740.00119 Control (Germany)/9–644
The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
Dear Doc: Here is a draft of our post-surrender directive to Eisenhower.1 It is something which the Committee, I believe, in view of what has gone before, should approve. It seems to me that this is very much in line with your paper2 which was discussed in the Secretary’s [Page 109] office yesterday. We would now be able to add, of course, a provision regarding regional movements. The directive would provide that they should not be discouraged. We are generally working on improving the language and in some cases the order of the document, but in general this is the idea. I think that if the Committee could approve it generally, without going through it with a fine tooth comb, it would leave us room in the [Combined] Civil Affairs Committee to work out the final language and the clearance with the British.
Secretary Stimson was very much disturbed this morning at the line that was taken throughout the discussion on the matter of economic repression of Germany. He felt that the last paragraph of the paper, I believe it was sub-paragraph (h),3 although objectionable in some form, could be interpreted in a way which would meet his views, but the tone of the discussion convinced him that its interpretation by those present amounted to such severe destruction of values in the case of properties and facilities and such severe limitation on the economy of the individual, that he felt he could not go along with the implications of this paragraph and has so communicated to Mr. Hull.4
I was not present at the discussion, so I do not know what happened. I don’t believe that the Secretary, from my long talk with him yesterday, however, is at all at variance with your and my thinking on the subject. I hope you will take a look at Mr. Stimson’s comments.
I have one other comment which I did not ask him to include because it was relatively minor. Somewhere in your paper there is a statement to the effect that Party members should not be permitted any political or civic activity. I think this must refer only to the leaders, because Party members who were only such in order to keep jobs will have to be permitted to carry on some civic activity, and possibly political activity if by political activity you mean employment in a government field. The provision as written would preclude any Party member from voting, practising law, or taking any part at all in any municipal or other governmental activity. I just do not believe that this is practicable and some modification of this language may be necessary in order to enable the military government to function.
- For a draft directive to the three Allied commanders-in-chief relating to the post-surrender period in Germany, prepared by the Planning Committee of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission and dated July 12, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 244–246. In the absence of action on a tripartite basis with respect to such a directive, the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, in CCS. 658, August 23, 1944 (not printed), suggested the preparation of an American-British directive to Eisenhower on the military government of Germany after Germany’s surrender. This suggestion was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and the War Department prepared a draft of such a directive. The draft printed below is not known to have been referred to at the Second Quebec Conference, but it formed part of the background of the discussion of German problems within the Cabinet Committee on Germany and between the Committee and Roosevelt. Following the Quebec Conference an amended version of this draft (dated September 22, 1944) was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as enclosure C to J.C.S. 1067, September 24, 1944, and was forwarded to Winant on September 27. For the covering instruction to Winant and for the text of the draft of September 22, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 142–154.↩
- “Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President”, September 4, 1944, ante, p. 95.↩
- See ante, p. 97.↩
- See Stimson’s memorandum for Roosevelt, September 5, 1944, ante, p. 98, which was submitted via Hull.↩
- Not filed with the ribbon copy of McCloy’s letter to Matthews, above; sup plied from Roosevelt Papers. McCloy also sent a copy of this draft to Hopkins on September 6, 1944 (Hopkins Papers), and another copy is in the Morgenthau Diary, vol. 768 (see Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. i, p. 509).↩
At the same time that this draft directive was in preparation, a draft Hand-hook of Military Government in Germany, prepared to provide guidance to military government officers on the objectives of military government, was under discussion in Washington. Morgenthau called Roosevelt’s attention to the Handbook and in a memorandum for the President dated August 25, 1944, quoted extracts which he considered particularly objectionable. Using the Morgenthau memorandum as a basis, Roosevelt instructed Stimson on August 26 to withdraw the Handbook. Roosevelt’s memorandum to Stimson stated:
“It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to death but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what they have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens. That will keep them perfectly healthy and they will remember the experience all their lives. The fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“There exists a school of thought both in London and here which would, in effect, do for Germany what this government did to its own citizens in 1933 when they were flat on their backs. I see no reason for starting a WPA, PWA, or a CCC for Germany when we go in with our Army of Occupation.
“Too many people here and in England hold to the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.”
For the text of Morgenthau’s memorandum to Roosevelt, see Morgenthau Diary (Germany), vol. i, pp. 440–442. For the full text of Roosevelt’s memorandum to Stimson, see ibid., pp. 443–445; Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 544–546.↩
- Not attached to the source text.↩
- Not attached to the source text. Concerning the drafting of the German surrender instrument, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 484 ff.↩
- There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: “How many thousand?”↩
- There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: “Are they to be put to work while in custody?”↩
- Blanks in this paragraph appear in the source text.↩
- There is a marginal manuscript notation on the source text that the following language is to be inserted in this paragraph: “and the necessity for the pro vision of civilian relief”.↩
- At this point in the source text there is the following addition, in an unidentified handwriting: “(4) to contribute to the expenses of the occupation”.↩
- A handwritten notation on the source text substitutes “You should take measures” for the first seven words of this paragraph.↩
- The last four words of this sentence have been changed by hand on the source text to read “the Nazi Govt, its officials and nationals”.↩
- The source text has been changed at this point to read “to identify, preserve and control”.↩