Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President1
1005. Winant to President Roosevelt.
The following three messages have been received from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy Moscow today, the first two this morning and third this noon. They have been forwarded to the Prime Minister and have just been given to me by Eden. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asking that he plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw.2 I understand that copies of this cable have been forwarded to General Spaatz, to the British Military Mission in Moscow and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The three messages follow in the order of their receipt.
Number 1 begins:
My immediately preceding telegram.3
In his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743.4 He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assistance [Page 201] to damaged British or American aircraft. “It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention.”
Message number 2 begins:
Your telegram No. 2855.5
Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty’s Government. (Begins):
Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5th, 1944.
The Soviet Government on September 5th received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.
The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish Émigré Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military Command, and in violation of the latter’s operational plans.
The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American, can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organizing a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.
Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both weapons and food for Warsaw insurgents but we have each time received [Page 202] information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However it is necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.
As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility “from a sick head to a clear one”. The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government’s position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish Émigré Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn?6 It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.
As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.7
Message number 3 begins:
My telegram No. 2379.8
Following for Secretary of State.
Personal.
This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and American Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.
I am in touch with United States Ambassador.
- Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then en route from Hyde Park to Quebec, as telegram No. MR–out–379.↩
- See post, p. 205.↩
- The reference is presumably to message No. 2, quoted below.↩
- Not found in United States files.↩
- No message bearing this number has been found in United States files, but it was probably the telegram containing the message of the British War Cabinet to the Soviet Government quoted in Churchill’s telegram No. 780 to Roosevelt, ante, p. 189.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 374 ff.↩
- Gromyko forwarded the Russian text of this communication to Hull on September 13, 1944 (740.0011 EW/9–1344).↩
- Presumably message No. 2, quoted above.↩