission3 any
instructions relative to a possible partition of Germany.
Shortly after the European Advisory Commission was established,
a Sub-committee on Partition was set up but no reports have ever
been received and apparently no discussion on this question has
taken place in London.
It is the view of the Department of State that this Government
should oppose a forcible partition of Germany. An imposed
dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has
been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any
renewal of German aggression. However, such a measure would not
remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching
security control upon Germany for an undetermined period whether
Germany is left united or is partitioned.
Furthermore, because of the high degree of economic, political
and cultural integration in Germany which has developed over the
past 75 years, it must be anticipated that partition would not
only have to be imposed, but also maintained by force. The
victor powers, by
imposing partition, would assume a burdensome and continuing
task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the
partite states and of restraining a nationalistic determination
to reunite, which would probably be the response of the German
people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity might
menace the economic stability of Europe as a whole.
In place of partition, the Department of State would favor a
return to a federal system of government in Germany, including
the division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. In
reaction to Nazi over-centralization, the Germans might return
to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including
the breakup of Prussia which in 1938 included 62% of the area
and two-thirds of the population of Germany.
[Annex 5]
Department of State Briefing
Paper
Arming of French
Forces
On August 19, 1944 the British Embassy raised with the State
Department the question of equipping adequate armed forces of
the
[Page 122]
Western European
Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own
countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany.4
The Netherlands Government has accepted in principle that the
Dutch Army will be re-equipped with British types of arms and,
while desiring to avoid the appearance of competing with the
United States, the British apparently desire to assume the same
responsibility for rearming the Belgians, Norwegians and Danes.
They suggest that during the next few years the equipping of the
French Army should be carried out from American sources, not
only because the French land forces are at present provided with
American type equipment,5 but because it would be
very difficult for the British to accept the added burden. The
British conclude that if this Government is unwilling to accept
the proposed commitment they will have to reconsider the
situation.
Presumably the technical aspects of the question are being
studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to whom supporting
figures have been furnished by the British. The financial
ramifications will also require careful study.
Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it
is in the best interests of the United States that France resume
her traditional position as a principal power, capable of
playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining
peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land
forces would be a natural corollary of that policy, leaving for
decision the question of the source from which the arms should
be obtained and the quantity which should be provided.
It would seem advantageous to this country to have the rearming
carried out from American sources. Politically it could be
portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for
France and a proof of our desire to see France restored to a
strong position. American influence and prestige would be
enhanced. Furthermore French reliance on the United States for
arms would provide us with a lever which might enable us to
exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a
number of years. Conversely it is certain that, in their present
highly nationalistic and aggressive frame of mind, the French
will make every effort to obtain arms from one source or
another. If they obtain them from a source other than the United
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States, they may
be compelled to accept conditions of a political or other nature
which run counter to American aims.
In making the above recommendation I have not failed to give
careful consideration to the fact that British policy aims at
forming, and playing the leading role in, a group of Western
European countries, including France, and that one of the
objects of the British Government in suggesting the rearming of
France by the United States is thereby to create a link between
this country and the Western European nations which might be
useful to them in the future. This I believe is the primary and
all important reason behind the British request and it may, of
course, have important long-range strategic implications.
